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The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze in 
detail the many aspects of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship as 
it developed from 1953 to 1970. The relationship between the 
two is extremely important because it provides insight into 
the roles of both Egypt aand the Soviet Union in both the 
history of the Middle East and in world politics. The period 
from 1953 to 1970 is key in understanding the relationship 
between the two states because it is the period of the genesis 
of the relationship and a period in which both nations went 
through marked changes in both internal policy and their 
external relations. 
Data used in this study varies widely. It includes 
material from sources as diverse as diplomatic memoirs, press 
accounts in both English and Russian, statistical collections 
of both a military and an economic nature, and chronicles of 
cultural interaction. These sources were consulted in various 
research libraries throughout the United States. 
On the basis of the available sources it is possible to 
state that Egypt and the Soviet Union developed a broad 
relationship that included integration in the military, 
economic aid and trade, diplomatic cooperation, and cultural 
exchange. Both derived important but distinct benefits from 
their friendship. This study attempts to show what those 
benefits were, how the friendship developed, and why it 
developed as it did. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE QUIET NILE 
Historically there has been relatively little contact 
between Russia and Egypt. The period following the military 
coup in Egypt in 1952 and continuing until the death of 
Gamel Abdel Nasser in 1970 is an exception to this general 
rule. This interlude was a time of comparatively feverish 
interaction between the Soviet government in Russia and the 
Arab Socialist Union government of Nasser in Egypt. Re-
lations on all levels between the two countries were tre-
mendously broadened. An intimate diplomatic relationship 
developed that bound the fortunes of the United Arab 
Republic (Egypt) and the Soviet Union tightly together. 
Economic interaction increased to such an extent that the 
total commerce between the two nations was multiplied by a 
factor of more than twenty between 1951 and 1970. Soviet 
imports from Egypt increased by almost 4500 percent during 
that same period. Exports showed a somewhat slower rate of 
increase but still rose from 21.8 million rubles in 1951 
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to 326.9 million rubles in 1970. Cultural contacts between 
the two nations also became frequent during this period. 
Interaction in the cultural sphere ranged from contact 
between the Islamic elements in Soviet Central Asia and 
the Egyptian clergy to the exchange of films and cultural 
centers. Even a cursory glimpse at the increased contact 
between the Soviet Union and Egypt shows how dramatic the 
change in relationship between the two was. The extremity 
of this change makes the relationship between the Egyptians 
and the Soviets an important target for an investigation 
into its new nature in order to try to discover the factors 
that precipitated it and to try to fathom its full extent. 
There are many plausible reasons for the Soviet Union 
to be interested in developing a closer relationship with 
Egypt. These range from Egypt's strategic importance to its 
cultural prominence - especially in the Arab world. Many of 
the factors that kindled Soviet interest in Egypt during 
this period were age old. Others developed from the growing 
conflict for power and influence between the Soviets and the 
United States that was going on at the time. 
The location of Egypt is of major import in any dis-
cussions of its influence in world affairs. Egypt is the 
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geographic center of the Arab world; to the west and south 
of Egypt are located the Arab-speaking nations of Africa: 
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, the Sudan and Tunisia; 
to the north and east are the Arab nations of Asia: Iraq, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the 
United Arab Emirates and the two Yemens. Because of its 
location at the conjunction of Asia and Africa, Egypt plays 
an important role in the affairs of two of the major seas of 
the world. Egypt has excellent ports on both its t1edi t-
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erranean and Red Sea coasts. Because of its access to two 
of the most strategically important bodies of water in the 
Middle East, Egypt necessarily must play an important role 
(either as an independent actor or as a pawn) in the affairs 
of the area that has been termed the "Crossroads of the 
World." 
Another important facet of the strategic importance of 
Egypt is its control of the mouth of the Nile, the longest 
river in the world. By controlling its mouth, Egypt domin-
ates the entire drainage basin of the Nile. This, in turn, 
allows Egypt an important voice in the affairs of the Sudan, 
Ethiopia and, at times, even Uganda. 
A third body of water that plays an important role in 
making Egypt one of the most strategically important nations 
of the world is the man-made Suez canal. The Suez canal, 
built by Egyptian labor under British and French direction 
in 1869, directly connects the Red and Mediterranean Seas. 
By providing a connection between the two, the Suez dras-
tically shortens the sea route from Asia to Europe. The 
elimination of the need for ships going in either direction 
to circumnavigate Africa makes the Canal one of the world's 
busiest shipping routes. 
Beyond its intrinsic strategic importance as the center 
of the Middle East, Egypt is strategically important because 
of its position in relation to the Soviet Union. Cairo and 
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Alexandria are located approximately 1000 miles directly to 
the south of Odessa, the Soviet Union's main Black Sea port. 
The region directly south of its borders has been of inter-
est to the governments of Russia from the days of the Tsars 
until the present. Whether this interest is a result of a 
traditional Russian obsession for a warm water port, or 
simply because of the traditional significance of the area 
in world affairs, or possibly even because of ideological 
considerations is open to question. Whatever the case, the 
Russian interest in the area is unquestionable. Egypt's 
geopolitical importance alone would be enough to interest 
any nation desirous of expanding its influence. However, 
there are other factors that have drawn Soviet interest to 
Egypt. 
"Egypt has for more than a century been the bellwether 
of Arab attitudes, the symbol of Arab values, the embodiment 
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of Arab polarities.'' It is this position of preeminence 
that makes Egypt the most culturally important of all of the 
Arab nations. This situation exists, and has existed, 
despite the fact that Egypt is without a doubt the least 
ethnically Arab of all of the Arabic-speaking nations of the 
Middle East. Egypt has gained its preeminent role in the 
Arab world not so much through its ethnic makeup as through 
its role as the pioneering leader of the Arab world. It was 
the first of the Arab nations to modernize politically, 
intellectually, and economically. Modernization is one of 
4 
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the factors that has made Egypt the key to the Arab world. 
Egypt began its march toward modernization in 1805 when 
Muhammed Ali destroyed the old Mamluk dynasty and estab-
lished his own rule. Ali established a dynasty in Egypt 
which was committed to the intellectual and economic modern-
ization of that country's institutions within an Islamic 
context and with as little Western influence on the culture 
of the country as possible. Ali began the modernization of 
Egypt with an idea: Autocracy is contrary to the Islamic 
doctrines of equality and humility. He and his successors 
promoted the communication of ideas through print. To this 
end, they founded the first major printing center in the 
Arab world in Cairo. They established a network of primary 
and secondary schools in which children were indoctrinated 
4 
in the application of pure Islamic ideals to Egyptian life. 
The intellectual climate of Egypt was further enhanced by 
sending many Egyptians to study in European colleges and 
universities, and by the opening of several foreign mission-
ary schools in Egypt itself. The renewal of intellectual 
activity helped to revive the Arabic language, and, as a 
result, Cairo gradually became the intellectual focal point 
of the nineteenth century Arab world. 
It also became the center of revolutionary economic and 
political impulses within the Turk-controlled Arab world. 
(Turkish control was nominal in most cases, including 
Egypt Is.) This was so despite the tendency of the Ali 
dynasty to brutally repress any and all ideas which came 
into sharp conflict with Islamic ideals. Ali was determined 
to maintain Islam as the central basis of all of the aspects 
of the life of Egypt and its inhabitants and any breaches of 
Islamic law or tradition were drastically punished. Despite 
its harsh measures, the Ali dynasty was unable to prevent 
the heightened intellectual activity in the country from 
producing and developing nonorthodox political and economic 
ideas and gradually merging these ideas into the cultural 
milieu of Egypt and, by extension, the entire Arab world. 
The Ali dynasty was responsible for considerable in-
creases in the material well-being of the Egyptian economy, 
as well as for stimulating increased intellectual activity. 
The Egyptian economy was revolutionized by the introduction 
of widespread cultivation of cotton for export. A modern 
system of irrigation was developed which helped to extend 
the amount of cultivatable land in the Nile valley. The 
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Suez canal was built thanks to the encouragement of foreign 
investment capital by the Alis. Railroads were laid, modern 
shipping ports built, and neophyte waterworks, sewer systems, 
electric lighting networks, and mass transit facilities were 
all introduced by the Ali dynasty and its administration. 
The military was revamped. European banking methods re-
placed the ancient methods that had theretofore been in 
common use. These achievements came about as a result of 
the Ali dynasty's desire to foster the modernization of 
5 
Egypt and its institutions. 
The modernization of Egypt's economic, political and 
intellectual life by the Ali dynasty made it the first of 
the nations of the Arab world to take such a step. It 
became more than simply an intellectual center for the Arab 
world (although the educational and intellectual role of 
such institutions as the Islamic college, Al-Azhar, were 
very important to the development of the Arab world, as was 
Cairo's role as the publishing center of the Arab-speaking 
world, and should not be downplayed), it became a role 
model, a nation to be emulated in the development of the 
Arab nations. It maintained this mystique for the other 
Arab nations despite its nominally colonial role under the 
Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century and the 
first two decades of the twentieth and its later position as 
a de facto colony of Great Britain from the 1880's until 
1952. 
It was this role as the spiritual (but not religious), 
cultural, and intellectual leader of the Arab world that, 
along with other factors, made Egypt so important in the 
eyes of the post-Stalin Soviet Union. A strong, positive 
relationship with Egypt should give the Soviet Union a 
dominant role in the politics of the entire Arab world and 
greatly enhance its position vis-a-vis the West throughout 
the world reasoned Soviet leaders. 
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A third major factor in Egypt's importance to the 
Soviet Union is its population. With over forty million 
inhabitants, Egypt has more than twice the population of any 
other Arab nation. In fact, the people of Egypt comprise 
over 25% of the entire population of the Arabic-speaking 
world. With its large population, Egypt must play a major, 
if not a dominant, role in the politics of the Middle East. 
The combination of Egypt's intrinsic strategic impor-
tance, its geographic relationship to the Soviet Union, and 
its cultural preeminence in the Arab world, make it one of 
the most important of the "developing" nations of the world 
in Soviet eyes. As a result, there is little wonder that 
when the Soviet Union became capable of extending its inter-
ests and influence throughout the world after World War II, 
one of its choices in which to attempt to insert itself was 
Egypt. It was a logical choice given the considerations 
outlined above. However, for the Soviets to be successful 
the Egyptians had to be willing to accept their overtures. 
After their successful coup in 1952 reasons began to 
develop for Egypt's revolutionary leaders to become inter-
ested in Soviet overtures. Egypt needed an alternative to 
the United States to push forward its internal and external 
plans for advancement. It needed a nation that had suffi-
cient economic resources to be able to bankroll a large 
portion of these plans as an ally. It needed a country that 
could provide it with the technical know-how to modernize. 
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It needed a country that could resist American diplomatic 
and, especially, economic pressure. Above all, what Egypt 
needed was a country that was willing to supply its needs 
without immediate returns other than Egypt's friendship. 
There were few if any nations that could meet all of 
these requirements. Most European nations were unable to 
help because they were still struggling to recover from a 
debilitating war. Even if they had been able to help, it is 
unlikely that they would have been willing to do so in 
opposition to American wishes. Britain was in the same 
predicament as most of Europe. It was rapidly divesting 
itself of its colonial empire and trying to rebuild from 
four years of intensive German bombing. However, the 
British may have been able to help the Egyptians. They did, 
in fact, offer the Egyptians aid in conjunction with an 
American offer. As later events were to prove, their 
position regarding Egypt and its role in foreign affairs was 
nearly identical to the American position, and they would 
not pursue a policy counter to American wishes regarding 
Egypt. 
Most of the rest of the nations of the world were 
unable to help. They were trying to modernize and develop 
their own resources. India, Japan, and the African nations 
all had their own crises to meet. China probably would have 
been willing to help despite its own financial needs. The 
Chinese, however, like the Egyptians, were trying to develop 
9 
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a war-ravaged nation with little industry. As a result, all 
they were capable of offering was the nebulous boon of moral 
support. They could offer nothing concrete in the way of 
financial assistance. Egypt's Arab brethren were also un-
able to help. They still had not received the tremendous 
wealth that their underground oil reserves would later bring 
them. 
The Soviet Union was just about the only place to which 
the Egyptian government, dissatisfied with American offers, 
could turn. Although it, too, had been ravaged by World War 
II, the Soviet Union had managed a relatively rapid re-
covery. The Soviets had an economy which was sufficiently 
sound to absorb the losses endemic in aiding Egypt in her 
far-reaching internal and external schemes. The Soviets 
were capable of providing the technical knowledge required 
in the modernization of Egypt. They were capable of with-
standing American pressure to the bitter end. They had been 
doing so since World War II concluded. The Soviet Union 
also met the most important requirement in aiding the 
Egyptians - it was willing to help. It was to demonstrate 
its willingness to support the Egyptians in 1955 when the 
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two nations consummated the historic Czech Arms Deal. 
The spectre of American resistance to the modernization 
of Egypt has repeatedly arisen in the foregoing pages. 
However, the Americans were not unalterably opposed to 
Egypt's development of its resources. They were quite 
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willing to aid Egypt's modernization if this aid was de-
livered on American terms and the modernization proceeded on 
an American timetable. They were not willing to aid the 
7 
Egyptians on Egyptian terms. 
In fact, the Egyptians were offered economic aid by the 
United States. However, as the following will hopefully 
demonstrate, the Egyptians could not readily accept the 
economic and political conditions that the United States 
attached to its loan. However, despite several conditions 
which were hard for the Egyptians to swallow, they did 
accept the terms. For reasons which will hopefully become 
clear as this study progresses, the United States withdrew 
its offer of aid. The Egyptians then began searching for an 
alternative source of the aid, which the Americans had 
proven unwilling to provide. 
They found that alternative in the Soviet Union and an 
offer which it had made before the Americans had tendered 
theirs. The Egyptian-Soviet rapprochement seemed to be a 
marriage made in heaven. Both sides were fulfilling their 
goals. The Egyptians were getting the financial aid that 
they needed, and on their own terms (or at least so it 
seemed at the time) . The Soviets were improving their 
global strategic position vis-a-vis the United States by 
gaining Egypt, at the very least as an ally, if not a com-
plete financial dependent. 
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As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the develop-
ments that allowed the Soviet Union to drastically upgrade 
its presence in the Middle East have their roots imbedded in 
the fabric of history. A look at the historical record of 
Russian involvement shows that this involvement has come 
along two main lines: 1) Economic intercourse; and 2) diplo-
matic/political contact. The economic intercourse between 
Russia and Egypt had been exclusively through the medium of 
traditional international commerce prior to the aforemen-
tioned Czech Arms Deal. 
Although there had been some commerce between the 
Tsarist government and Egypt before the Soviet revolution, 
commerce between the Soviet regime and Egypt did not begin 
until the early 1920's. At that time, it began to develop 
along the lines that had been drawn during the Tsarist 
period. The Egyptians supplied the Soviet Union with cotton 
and rice. In turn, the Soviets supplied them with lumber, 
wheat and various other items from the Soviet Union. The 
trade between the two was never large, however. The maximum 
flow of commercial goods between the two during their 
pre-friendship period was during the fiscal year of 1927/28 
when 146.7 million rubles (evaluated in 1950 A.D. rubles) 
worth of goods changed hands. By 1930 this commerce had 
almost completely ceased. It totally stopped by 1941 when 
World War II intervened in the trade process. During the 
years prior to World War II, Egypt nearly always had a trade 
surplus in its trade with the Soviet Union. The only ex-
ceptions to this general rule were the 1923/24 fiscal year 
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and the year of 1932. 
The reasons for the drastic decrease between the 
U.S.S.R. and Egypt at that time are unclear. It is quite 
possible that it was due to the negative reaction of Great 
Britain to the publishing of the program of action of the 
9 
Egyptian Communist Party in 1931. This probably combined 
13 
with a general worsening of internal conditions in Russia due 
to the drive for collectivization being pushed by Josef 
Stalin to put a damper on Soviet-Egyptian commerce. A look 
at the political contacts between the Soviet Union and Egypt 
prior to the Egyptian revolution is the next step which must 
be taken in understanding the nature of the relationship 
that was to develop between the Soviet Union and Egypt in 
the 1950's. 
The Egyptian Communist Party has already been men-
tioned. Although it was quite small and proscribed by the 
Egyptain government, it was developing under the tutelage of 
the Comintern. Contact between the Egyptians and the 
Comintern had been established long before the Egyptian 
program of action of the Communist Party was published. 
After the Soviet Union settled down following its own revo-
lutions in 1917, the first major political event in Russian 
foreign policy that was to have any siginif icant effect upon 
Egypt was the Conference of the Peoples of the East held in 
14 
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Baku in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaidzhan. The Baku con-
ference, as it came to be known, was an attempt by Lenin and 
the Comintern to promote revolution in the countries of Asia 
and Africa. It was aimed at both those countries that had 
recently become independent and those that were still 
European colonies. Egypt was one of the countries whose 
left-wing sent a delegate to the conference. As a matter of 
fact, the Egyptians had been closely connected with the 
conference even before it took its final form. 
The initial idea for a meeting along the lines of the 
Baku conference came from a prominent Crimean Tatar member 
of the Communist Party of the then Tsarist Empire. His idea 
was for a conference of Muslim peoples to be held in Cairo 
in 1908. He passed his idea on to Grigori Zinoviev (who was 
to become the head of the Comintern) . Zinoviev carried 
through with the idea and it resulted in the conference at 
Baku. The appeal made by Lenin and the Cominterm at Baku 
was directed toward the nascent working classes of Asia and 
Africa. It was aimed at inspiring them to join with the 
bourgeosie in their countries and to throw out their foreign 
oppressors and join with Russia in the (Marxist) march of 
history. 
The conference at Baku was a child of the Comintern. 
The Comintern was destined to become one of the, if not the, 
most important instruments of Soviet foreign policy from its 
founding following the Russian revolution of November 1917 
until its dismantlement as a concession to the Western 
11 
allies of the Soviet Union during World War II. It was 
founded in 1919 as an aid to the world socialist movement. 
From its inception until its demise, the Comintern was 
comprised mostly of Soviet citizens. It remained mostly 
15 
Russian in character and became the unofficial arm of Soviet 
foreign policy in the rest of the world. It was heavily 
involved in the creation of Communist parties throughout the 
world. It helped to devise the tactics of the various Com-
munist parties around the globe. It played a major role in 
the development of the platform of the Egyptian Communist 
Party as evidenced by the text of that party's program of 
action as published in Arabic in 1931 and Russian in 1932. 
In that program of action, the Egyptian Party declared that 
it must make an "alliance with the U.S.S.R., with the inter-
national revolutionary proletariat, and the toilers strug-
gling in the colonies" in order to promote the establishment 
12 
of "a Soviet regime'' in Egypt. This type of rhetoric was a 
standard component of Comintern influenced programs of 
13 
action throughout the Third World. 
Most of the contact between Egypt and the Soviet Union 
was on the unofficial level heretofore mentioned. There was 
little direct contact between the Soviet government and that 
of Egypt. There was some trade between the two nations, but 
that was ostensibly handled through intermediaries. Despite 
the lack of direct contact between the Soviet government and 
16 
its Egyptian counterpart, there was no lack of interest on 
the part of the Soviet Union in Egypt. They continued to 
have the same interests in the strategic and cultural impact 
on the Eastern Mediterranean basin that good relations with 
Egypt could have. They were interested in obtaining 
supplies of Egyptian cotton (which was one of the world's 
finest strains) as well. 
There was a strong deterent to the spread of Soviet 
influence at the time, however. The rise of Fascism through-
out the world drastically slowed the spread of left-wing 
ideologies and their manifestations in all of their forms. 
Fascism, despite whatever characteristics it might or might 
not have, was undeniably the most effective force in the 
1930's in halting the spread of Communism throughout Europe 
and the European colonies. It was the reaction of the 
middle classes to the growing unrest and disorder that was 
occuring in Europe at that time. This malaise was often 
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attributed to the spread of Communism. With this rise of 
Fascism in the west (especially in Germany) , and the ex-
pansionistic imperialism of Japan in the east, the Soviet 
Union became a land threatened on both frontiers. As a 
result, it resorted to a policy of gaining non-aggression 
pacts with its neighbors to protect itself from these grow-
ing threats. This type of diplomacy combined with the 
Soviets' own internal difficulties to leave little room for 
Soviet manuever in a British sphere of influence like Egypt. 
17 
Due to British perceptions of the Soviets' policies (which 
they gained from the type of propaganda the Comintern was 
spreading) and Great Britain's own long-standing interests 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, the British quite successfully 
kept the Soviet bear and its influence out of Egypt. They 
had no trouble at all in counteracting the weak and sporadic 
attempts of the Egyptian Communist Party to stir up revolu-
tion between 1931 and the Second World War. 
World War II, although it constituted a major threat to 
the existence of the Soviet Union, was fraught with oppor-
tunities for Soviet diplomacy in what had been hitherto 
unaccessible regions. The alliance between the Soviet Union 
and the Western powers, especially Great Britain, opened up 
many new vistas in which the Soviets could attempt to estab-
lish themselves as a factor. The former British colonies of 
Asia and Africa, including Egypt, now became acceptable 
nations with which the Soviets could attempt to establish 
diplomatic contacts without the opposition of the British or 
any of the other Allied powers. 
The first step in Soviet diplomatic penetration into 
Egypt came in 1943. At that time the Soviets and the Farouk 
monarchy of Egypt exchanged diplomatic personnel. The 
second step in the further exploitation in this breach of 
the diplomatic wall around the old British sphere of influ-
ence in Egypt came in 1948 when the Soviets concluded a 
barter agreement with the Egyptian government on February 
18 
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25. The last significant diplomatic contact between the 
Soviet Union and the Egyptian monarchy came in March of 1952 
on the eve of the Egyptian revolution. At that time the 
Farouk government and the Soviet Union concluded a second 
barter agreement. Three months later, the Farouk monarchy 
was to fall. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
As the year 1952 opened, Egypt was still ruled by its 
hereditary monarch. King Farouk I was the titular head of 
the Egyptian constitutional monarchy. The governmental 
system of Egypt was loosely based on that of Great Britain. 
Under the provisions of the Egyptian constitution which had 
chartered the monarchy, the King had the power to appoint 
two-fifths of the Egyptian senate and to disband the cabinets 
of the country. King Farouk often exercised his perogative 
of cabinet dismissal and, as a result, during his reign 
Egypt was a victim of constant governmental turnover. This 
kept Egypt in a constant state of internal political insta-
bility. During Farouk's reign, the civil government changed 
hands no less than fifteen times. Martial law was declared 
on three separate occasions, in 1939, 1948 and 1952. One 
measure of the unstable character of Egyptian politics 
during this period is the fact that Mustafa el-Nahas was 
prime minister three times and Ali Maher twice (excluding 
his caretaker role between the death of Farouk's father and 
Farouk's assumption of the throne) while Farouk was king. 
During Farouk's reign, the government of Egypt changed an 
19 
average of once a year despite the six years of martial law 
when no governmental changes took place. In 1952 martial 
law was declared for the last time during Farouk's reign. 
After it was suspended, three different governments were 
formed before the July revolution eliminated the monarchy. 
The continual governmental upheavals were a direct cause of 
the revolution. They led to dissatisfaction in the Egyptian 
officer corps and finally led the officers to feel con-
strained to make a governmental change of their own. 
External factors were also a contributing factor to 
Egypt's instability under King Farouk. Two of the periods 
during which martial law was in force were periods during 
which Egypt was at war. The first of these came two years 
after Farouk succeeded his father to the throne. At that 
time World War II interrupted the flow of Egyptian politics. 
During the war Egypt was the site of battles between 
British/American forces and their German opponents. Parts 
of Egypt were occupied for a time by the Germans during the 
16 
war. It served as a base for both the Germans and the 
British Eighth Army at different times during the course of 
the war. 
The second war which interrupted Egyptian political 
life was to occur in 1947. At that time Egypt and its Arab 
allies attacked the fledgling state of Israel. Their re-
sulting defeat increased the popular dissatisfaction with 
the policies of the governments under Farouk. An especially 
20 
important facet of this dissatisfaction was the disgruntle-
ment of the Egyptian officer corps. One of the officers who 
became discontented with the government was Captain Gamel 
Abdel Nasser. Nasser had been actively anti-British since 
he organized student riots protesting the constitution of 
1936. Following the first Arab debacle at the hands of the 
Israelis, Nasser became increasingly anti-Farouk. He also 
developed a hatred for the Israelis that was to help elimi-
nate any chance of peace in the Middle East in the years to 
come. The Israeli-Arab conflict was to erupt into open war 
sporadically (in 1956, 1967, and again in 1973). The con-
flict between the Arabs and Israelis is still smoldering to 
the present day and quite probably will never be settled 
without drastic changes of attitude on the part of both 
sides. Because of the constant external flux that Egypt was 
subject to, the internal situation became more and more 
uncertain. Egypt was involved in wars from 1939 to 1945 and 
again in 1947 and 1948. It suffered through the invasions 
of hostile powers and defeat from its enemies. It was used 
as a base and a retreat route by both its enemies and its 
allies. It is little wonder that internal discontent rose 
dramatically during the reign of King Farouk. 
The army was the base for one of the many nationalistic 
movements that developed during Farouk's reign. This group, 
the most important of all of the revolutionary groups in 
Egypt, was to become known as the Free Officers clique. The 
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Free Officers clique had been formed in 1942 by a young 
lieutenant named Anwar el-Sadat. It was dedicated to the 
removal of foreign influence from Egypt - especially the 
influence of Great Britain. To accomplish its goal, the 
Free Officers clique conspired to help Germany against the 
Allies during World War II. Sadat and General Aziz el-Masry 
became involved in a plot to aid German general Erwin Rommel. 
Sadat arranged for contact between Masry and Rommel. Masry 
was to help the Germans by convincing Egyptian troops to 
desert the British. Masry's efforts in this regard were 
far-reaching. Masry disseminated pro-German propaganda 
among his fellow officers in the Egyptian Army, and the 
Moslem Brotherhood took to the streets of Cairo proclaiming 
themselves "Rommel's soldiers". Masry's career as a sub-
versive was shortlived, however. He was arrested by the 
British late in 1942 when he was preparing to fly to 
Rommel's headquarters in Libya so he could broadcast 
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anti-British radio messages to the Egyptian troops. With 
the arrest of Masry, Sadat became the prime motivating force 
in the Free Officers clique. In time, the movement was to 
grow and others (such as Nasser) were to join him at its 
fore. 
Although it attempted to aid the German cause in World 
War II, the Free Officers clique was in no sense pro-Nazi. 
Rather, they were determined to rid Egypt of, what they were 
certain was, the stultifying effect of British influence on 
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their national development. In 1942 aiding Rommel must have 
seemed an excellent opportunity to accomplish their goal. 
The Free Officers clique was primarily anti-British in 
character - rather than anti-monarchy - until the very end 
of Farouk's reign. At that time, when it began to become 
more apparent to the leaders of the Free Officers that 
Farouk's tutelege was leading Egypt upon a course of dis-
aster, the clique began to take on a much more definitely 
anti-Farouk character. 
A word or two about the British role in Egyptian poli-
tics is needed at this point. The British had played a 
dominant role in Egyptian political affairs since their 
intervention there in 1841. After the British intervention 
in Egypt at that time, Egypt had nominally remained an in-
tegral portion of the decadent, sickly, and slowly deterior-
ating area of Ottoman dominion, but in actuality, the 
British played the dominant role in Egyptian politics until 
the coup in 1952. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the British 
domination of Egypt's politics spurred the rise of national-
istic movements in Egypt. These groups were dedicated to 
the removal of foreign influence from Egyptian soil. This 
movement toward national independence in all aspects of 
policy was culminated in 1952 when the Free Officer's clique 
(which included Sadat, Lt. Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, and 
Lt. General Mohammed Neguib) led a successful revolt that 
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forced King Farouk to abdicate and placed Egypt at least 
temporarily among the ranks of the world's multi-party 
democracies. 
When the Egyptian revolution occurred in 1952, the 
Soviet Union was led by Josef Stalin. Stalin held the reins 
of power in the Soviet Union firmly in his personal grasp. 
He maintained autocratic control of all of the aspects of 
the internal and foreign policies of the Soviet government 
and the Communist Party. Stalin had a rather simplistic 
view of world affairs that has been labeled the Two Camp 
View of world politics. Simply stated, in Stalin's view the 
world was divided into two camps: Those who followed the 
Soviet line of foreign policy; and those who didn't. Those 
who didn't toe the Soviet mark were obviously enemies. 
There was no middle ground for any nation that preferred to 
chart its own course rather than follow either the Soviet 
line or the opposing 'Western' line. The results of this 
policy as it applied to Egypt were quite predictable. The 
Soviets alienated the emerging Third World nations - includ-
ing Egypt - by criticizing them. The Soviet press attacked 
Egypt and the other Arab nations by labeling the newly 
formed Arab League "a tool of British imperialism." It 
further antagonized the new-born Egyptian regime by calling 
Nasser, as it had India's Nehru and Syria's Shishakli, a 
18 
"lackey of imperialism." Needless to say, this did not lead 
to immediately harmonious relations between the new Egyptian 
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government and the Soviet Union. 
The Two Camp view undoubtedly cost the Soviet Union a 
large amount of the influence that was becoming available in 
the new nations of the Third World. These nations, includ-
ing Egypt, wanted to determine their own course in policy 
matters and a little encouragement along those lines would 
have gone a long way in weaning them away from their tradi-
tional ties to the West. They had no desire to have their 
policies determined by bureaucrats in Moscow, London, or 
Washington, who often had little or no understanding of the 
needs and desires of the nations and cultures of the emer-
gent Third World. Unfortunately, this was what both sides 
expected them to put up with. As a result of the desire for 
independence in the governments of the underdeveloped nations, 
Stalin's Two Camp view was counterproductive (so, too, was 
the same approach by John Foster Dulles) . There was soon to 
be a shift in the pattern of Soviet foreign policy however. 
With the death of Stalin in 1953, a power struggle be-
gan in Moscow between his former lieutenants. At first 
Georgi Malenkov assumed the mantle of Stalin's successor. 
He held the two most important positions in the heirarchy of 
the Soviet Union, those of First Secretary of the Communist 
party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
All-Union Government. He relinquished his position as First 
Secretary within two weeks of gaining it, presumably as a 
result of pressure from the Politburo. The head of the 
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Soviet secret police was also a major factor in the power 
struggle that followed Stalin's death. Lavrenti Beria, the 
head of the NKVD, had the authority and physical power to 
control the party to a large extent. He had been given this 
power by Stalin in order to help Stalin maintain his posi-
tion of autocratic leadership by uncovering any plots 
directed at undermining Stalin's authority and eliminating 
their perpetrators. Following Stalin's death, Beria 
attempted to place himself in Stalin's position as dictator. 
For the next three months, Beria battled the other members 
of the Politburo in his attempts to gain the power which he 
sought. He was ultimately unsuccessful and the other Soviet 
leaders finally eliminated him from the calculations of 
power in June of 1953. At that time, Beria was executed, 
probably with the. help of the Soviet army. Another key 
figure in the period immediately following Stalin's death 
was Vyacheslav Molotov, an Old Bolshevik who had the main 
responsibility for foreign policy. Molotov and Malenkov 
held the two top roles in Soviet politics until September of 
1953, when Nikita S. Khrushchev was designated First Secre-
tary of the Communist Party. 
The rise of Khrushchev heralded a major new struggle 
for primacy in the Soviet Union between Malenkov and 
Krushchev. Molotov played a less significant role in the 
struggle than did these other two because his role as 
Foreign Minister was inherently less important in Soviet 
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internal politics than were their positions. All three of 
these figures were members of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist Party, or Politburo, and it was to be the stage on 
which the struggle for power was to again take place. 
For two years the struggle at the top between Krushchev 
and Malenkov was to rage quietly. Khrushchev slowly gained 
the upper hand and, finally on February 8, 1955, he succeeded 
in forcing Malenkov to resign his post of Premier. Malenkov 
was replaced as premier by Nikolai Bulganin. Eventually, 
Bulganin himself was to struggle with Krushchev for power. 
He and the rest of the so-called "Anti-Party" group were 
defeated two years later following a nearly successful 
attempt to oust Khrushchev that occurred while Khrushchev 
was absent from Moscow. In fact, the attempt was successful 
in the Politburo, but Khrushchev returned and was able to 
convince the Central Committee to override the decision of 
the Politburo. 
During the years following Stalin's death, the power in 
the Soviet Union was in the hands of what appears to have 
been, and what the Soviets called, a collective leadership. 
In the collective leadership some, like Khrushchev and 
Malenkov, were more equal than others, but all played a role 
in the decisions that were reached. The collective leader-
ship had a shifting membership, but the most important of 
its members were probably Malenkov, Molotov, Lazar Kagano-
vich, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Klimenty Voroshilov and Anastas 
Mikoyan. All of these men affected Soviet policy consider-
ably at various times during the years following the death 
of Stalin. As the alignments of these men shifted, so did 
the policies of the Party and the Soviet government. 
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The viewpoints of the various factions in the political 
infighting in the Soviet Union can be seen in the rapid 
oscillations taken in the state controlled press on many 
policy issues. During the period immediately following 
Stalin's demise when Malenkov, Molotov, and Beria were the 
main figures in Soviet policy, the policy of the Soviets 
shifted slightly from its anti-Arab bent to one that was 
slightly more favorable. (It was, however, still harshly 
critical of Egyptian policies at times. A case in point was 
the bitter Soviet condemnation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
signed in 1954.) It was not until Khrushchev ousted Malenkov 
in 1955 from the Soviet premiership that there was a strong 
and definitely pro-Arab policy emanating from Moscow. 
The interests of the U.S.S.R. had long been directed 
toward Egypt. With the rise of Arab nationalism as embodied 
by Nassar and the Egyptian revolution and the rise in the 
U.S.S.R. of Khrushchev, the stage was now set for the Soviet 
Union and Egypt to become partners and, eventually, close 
allies. The Czech Arms Deal in 1955 was the start of a 
friendship that was to last as long as Nasser lived. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CZECH ARMS DEAL AND BEYOND: THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN 
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 
The military relationship between the Soviet Union and 
Egypt was the key which allowed the Soviets to enter the 
political arena of the Middle East and to escape the encir-
clement attempts of the West in that area by completely by-
passing the Northern Tier of nations of the region. As well 
as being the medium for the first important breakthrough 
between the Soviets and the Arabs, the military aspect of 
the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt was in many 
ways its most important facet. It was the one element which 
• was really crucial for Egypt over the long term. 
The military relationship was crucial for Egypt for a 
number of reasons, but what made it vital for both the 
Soviets and the Egyptians was that it was the long aspect of 
the relationship between the nations in which it was nearly 
impossible for the Egyptians to replace the Soviets and their 
support with Western aid while still maintaining their avowed 
foreign policy goals vis-a-vis their archenemy, Israel. 
Without Soviet arms and military support, the Egyptians 
could not avenge their defeats at the hands of Israel and 
assuage their wounded pride. They could not help their 
Palestinian "brothers" achieve a "just" solution to the 
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problems which the creation of the state of Israel had en-
gendered. With these goals - and with the prestige that 
championing them had gained for Nasser and Egypt, it was un-
likely that they would change them as long as Nasser was 
alive - Soviet military support was vital if the Egyptians 
hoped to accomplish the tasks which they had set for them-
selves. 
The military relationship between the Nasser regime and 
the Soviet Union clearly started with the so-called Czech 
Arms Deal between the two countries in which Czechoslovakia 
acted as the transshipper of Soviet equipment to Egypt and 
the supplier of record of the arms thus provided. The pact 
between the Soviet Union and Egypt provided the Egyptians 
with substantial numbers of relatively modern types of mili-
tary equipment, including MiG-15 fighters, IL-28 light 
bombers, naval destroyers, submarines, IS-III (Stalin) heavy 
tanks, T-34 medium tanks, and light arms of all types. All 
in all, the arms credit provided in the deal by the Soviets 
to the Egyptians totalled between ninety and two hundred and 
1 
fifty million dollars in value. All of the Soviet weaponry 
which was supplied by the Soviet Union to Egypt through 
Czechoslovakia was, from the Soviet point of view, outmoded. 
From the Egyptian point of view, however, the weaponry was as 
good or better than anything it had received from the West, 
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and was certainly supplied in much greater quantities. 
The arms credits were offered by the Soviet Union to 
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Egypt in exchange for Egyptian cotton and rice shipments 
which were to be sent to the Soviet Union over a twelve-year 
period. Under the terms of the agreement, Egypt was allowed 
to purchase weaponry with a high market value without dras-
tically depleting its then-existing holdings in foreign 
currency. 
The Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt upset an arms bal-
ance which had existed in the Hiddle East since 1950. This 
balance had been maintained by the Near Eastern Arms Co-
ordinating Commission (a Western-dominated body which had 
been set up under the terms of the Tripartite Declaration in 
1950) which had controlled the supply of Western arms to all 
of the nations of the Middle East. The Czech Arms Deal des-
troyed the Western monopoly on arms supply to the Middle 
East and with it, the ability of the N.E.A.C.C. to maintain 
an arms balance in the region. It also marked the entrance 
of the Soviet Union into the political and military life of 
the Middle East as a significant factor. 
The entrance of the Soviet Union into the politics of 
the region by aiding Egypt was clearly motivated almost com-
pletely by political considerations on the part of both in-
volved nations. From the Soviet point of view, the Arms Deal 
demonstrated the Soviet Union's ability to tamper with local 
balances of power set up by the West and to of fer solid in-
ducements to its prospective partners. In terms of Hiddle 
Eastern politics, this meant that the Western-dominated 
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status quo was no longer inviolable, and the ruling regimes 
of the region's nations no longer needed to bow to Western 
pressures for political accords or changes in order to main-
tain a reliable military posture vis-a-vis their neighbors. 
As a result, the Czech Arms Deal effectively sabotaged the 
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Baghdad pact which was in the process of being organized by 
Great Britain and the United States under their joint policy 
of the containment of the Soviet Union. It also provided 
the Soviet Union with several new prospective allies. 
The undermining of the Baghdad pact was also something 
quite close to Nasser's heart. Whether he and Egypt had 
stayed out of the pact on principle because it curtailed 
Arab independence too far (as the Egyptians have contended) , 
or it was simply a case of the Egyptians having been politi-
cally outmanuevered by Iraq's president, Nuri a-Said (as 
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has been suggested elsewhere), Nasser was determined to 
destroy the Baghdad pact because it could well have thrust 
Iraq into Egypt's place at the forefront of the Arab world. 
Egypt needed some sort of a bold political stroke to main-
tain its position. The Czech Arms Deal provided just such a 
gambit. With the Arms Deal, Egypt could offer military 
assistance to other Arab countries and organize a counter-
alliance which would negate the Iraqi attempt to improve 
their political position in, and perhaps even gain hegemony 
over, the Arab world. Secondly, the signing of an arms 
accord with the Soviet Union made Egypt much more capable of 
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charting its own political course instead of being forced to 
accept the policy dictates of either the West or the Soviet 
Union. 
It has been argued, particularly by the Egyptian side, 
that the Czech Arms Deal was a needed step to ensure the 
security of Egypt. The Egyptians claim that Israel had al-
ready made a secret agreement with France which would have 
supplied the Israelis with significant amounts of advanced 
armaments (including Mystere IV jets and AMX-13 tanks) be-
fore the Soviet-Egyptian pact was signed and that that pact 
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was needed to offset those arms deliveries. This argument 
is dubious at best. Israel had requested !1ysteres from 
France in 1954, but it had requested the less sophisticated 
Mystere II. Soon thereafter, the French authorities agreed 
to supply Israel with a dozen Mystere II's. The shipment of 
these planes was held up for quite some time because of mis-
givings which were voiced in N.E.A.C.C. meetings. During 
the interim the Hystere II had become obsolete and the French 
agreed to replace the nystere II's with Mystere IV's. The 
change in aircraft caused further delays in N.E.A.C.C. ap-
proval, and it was not until April 12, 1956 that the first 
of eight Mysteres arrived in Israel. 
On the other hand, the Soviets had nearly completed the 
arms deliveries contracted for under the terms of the Czech 
Arms Deal with Egypt before the Israelis received their 
small quantity of Mystere IV's. Clearly, Egypt was the first 
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nation to receive a massive boost in its level of arms sup-
plies, not Israel as the Egyptians have claimed. It is also 
just as apparent that the shattering of the delicate arms 
balance in the Middle East could well have been avoided by 
more adroit handling of Egyptian arms requests by the United 
6 
States and Great Britain in 1954 and 1955. 
A second argument put forward by the Egyptians regard-
ing the military necessity of their agreement with the 
Soviets is that their planes were inoperative and that they 
needed new aircraft to replace them. They claim that less 
than ten of their planes were airworthy at the time of the 
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arms deal. Again, this contention does not seem to hold 
water when it is carefully examined. In late July of 1955, 
approximately fifty of Egypt's eighty fighters were capable 
of participating in an aerobatic exhibition at Egypt's 
annual military parade. This would seem to contradict the 
Egyptian claims of aircraft disabilities. Certainly any 
nation that could make its jets operational for a military 
parade could make them operational for a military emergency. 
After the initial ties of the Czech Arms Deal, the next 
step in the deepening of the Soviet-Egyptian military rela-
tionship came quite soon. Immediately prior to the beginning 
of the Suez Canal War between Great Britain, France and 
Israel on the one side, and Egypt on the other, the Soviet 
Union and Egypt came to terms on a second arms pact which 
provided the Egyptians with an identical amount of credit to 
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that provided by the initial deal. The weaponry provided by 
this second agreement was not delivered until after the war. 
As a result, it did much to supply Egypt with replacements 
for its heavy losses during the futile military phase of its 
battle with its opponents. 
The Suez Canal War between Egypt and its Franco-Anglo-
Israeli opponents provided an opportunity for the Soviet 
Union to show its support for its newfound ally by providing 
Egypt with direct military support. Such support was not 
forthcoming. The Soviet Union was reluctant to provide any 
such support for a variety of reasons. It was probably quite 
wise in making this decision since its involvement certainly 
would have drawn the U.S. into the conflict in support of its 
NATO allies and quite possibly would have led to a nuclear 
conflagration in which the Soviets and much of Europe would 
have been annihilated. 
After the military phase of the Suez War had been con-
eluded, the Soviets did threaten direct military involvement 
in the conflict. They warned that both Soviet "volunteers" 
and Soviet rocket forces were prepared to defend Egypt from 
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the "capitalist aggressors." Generally, these statements by 
the leaders of the Soviet Union were considered idle threats. 
The military round of the conflict was effectively over so 
there was little point in sending Soviet "volunteers" to 
Egypt. The rocket threat was even less credible. In 1956 
the Soviets had not yet deployed rockets capable of reaching 
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more than 450 miles on any scale of note, although they were 
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close to developing a rocket that could. This put all of 
Great Britain and Israel out of Soviet missile range, and a 
large portion of France (including Paris) as well. 
The weaponry supplied to Egypt by the Soviets played a 
role that was little greater than that of the Soviets them-
selves during the combat phase of the Suez War. Neither 
participated much. President Nasser called for the complete 
cessation of all air activities when Britain and France be-
gan their bombardment of Egypt, presumably because of over-
whelming Anglo-French-Israeli airpower. This effectively 
took the newly-supplied Soviet jets out of the fray. The 
Egyptians tried to withdraw their new IL-28's at that time 
along with their Soviet and Czech advisors and technicians. 
However, according to one British general, Franco-British 
bombers caught 60 percent of the Egyptian IL-28's on the 
ground and destroyed them. The MiG-15's were little more 
effective. Less than thirty of them were operational at the 
onset of the Israeli invasion of the Sinai. Of these four 
were shot down and the rest were withdrawn with the entry 
of the British and French into the conflict. Despite this 
attempt to withdraw the bulk of their air force, most of the 
Egyptians' newly-supplied aircraft were, like the IL-28's, 
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destroyed on the ground by the Anglo-French bombing. 
The Soviet-supplied ground equipment apparently did per-
form well in the uses to which it was put. Unfortunately, 
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the Egyptians relied upon static defensive positions which 
negated the value of their tanks' mobility. As a result, 
the Israeli army simply bypassed the Egyptian positions and 
roared almost unchecked to the Suez Canal. With the with-
drawal of the Egyptian air forces, the fate of the bypassed 
Egyptian ground positions was sealed. The U.S. cease-fire 
of November 7th came, therefore, as a great benison to the 
beleagured Egyptians. 
The third of the arms deals between the Soviet Union 
and Egypt came in the wake of the Suez Canal War. Under the 
terms of the agreement, the Soviets agreed to replace all of 
Egypt's wartime losses and to add a large quantity of 
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weapons above and beyond those required as replacements. 
This pact was the origin of all the post-Suez agreements be-
tween the two nations and set a pattern for future accords. 
Under the terms of the 1957 agreement, the Soviets were to 
provide Egypt with over one hundred and fifty million 
dollars worth of hardware. The weaponry included 200 MiG-17 
fighter-bombers and more naval vessels. The MiG-17 was a 
more modern version of the HiG-15 which had been provided 
under the terms of the Czech Arms Deal and would upgrade 
the Egyptian air forces. Soviet and Czech trainers and ad-
visors were also sent again to Egypt to instruct that 
country's pilots in the use of the newly purchased aircraft. 
The combination of the 1957 arms agreement between Egypt and 
the Soviet Union and the two previous accords prompted one 
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Egyptian spokesman to claim that the strength of the Egyptian 
Air Force had doubled between the beginning of The Suez Canal 
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War and September of 1957. 
The next arms agreement between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union came two years later in the midst of the tension be-
tween the two countries which had arisen over Nasser's re-
14 
pression of the Egyptian Communist Party. Slightly smaller 
than the previous agreements had been, the 1959 accord never-
theless was valued at approximately one hundred and twenty 
million dollars. It included 120 MiG-19 interceptors and 
also included the construction of some new elements in the 
Egyptian military infra-structure such as five new airfields 
and a submarine base which was built at Aboukir on the 
Mediterranean coast. 
Thereafter, arms agreements between the Soviet Union 
and Egypt seemed to come at the pace of approximately one 
every two years. The next agreement between the two nations 
was concluded on schedule in 1961. Valued at one hundred 
and seventy million dollars, the 1961 agreement provided 
enough equipment to fully equip six Egyptian infrantry and 
armored divisions. The Soviets also dispatched over 1300 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact advisors (900 of whom were Soviets) 
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to reorganize the Egyptian military along Soviet lines. 
The next agreement between the two nations was of far 
greater value. Estimates of its total monetary worth vary 
from two hundred and twenty million dollars to five hundred 
16 
million dollars. Even if one accepts the low estimate as 
valid, the 1963 accord was of far greater value than any of 
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the previous agreements had been. Concluded in June of that 
year, it was undoubtedly the most significant pact of all of 
those concluded between Egypt and the Soviet Union in the 
interim between the Czech Arms Deal and the Six-Day War in 
1967. For the first time, the Soviets had agreed to provide 
Nasser's government with first-line weapons. 
The reasons for the change in the quantity and quality 
of the arms with which the Soviets provided Egypt are numer-
ous. One important factor was the Egyptian intervention in 
the Yemeni civil war on the side of the "progressive" repub-
lican government which had been set up in opposition to the 
Yemeni monarchy. 
The Egyptian intervention in the Yemeni civil war was 
exact.Ly tue type uf actiun Wllicu the: SovieL.. Un.1.on llad llOpt::d 
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fur from J..ts Midale Lastern al.Lies. In the view of the 
Soviet leaders, such actions could only broaden their own 
base of support by polarizing the Middle East and increasing 
the necessity for the more radical of the Arab regimes to 
rely on the Soviet Union and its allies for military and 
political support against their Western-supplied foes. 
The Soviet hopes in this regard were undoubtedly fueled 
by the short-lived Tripartite Pact concluded between Egypt, 
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Syria and Iraq in April of 1963. The pact between the Arab 
radicals had as one of its stated goals the creation of a 
military alliance which would "be able to free the Palestine 
19 
Arab homeland from the Zionist danger." The pact must have 
brought the pleasant spectre of an anti-Western Arab alliance 
hovering before the eyes of Soviet leaders. Such a possibil-
ity (which never came about) undoubtedly encouraged the 
Soviet Union to supply the Egyptians with better weapons in 
the hopes of cementing the newly-formed Arab alliance which 
was aimed at Israel and through it the West. 
The 1963 agreement provided Egypt with the same T-54b 
medium tanks that were still standard for both Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact armored forces at that time. The Egyptians re-
ceived enough of the new tanks to completely equip two 
armored divisions. The quality of the Egyptian Air Force 
was also improved markedly by the weaponry provided under 
the terms of the pact. The Egyptians received at least 50 
MiG-21 supersonic interceptors, a first-line fighter with 
which they augmented their forces. They also received 
several TU-16 medium bombers which could carry a much 
heavier payload than that of the aircraft which had hitherto 
been provided to them. These aircraft may well have been 
the most important of all of the equipment which was sup-
plied to Egypt under the terms of the 1963 arms deal. They 
provided Egypt with a really significant offensive threat 
with which it could extensively damage the Israeli heartland 
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for the first time. The agreement called for more IL-28 
light bombers, MiG-17 and niG-19 fighters, AN-12 troop trans-
port planes and IL-16 paratroop carriers to aid in the re-
supply and support of the Egyptian forces in Yemen, as well 
as MI-2 helicopters and (probably) SAM-2 ground-to-air 
missiles. The Egyptian navy was by no means neglected. It 
received 36 guided missile gunboats, two destroyers, and two 
submarines. 
The 1963 arms deal marked a breakthrough in the re-
lationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union and was in 
many ways a new breakthrough in the military balance in the 
Middle East. It was the first time in modern history when 
any of the Middle Eastern nations were supplied with 
state-of-the-art weaponry in significant quantities for all 
three major branches of the military: land, sea and air; and 
the first time that the Soviets had supplied a nation with 
an avowedly anti-Communist leader with frontline military 
equipment. It also signalled the beginning of an arms race 
for both quantity and quality between Israel and the Arabs 
that was to rapidly escalate and it was eventually to serve 
as a proving ground for the new weapons systems of both the 
Soviet Union and the West. 
There was one more Soviet-Egyptian arms pact prior to 
the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel in 1967. Concluded 
in August of 1965, the agreement provided Egypt with approx-
imately three hundred and ten million dollars worth of 
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equipment. It significantly increased the Egyptian stock-
piles of land, sea and air armament, but it did not quali-
tatively improve their armed forces as had previous deals be-
20 
cause no new weapons types were supplied to the Egyptians. 
At the onset of the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union had 
over the years supplied Egypt with an immense amount of arma-
ment (See Figure 2). They had completely revamped the 
structure of the Egyptian armed forces and had trained those 
forces in the uses of the weaponry that they had been pro-
vided. They had helped to improve the infrastructure of the 
Egyptian military by helping to construct new air and naval 
bases for its use. The total value of the armaments and 
services with which the Soviet Union had provided Egypt be-
fore the Six-Day•War has been estimated at anywhere from one 
to two billion dollars. The equipment was both a step up in 
both quantity and quality and provided Egypt with something 
beyond military might; something in the long run which has 
undoubtedly proved far more valuable to Egypt: It had main-
tained and even enhanced Egypt's position as the preeminent 
political and cultural force in the Arab world. It had 
helped to maintain Egypt's role as the innovator of the 
Middle Eastern Arab nations and as the most physically power-
ful of those nations. These effects combined to place the 
value of the Soviet Union's military aid to Egypt far beyond 
even the two billion dollar upper limit that has been placed 
upon it. With such advances in both physical and emotional 
power, the Egyptians and Soviets must have expected a far 
better showing than the Egyptians had given in the Suez 
Canal War in any future conflict. They were to be rudely 
disappointed very soon. 
The Six-Day War between Israel on the one side and an 
Arab combination of nations that included Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan on the other, marked a new watershed in Soviet-
Egyptian relations. The Soviet military presence in the 
Arab world, particularly in Egypt, increased dramatically 
after the Arab debacle. Not only did the Soviets replace 
Arab equipment losses and drastically increase the quality 
of the armaments which were provided to the Arab forces 
(particularly in terms of air defense equipment), but 
they also occupied air and naval bases in Egypt and even-
tually began to fly fighter sorties over Egypt and man 
surface-to-air installations in Egypt's defense. 
On the morning of June 5, 1967, the Israeli armed 
forces initiated a "preemptive" attack on the Arab nations 
of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Their attack was a com-
plete success and achieved the devastation of the air 
forces and airfields of the Arabs in a very short time. 
Egypt and Syria had been singled out by the Israelis as 
their primary foes. Within three hours of the launching of 
the Israeli attack, their planes had destroyed nearly 60 
percent of the Egyptian air force in attacks on Egyptian 
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airfields throughout Eastern Egypt. During the brief 
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course of the war, another 40 Egyptian aircraft were downed 
22 
by Israeli pilots. 
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The quick devastation of Egypt's air force and those of 
the other Arab nations assured that the battle on the ground 
would be equally devastating to the armies of the Arab 
nations. The Israeli air force dominated the skies. In the 
open desert warfare which followed the initial Israeli air 
strike, this meant that Arab military formations were com-
pletely vulnerable to ground support attacks from Israeli 
aircraft. This combined with Israeli tank and tank crew 
superiority to result in the rout of the Egyptian tank 
forces and in the destruction of at least 500 Egyptian tanks 
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in battle. 
By the end of the brief conflict, the Israelis had ad-
vanced from their pre-war borders to the Suez Canal in the 
West. They had made similar gains in other regions. They 
had demonstrated land and air superiority over their foes 
and the navies of both sides had been no more than negli-
gible factors in the conflagration. A great deal of the 
Soviet equipment supplied to the Arabs had proven to be al-
most completely ineffective against the armed forces of the 
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Israelis. 
Unlike the hesitance which the Soviets showed following 
the Suez attacks, they reacted immediately to the Israeli 
attack. They condemned the Israelis, declared their un-
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conditional support for the Arabs, and began to pressure for 
an immediate cease-fire when the extent of the Arab debacle 
became clear. By June 9, the Arabs had all decided that a 
cease-fire was essential. The Israelis, however, demurred. 
They continued their advances into Arab territory and were, 
for example, nearing Syria's capital, Damascus. The Soviets, 
perhaps fearing the downfall of the rather radical Syrian 
regime, immediately broke off diplomatic relations with 
Israel and threatened other sanctions including direct uni-
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lateral military intervention. 
Eventually, the combination of Soviet threats and 
American pressure and the Israelis' achievement of most of 
their goals resulted in the end of the Six-Day War. The war 
had resulted in the complete humiliation of the Arabs and in 
the destruction of the bulk of their armed forces. It also 
left them shorn of large amounts of valuable territory. The 
two most important outcomes of the war as far as the Soviets 
and the Egyptians were concerned were undoubtedly the evi-
dence that Soviet military supplies to Egypt and the other 
Arab nations were completely inadequate for their needs and, 
perhaps even more importantly, the realization that the 
Egyptians were now even more reliant on the Soviet Union -
at least in terms of military support - than they had ever 
been in the years prior to the war. 
The performance of Egypt's armed forces during the 
Six-Day War gave the Soviets extensive information on what 
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was needed in any future wars that might conceivably be 
fought between Egypt and Israel. The most pressing of 
Egypt's needs was clearly some sort of an effective air 
defense. The Egyptian pilots had proven themselves to be 
no match for their Israeli counterparts. The SAM-2 
anti-aircraft missiles with which the Soviets had provided 
the Egyptians before the war proved to be no more effective 
in reducing Israeli air superiority. The SAM-2 missiles had 
a very slow rate of acceleration and were rather ineffective 
at low levels. Since most of the Israeli sorties were flown 
at low levels, the Israeli planes easily evaded the missiles 
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which the Egyptians fired at them. 
To offset the problems in Egypt's air defense, the 
Soviet Union provided Egypt with an air defense package that 
was designed to overcome the failings of the Egyptian pilots 
and the SAM-2. This was the Soviet alternative to an 
Egyptian proposal that the Russians take complete command of 
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Egyptian air defense and the Egyptian air forces. The 
Soviets began by replacing the massive aircraft losses that 
the Egyptians had suffered from the Israelis' surprise pre-
emptive bombing raids on Egypt's airfields at the outset of 
the Six-Day War. Egypt's losses were staggering: They lost 
all 30 of their TU-16 medium bombers, two-thirds (27) of 
their IL-28 light bombers, 12 SU-7 ground attack fighters, 
90 MiG-21 interceptors, 20 MiG-19 fighters, 75 MiG-17 
fighter-bombers, and 32 transport planes or helicopters. All 
49 
in all, they lost approximately 300 of their 500 aircraft, 
nearly all of their strategic bomber force, and the majority 
of their most advanced interceptors. By the end of June of 
1967, the Soviets had replaced 200 MiG's. By October of that 
year, they had supplied Egypt with an additional 100 MiG-2ls, 
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50 MiG-19's, 50 to 60 SU-7's, and 20 IL-28's. As a result 
of the speed of the massive Soviet airlift to resupply them, 
the Egyptians had by late fall more than replaced nearly 
every element in their air force. The only two exceptions 
were their strategic bombing force and their troop transport 
planes. 
The Soviets also slowly rebuilt Egypt's anti-aircraft 
system. Initially the Soviets shipped Egypt an improved 
version of the SAM-2, along with radar guided 57mm 
anti-aircraft guns. Along with the weapons, there came 
Soviet controlling technicians to oversee the use of the 
weapons. Eventually the Soviets also supplied Egypt with 
SAM-3 missiles which were manned by Soviet technicians and 
placed around the Aswan dam. The bulk of the new 
anti-aircraft missiles was placed in a rectangular forma-
tion between the Suez and the Egyptian heartland along the 
Nile. The so-called "missile box" was a key element in the 
new Egyptian air defense plan and was intended to protect 
Cairo and the rest of the upper Nile Valley from deep inter-
diction by Israeli bombers. Initially, it was relatively 
unsuccessful; neither the missiles nor their technicians had 
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been sufficiently improved to slow the Israeli pilots who 
crossed the Suez to raid strategic targets within Egypt. 
The Soviets also rapidly replaced the tanks that the 
Egyptians had lost in the Sinai during the Six-Day War. The 
pace of this segment of the Soviet resupply of Egypt's mili-
tary was somewhat slower than was the replacement of air-
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craft, but, nevertheless, by February of 1968, the Soviets 
had provided the Egyptians with replacements for 60 percent 
of the 700-800 Egyptian tanks which had been captured or 
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destroyed. In some ways the Egyptians were better off on 
land than they had been prior to the debacle in June. Many 
of the tanks that they had lost in the Sinai were older 
models such as the IS-III heavy tank and the T-34 medium 
tank. All of the replacements that they received were the 
much more modern and effective T-55 medium tanks. 
The massive resupply of Egypt's military by the Soviet 
Union after the Six-Day War was undertaken on terms that 
practically amounted to an outright gift. According to 
Nasser on July 28, 1968, "We (Egypt) have so far paid not 
one millieme for the arms we obtained from the Soviet Union. 
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We have no money to buy arms." Indeed they did not. By 
1968 the Egyptians had completely depleted their reserves 
of foreign currency of 1955 and were heavily in debt. 
By October 1968, the Soviet Union had replaced over 
80 percent of Egypt's material losses from the Six-Day 
War. That month also marked an inspection of the Egyptian 
defenses along the Suez Canal by the Soviet Chief of Staff, 
Marshal Ivan I. Iakobovskii. He returned to Moscow and re-
ported his findings, and then immediately returned to 
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Egypt. At that time, the Soviets proposed that Egypt and 
51 
the other Arab nations to which the Soviet Union was selling 
arms join together in a defense organization along with the 
33 
nations of the Warsaw Pact Organization. This would have 
put the arms that the Soviet Union was selling more direct-
ly under Soviet supervision and tightened the military and 
political relationship between Egypt and the other Arab 
countries and the Soviet Union. Nasser and the other Arab 
leaders were skeptical of the idea for many of the same 
reasons that had caused them to reject the Anglo-American 
sponsored Baghdad Pact in the mid-fifties. As a result, 
the idea never came to fruition and quickly disappeared. 
By early 1969, the Egyptians were beginning to become 
familiar with their newly-acquired Soviet weaponry. They 
had been instructed in its use by their Soviet advisors 
until they were proficient enough for these advisors to be-
come unnecessary. As a consequence, the Soviet advisors 
were steadily withdrawn until less than two thousand were 
left in Egypt. As the number of Soviet advisors dwindled, 
so, too, did the influx of Soviet arms to Egypt. Spare parts 
soon became in short supply and the Egyptians consequently 
did not have the hardware to fight any war save a defensive 
52 
one for more than two or three days. By cutting off the 
supply lines to Egypt, the Soviet Union's leaders had ef-
fectively eliminated the possibility of Egypt launching an 
attack on Israel and placed Egypt's impatient military under 
limited control. 
The Soviet control of Egypt's military possibilities 
was not to last long, however. The junior officers in 
Egypt's military were impatient and would brook little, if 
any, delay in going into combat with the Israelis. They 
disliked the diffidence of their Soviet advisors and chafed 
under the restraints which had been placed upon them. In 
February of 1969, their discontent was assuaged. After a 
visit to the front, President Nasser gave permission for 
Egypt's artillery to resume its shelling of the Israeli 
positions across the Suez. Thus began the so-called "war of 
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attrition" between Egypt and Israel. It quickly escalated. 
Initially the Soviet role in the "war of attrition" 
was minimal. In fact, in the political arena the Soviet 
Union's leaders agitated for a cessation of the hostilities 
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for the first several months of the conflict. Nasser was, 
however, adamant in his resolve to pursue his policy of a 
mini-war against the Israelis. After a time the Soviet 
Union acceded to his wishes and went along, albeit reluctant-
ly, with the Egyptian desire for conflict. 
The Soviet role in the conflict developed slowly. At 
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first, it was limited to the supply of copious quantities of 
artillery shells and presumably advice on tactics from the 
Soviet advisors in Egypt to the Egyptian commanders of the 
fire-control centers at which they were stationed. The 
Egyptian artillery barrages directed at the Bar-Lev line of 
Israel naturally provoked an Israeli response. The Israelis 
were clearly outgunned in any sort of an artillery battle 
with the Egyptians. The Egyptians had more and better artil-
lery and less frontier to cover. To offset their disadvan-
tage, the Israelis resorted to commando and air raids and 
an occasional armored sortie across the Canal. By November 
their tactics had completely obliterated Egypt's missile box 
and had given them free access to Egypt's heartland. They 
were bombing when and where they chose. Egypt's air force 
was unable to stop the Israeli air incursions and was 
effectively banished from the air by the Israeli superiority 
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in that medium. 
The Israeli air superiority over the Egyptians was an 
embarrassment of sorts to the Soviet Union. It made a 
mockery of the Soviet attempt to rebuild Egypt's defenses 
and, thus, indirectly jeopardized the Soviet's ties with 
all of their Arab allies. This was particularly true if 
Egypt's vulnerability was linked to the Soviet Union. Again 
the desires of the Soviet Union and the Nasser regime had 
come into congruence. In December 1969, this congruence 
brought the Soviet Union more directly into the "war of 
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attrition." 
The heightened Soviet involvement began in mid-December 
when Anwar Sadat went to the Soviet Union to request more 
help. His visit was a success. The Soviets agreed to take 
"active measures in strengthening the defense capability 
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of the U.A.R. (Egypt) and the other Arab states." The most 
important element of the agreement that Sadat and the 
Egyptian delegation had worked out with the Soviet leadership 
was their agreement to send the SAM-3 surface-to-air missile 
to Egypt. The SAM-3 was a sophisticated weapon that even 
North Vietnam, which was suffering from incessant U.S. bomb-
ing, had as yet not received from the Soviets. The missile 
was effective at low altitudes and so could go a long way 
in helping the Egyptians to effectively combat the Israeli 
air force and its low-flying tactics. 
Despite its value, it appeared that the supply of the 
SAM-3 to Egypt would turn out to be too little too late. In 
January of 1970, the Israelis announced that "all of Egypt 
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is our battlefield" and extended their raids to the thither-
to unbombed areas west of the Nile where the bulk of Egypt's 
population dwelled. Nasser hurried secretly to the Soviet 
Union to arrange for more aid. His journey accomplished two 
things, one of which would be of tremendous significance for 
Soviet-Egyptian relations and both of which would be instru-
mental in stemming the tide of the Israeli air assault. 
The first of the two things which Nasser accomplished 
during the course of his talks with the Soviet leadership 
was of obvious importance. He succeeded in convincing the 
Soviets to speed up their arms deliveries. As a result, by 
mid-March the SAM-3 missiles were already arriving in Egypt 
along with Soviet technicians to man them. 
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The dispatch of Soviet technicians to man the SAM-3's 
was the second, and in many ways more important, of Nasser's 
accomplishments on his trip to Moscow. Nasser had convinced 
the Soviet leadership to commit their technicians and also 
their fighter pilots to an active role in the defense of 
Egypt. 
The commitment of Soviet personnel to an active role 
in combat to defend Egypt was another major breakthrough in 
the Soviet-Egyptian military relationship. No similar 
course of action had ever been taken by the Soviet Union in 
support of a non-Communist nation. The genesis of the change 
in their relationship had begun with the Six-Day War. In 
that conflict Egypt had shown an inability to defend itself 
and its Soviet weaponry adequately from Israeli attacks. 
This inability had been underscored by the results of the 
first phase of the "war of attrition.'' The Soviet Union 
was committed to Egypt as its ally. Egypt was unable to 
defend itself and unwilling to suspend hostilities. The 
logic of the situation demanded that the Soviets either 
commit their own troops or even more sophisticated weaponry 
(such as the MiG-23[25]) to Egypt's defense. Both courses 
of action had their drawbacks. Committing their troops 
risked both the lives of the troops and steadily escalating 
involvement. Committing their best weaponry risked its 
falling into the hands of their enemies. As it turned out, 
the Soviet Union chose to adopt a compromise between the 
two courses of action. 
Initially, the Soviet role remained quite limited. 
The new SAM-3 missiles and their Soviet crews were corn-
rnitted only to halt Israel's deep penetration raids against 
the Egyptian heartland when first ernplaced on March 15, 
39 
1970. They were therefore placed exclusively around Cairo, 
Alexandria and the Aswan Darn. The Soviet fighter pilots 
and their planes officially patrolled only the areas around 
the SAM-3 sites in order to protect them from Israeli 
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attacks in early April. They also were committed to protect 
the airbases which Nasser had given over to Soviet control 
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under the terms of the January 1970 agreement. The limited 
involvement of the Soviet Union was shortlived. For a 
variety of political and military reasons, the scope of 
their activities would soon widen. 
In early April 1970, the Israelis ceased their deep 
penetration raids over Egypt. The new SAM-3 sites and the 
Soviet air missions over them had been effective in de-
terring the Israelis from their assaults on the Egyptian 
heartland. Those sites and air missions had now become, 
however, effectively pointless to continue. The Soviet 
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leadership was now faced with another decision regarding its 
role in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict; either withdraw their 
forces and perhaps see a resumption of the Israeli raids, 
or increase their involvement by widening the scope of their 
military support of Egypt. Flushed with success, they chose 
the latter. 
On January 1, 1970, there were only 2500-4000 Soviet 
advisors in Egypt. None were pilots and none were members 
of missile crews. The Soviets manned no SAM sites or air-
craft, nor did they control any airfields. By !larch 31, 
there were 6500 to 8000 Soviet military personnel in Egypt. 
Sixty to eighty of the Soviets were pilots and approximately 
4,000 were members of missile crews. The Soviets were 
manning twenty-two SAM sites and may have controlled one 
airfield. By June 30, the number of Soviets had escalated 
to between 100 and 150 pilots and 8,000 missile crew members. 
They manned 45 to 55 SAl1 sites and were flying 120 combat 
aircraft as well as controlling six airfields on Egyptian 
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soil. The pilots had also extended their range of opera-
tions from the limited sphere of April to now include 
flights up to the edge of the Suez Canal Zone. Additionally, 
in May the Egyptians had deployed Soviet crews and SAM-3 
missiles in the Canal air defenses and had rebuilt their 
missile box with the improved equipment and improved firing 
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techniques, which were probably suggested by the Soviets. 
The tide of the war of attrition had now turned. 
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Soviet weapons, Soviet personnel and Soviet tactics had put 
Egypt back into a feasible defensive position almost over-
night. The Israelis, while not defeated, were now being 
held in check. For Egypt it was a military victory. For 
the Soviets it was something more. It was a vindication of 
their air defense plans for Egypt and an earnest of the 
lengths to which they would go in support of their allies. 
It could not do anything but good for their political role 
in the Arab world. 
The war of attrition continued into July. On the 30th 
of that month, something happened in the skies over Egypt 
which could well have changed the complexion of events in 
the Middle East for some time to come. Four Soviet-piloted 
Mig-2l's were lured into an Israeli trap and shot down in a 
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dogfight that took less than one minute. It was the first 
documented case of the loss of Soviet pilots during the 
conflict. The incident might well have been disasterous 
for the peace process that was underway in the Middle East. 
The American-proposed Rogers Plan had been accepted by the 
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Egyptians on July 23rd. The Israeli Knesset was set to 
debate the issue on July 31st. Flushed by the success of 
their pilots against the Soviets, the Israelis might well 
have chosen to reject the peace initiative in hopes of 
earning a more favorable offer. The direct military involve-
ment of the Soviet Union had turned the tide of the "war 
of attrition" but the Israelis had now proven themselves 
capable of defeating even the Soviets in air combat. With 
proof of their own vulnerability, perhaps the Soviet Union 
would be less willing to support Egypt quite so forcefully. 
Some argued along these lines in the Knesset in the hope 
that in the continuation of conflict, Israel would improve 
its bargaining position. Cooler heads prevailed, however, 
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and the Knesset approved the Rogers proposal on July 31. A 
cease-fire came into effect one week later. 
The cease-fire did not slow the renewed influx of 
Soviet-made arms and Soviet personnel into Egypt. When 
Nasser died on September 28, 1970, there were 150 Soviet 
pilots manning a like number of planes and over 10,000 
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Soviets manning more than 70 SAM sites. 
Nasser's death marked the beginning of the end of 
an era in Soviet-Egyptian military relations and Soviet-
Egyptian relations as a whole. When he had come to power, 
following the coup of the Free Officers in 1953, the Soviet 
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Union and Egypt had had little government-to-government con-
tact for many years. The Czech Arms Deal that Nasser had 
initiated changed that. 
The Czech Arms Deal was the military key that opened 
the door for Egypt's relationship with the Soviet Union to 
grow and flourish. It released Egypt and with it the rest 
of the Arab world from its dependence upon the West for 
arms, and with that, from political dependence as well. It 
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brought the Soviet Union into a region of the globe that it 
had thitherto been, economically, militarily and politically, 
almost completely excluded from by the hegemony of the West. 
It shattered the delicate military and political balances 
that had been maintained in the region and, with one bold 
stroke, made a connection between the Soviet Union and 
Egypt that was to endure for more than two decades. 
From the point of view of the Soviet Union, the Czech 
Arms Deal both strengthened Egypt's ability to break free 
of the West and withstand its pressures and appealed to the 
professional interests of the upper echelons of the Nasser 
regime. It also was the beginning of what the Soviet leader-
ship hoped would be a broader based anti-imperialist coali-
tion than they had been able to forge previously. The 
Soviet attempt to forge such a coalition may well have been 
a policy counterweight to its efforts to ease tensions with 
the West, efforts which were embodied by the Austrian State 
Treaty and the generation of the so-called "Spirit of 
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Geneva." Like most major qualitative changes in 
Soviet-Egyptian relations, the Czech Arms Deal came at a 
time when the relationship between the Soviet Union and the 
West was relatively positive (See Figure 3). Whether this 
was because the Soviets had a conscious policy line under 
the auspices of which they counterbalanced positive direct 
relations with the West by minor indirect provocation and 
the encouragement of "national independence" movements, or 
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simply a result of coincidence, it is remarkable in its con-
48 
sistency as a pattern. The single exception to the rule was 
the commitment of Soviet air defense personnel to Egypt in 
19 70. 
The qualitative changes in Soviet-Egyptian relations 
also coincided with almost every improvement in Soviet-
Western relations. Again, there was a single exception to 
the pattern: the period of relative tension between the 
Soviets and Egyptians which existed in 1970. At that time, 
Soviet relations with the West were at a positive peak due 
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to the "Spirit of Camp David," however, there were no major 
changes in Soviet-Egyptian relations, a circumstance that 
was almost certainly due to Nasser's avid anti-Communist 
campaigns in Egypt and Syria. 
From the Egyptian point of view, the benefits of Soviet 
arms patronage were obvious. It provided them with inde-
pendence from the West. It provided them with a much greater 
stock of weaponry than they could possibly have obtained 
elsewhere. Most importantly, it helped to preserve Egypt's 
standing as the cultural and political innovator and leader 
of the Arab world. 
From the Czech Arms Deal until Nasser's death, the 
Soviet-Egyptian military relationship improved greatly. The 
improvement came in fits and starts, but it always came 
despite occasional Soviet reservations or Egypt's periodic 
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determination to demonstrate that it was as independent of 
the Soviet Union as it was of the West. Egypt's consistent 
defeats at the hands of Israel forced it to depend more and 
more upon the Soviet Union for military support. The more 
it relied upon the Soviet Union for its military hardware, 
the more permanent that reliance became. By the time of 
Nasser's death, the militaries of the two countries had be-
come so inexorably intertwined that Egypt was depending on 
Soviet personnel manning Soviet weaponry for its air defense 
since it was unable to defend itself from Israeli deprada-
tions. 
However, the more the Egyptians relied upon the 
Soviets, the more the Soviets were forced to bolster Egypt's 
defense to maintain the viability of the Nasser regime with 
which it was so intimately connected. And, despite the 
almost complete reliance of the Egyptians upon it for mili-
tary hardware and support and for the training of many of 
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its officers, both in the U.S.S.R. and in Egypt, the Soviet 
Union still had no control of Egypt's actions. Egypt con-
tinually acted in a bellicose manner, a manner that cost 
the Soviets progressively more money and eventually cost 
them lives. 
Clearly, the military relationship over the years be-
tween Egypt and the Soviet Union had both positive and nega-
tive repercussions for both sides. Egypt was provided with 
military weaponry, training, and support which gave it the 
ability, or at least what it preceived as the ability, to 
pursue an aggressive foreign policy line toward Israel. As 
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a result, Nasser and Egypt gained a great deal of political 
prestige in the Arab world. But what had been gained also 
extracted costs that were nearly as great in terms of 
political independence. It also had both positive and nega-
tive effects on Egypt's economy. While the relationship did 
modernize Egypt's military and thus, at least to some extent, 
the rest of the economy through a ''trickle down" process, 
the militarization of Egyptian society drained away resources 
from the civilian sector of the economy and led to periodic 
wars which destroyed much of the economic progress that had 
been made, especially that which had been made in the Sinai 
Peninsula. 
The military relationship between the two nations had 
both an up side and a down side for the Soviet Union as well. 
It gave the Soviets bases in Egypt and unlimited access to 
the Suez Canal - when it was open - which provided them with 
an improved military posture and presence in the Hediter-
ranean and in the Indian Ocean, and it made Egypt dependent 
upon the Soviets for military hardware and support. They 
also gained an excellent testing ground for their weaponry 
in the Arab-Israeli wars (although there were often in-
stances when their weapons fell into the hands of the 
Western intelligence agencies as a result of its having 
been committed in Egypt). On the other hand, the relation-
ship also cost them a great deal of military hardware and 
capital and gave them an ally which was both unpredictable 
and uncontrollable and which of ten acted in a manner that 
was contrary to Soviet goals and aspirations. 
Overall, it is impossible to make an overreaching 
judgment of the value of the Soviet-Egyptian military re-
lationship which is not at least to some degree debatable. 
The value of the relationship to each nation involved was 
different in both form and content. The goals of the two 
nations were too dissimilar for it to be otherwise. As a 
result, some differences were unavoidable. These differ-
ences may well have led to a situation in 1970 where the 
burdens of Soviet help - while still necessary for a few 
more years - were beginning to outweigh the benefits for 
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the Egyptians. Sadat's increasingly negative attitude 
toward the Soviet Union in the years after he took power in 
Egypt may be evidence of this. For the Soviets, on the 
other hand, their presence in Egypt still probably held too 
much value for them than any costs which arose from it could 
negate. 
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Love, op cit, pp. 528 and 574. This information is con-
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where he also says that the British and French des-
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20) Glassman, ibid, p. 26. Lenczowski, op cit, p. 148. 
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(London: Faber, 1972), p. 82. It is also presented in 
Israeli Ministry of Defense, The Six-Day War (Tel Aviv: 
Israeli Ministry of Defense Publishing, 1967), p. 40 
and Glassman, ibid, p. 47. 
23) O'Ballance, ibid, p. 168; Glassman, ibid, p. 48. 
24) This included SAM-2 anti-aircraft missiles, Shrnel 
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42) Soviet personnel were manning Egypt's so-called ''missile 
box" and they were directing the placement and utiliza-
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pilots were shot down." Rubinstein, op cit, p. 120ff. 
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50) The Soviets had been training Egyptian officers in both 
tactics and the use of Soviet weaponry since just after 
the Czech Arms Deal. See the Middle East Journal, Vol. 
10, #3 (Summer 1956), p. 262 for the announcement of 
the beginnings of this sort of cooperation between the 
militaries of the two countries. 
CHAPTER III 
NOT BY ARMS ALONE: SOVIET-EGYPTIAN DIPLOMACY 
The political aspect of the relationship between Egypt 
and the Soviet Union was by far the most broad-reaching 
element of the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the 
Egyptians. Politics and diplomacy were necessarily involved 
in each of the other facets of the relationship, if for no 
other reason than simply because they played the role of the 
initial phase in the development of the military, economic, 
and cultural connections between Egypt and the Soviet Union. 
The political connections between the two countries were 
tenuous at best before the consummation of the Czech Arms 
Deal. After the signing of the arms pact, the political 
aspect of the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt 
solidified and became a prominent part of the overall in-
volvement between the two nations. While politics and dip-
lomacy were always involved when one of the other elements 
of the relationship was being negotiated, they also had an 
independent role in situations where the others were either 
useless or inappropriate. 
Prior to the signing of the Czech Arms Deal, there 
were few direct contacts between Egypt and the Soviet Union. 
Certainly, the connections that did exist were on no scale 
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of any note. While the direct contacts between the two 
countries were relatively unimportant, the internal politi-
cal developments within both Egypt and the U.S.S.R. were 
instrumental in shaping the interrelationship between the 
two nations for the next two decades. Developments affect-
ing the future connections between the two occurred in Egypt 
first when the military coup led by Lt. Colonel Gamel Abdel 
Nasser and Lt. General Mohammed Neguib swept away the 
monarchy which had ruled Egypt for the last century and a 
half. 
After leading the successful coup by the military in 
1952, Nasser and Neguib became the dominant figures in the 
Free Officers clique and in Egyptian politics. They then 
proceeded to form a government that emphasized reform. What 
had previously been known as the Executive Council of the 
Free Officers' clique now became known as the Revolutionary 
Command Council. The Council, under the joint direction of 
Nasser and Neguib, reinstated Ali Maher - who had been one 
of the Prime Ministers during Farouk's reign - as Prime 
Minister with the stipulation that he must accept and im-
plement a list of demands regarding the running of the 
Egyptian government that the Revoluntionary Command Council 
deemed necessary. These demands included the restoration of 
the 1923 constitution, the disbanding of the political 
police, the cessation of martial law, and the deposing of 
1 
King Farouk. The next major move made by the Revolutionary 
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Command Council was to ask that Maher begin a program of 
land reform. The Council continued to push for the political 
reforms that it had demanded earlier, and it also began to 
make overtures to the British and American governments for 
the acceptance of its revolution. It hoped for economic and 
military aid for Egypt from these two nations, especially 
from the United States. 
In September of 1952, Maher was dismissed as Prime 
Minister. The officially stated reason for his dismissal 
was his failure to follow the Revolutionary Command Council's 
2 
land reform policies. A more likely explanation of it is 
that the Revolutionary Command Council was simply making its 
move to consolidate its effective position of power and its 
titular counterpart. This argument is lent a measure of 
credence by the immediate installation of Neguib as Prime 
Minister after Maher had been dismissed. Still, the old 
multiple party political system of Egypt remained until 
January of l953, when Neguib issued decrees abolishing the 
1923 constitution and instituting a military government. 
The military government was to be a transitional phase that 
was to last three years according to the decrees. Another 
important move made by the Revolutionary Command Council at 
this time was begun by Nasser who had been named Minister of 
the Interior. As Minister of the Interior, Nasser controlled 
the police organs of the Egyptian government. He used the 
security forces which he now controlled to initiate a drive 
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to suppress the Egyptian Communist Party. The policy of 
suppressing the Communist Party was to set a pattern that 
Nasser was to follow all through his career, a pattern that 
was to cause considerable friction between Egypt and the 
Soviet Union in later years. 
With Neguib's assumption of the post of Prime Minister, 
a power struggle began to surface which pitted him against 
Nasser. Earlier there had been subsurface indications of 
such a dispute existing between the two central figures of 
the Free Officer's clique, but they had been sublimated by 
the need for internal solidarity within the Free Officer's 
clique and the Revolutionary Command Council in the face of 
its external opponents. The conflict bewteen the two most 
influential members of Egypt's revolution came to a head in 
1954 when Nasser violently suppressed the Moslem Brother-
4 
hood. Neguib was a supporter of the Brotherhood and was, 
in turn, given its support, so Nasser's act - in his capa-
city as Minister of the Interior - brought him to logger-
heads with Neguib. Their clash resulted in a brief but 
bitter clash which culminated in Neguib's resignation of the 
post of Prime Minister. Nasser took over the reins of 
government when Neguib resigned. 
Nasser's arrogation of power in Egypt was greeted with 
mixed reactions by the leadership in the Soviet Union. The 
Egyptian Communist Party had sided with Neguib in his power 
struggle with Nasser. Given the relationship between the 
ECP and the Soviet Union at that time, a relationship which 
was characterized by complete Soviet dominance, the ECP 
decision to support Neguib would seem to be indicative of 
the attitude of at least one of the elements in the Soviet 
leadership at the time. The members of that clique within 
the Sqviet leadership must have felt that Nasser was more 
pro-British than Neguib because he seemed to have more ties 
to England from his education there and from his military 
connections with British officers than did Neguib. 
Officially, the response of the Soviet Union to 
Nasser's assumption of power in Egypt was not quite as 
5 
hostile as that of the Egyptian Communist Party. It ranged 
from the condemnation of some of his policies to the en-
couragement of others. The Soviets, of course, encouraged 
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any kind of hostility toward the West which was exhibited by 
Nasser. When the Egyptians signed the Anglo-Egyptian Pact 
in 1954, the Soviets on the other hand reacted in an equally 
predictable negative fashion. They claimed that the Nasser 
6 
regime ''was totally dishonoured." This oscillation toward 
Egypt and the Nasser regime was typical of the Soviet Union's 
attitude toward the revolutionary government for the first 
7 
few years following its inception in 1952. The initial 
period of disinterest in Egyptian affairs shown by the Soviet 
Union (which was mentioned in the first chapter) was quickly 
followed by the unsettled situation described above. It is 
understandable in light of the internal turmoil that was 
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taking place in the Soviet Union and, to some extent, in 
Egypt at the time. 
In the Soviet Union Stalin was still in power, but he 
was becoming increasingly ill when the coup first occurred. 
Thereafter, the struggles for power between .Malenkov, Beria, 
and Khrushchev occupied the Soviet leadership. With these 
concerns, the initial lack of interest and later confusion 
which they displayed toward a small, albeit important, 
nation in an area which their influence was extremely 
limited was not only understandable, but almost certainly 
predictable. 
The earlier years of Nasser's leadership provided much 
with which the Soviet government could take umbrage. Nasser 
initially sought the aid of the United States in modernizing 
his army and in constructing the Aswan High Dam. Nasser 
always looked to the West first and foremost in any matter 
of importance to Egypt. At the same time, however, he did 
seek to improve relations with the Soviet Union. In August 
1953, the Soviets signed their first agreement with the new 
government in Egypt. This pact, which instituted inter-
national banking cooperation between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union, was the harbinger on many more ties which were to 
8 
develop between the two countries. One year later, there 
9 
was an agreement on trade between the two nations. Agree-
ments of this sort were typical of Egyptian-Soviet relations 
until July 19, 1955. The two nations maintained cordial, if 
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not intimate, relations typical of the sort of diplomatic 
relations which are maintained by most nations in a relative-
ly stable geopolitical situation as a matter of course. 
On July 19, l955, Egypt made an agreement with 
Czechoslovakia to trade cotton, rice, and textiles for 
machinery. The true nature of the agreement was not im-
mediately announced by either country. As the world was to 
discover later, the agreement was not a simple commercial 
accord between two countries that were attempting to estab-
lish solid trade relations. It was in actuality a deal for 
250 million dollars worth of Soviet military equipment which 
Czechoslovakia was to provide to Egypt as an intermediary 
for the Soviet Union. The Egyptians were to receive exten-
sive supplies of relatively modern equipment which included 
MiG jets, 100 tanks, six submarines, artillery and various 
10 
other weapons. 
The Egyptians had been seeking this sort of arms 
package for more than a year. Initially, they had looked to 
the United States to supply them with the armament that they 
desired. Nasser tried hard to obtain the arms from the U.S. 
The American government equivocated for a long while, re-
fusing to give Nasser a definite answer. When Nasser 
finally forced the issue, the Americans refused him the arms. 
As Admiral Arthur W. Radford of the U.S. Navy said before a 
U.S. congressional committee hearing, "The Egyptians wanted 
11 
the kind of arms we [the U.S.] did not want them to have." 
78 
The Egyptians also tried to obtain arms from the British 
following the Anglo-Egyptian Pact. The British turned a 
deaf ear to the purchase requests of the Egyptians as the 
Americans had before them. 
Nasser was determined to obtain modern armaments for 
the Egyptian armed forces. He apparently felt that such 
armaments were imperative if Egypt was to survive and to 
grow as a free and independent nation. He felt threatened 
by Israel. He saw the Baghdad Pact as a threat to Egypt's 
prestige in the Arab world which had been initiated by the 
United States and Great Britain to maintain their domination 
12 
of the Middle East. The Baghdad accords coupled with Israeli 
raids on Egyptian territory - the Gaza raid of February 1955 
in particular - led Nasser to seek armaments elsewhere. 
Nasser's desire for arms led him to the Soviet Union 
via a very convoluted path. It started with his trip to the 
Bandung Conference in April of 1955. On his way to the con-
ference, he met China's Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, in 
India. They became cordial, and in the course of their con-
versations, Nasser inferred to Chou that he would be inter-
ested in obtaining arms from the Soviet Union. Chou indi-
cated to Nasser that the Soviet Union would quite possibly 
be willing to sell Egypt the arms it needed. Indeed, Chou 
recommended exactly that course of action to the Soviets in 
13 
a report he made on Nasser to Moscow. 
About six weeks after his return from Bandung, Nasser 
was approached by the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt, Daniel 
Solod, at a reception. Solod informed Nasser that he had 
14 
"an answer to the question you posed to our friends." An 
appointment was set up for the next day. In that meeting 
Solod told Nasser that the Soviet Union would be willing to 
supply the arms that the Egyptians desired and that a com-
mittee would be set up in the Soviet Union to decide the 
15 
exact nature of the armaments that would be supplied. 
Nasser now had a firm offer for the arms that he 
desired. He preferred American arms, however. Since this 
was the case, he gave the United States one last chance to 
supply him. According to Mohammed Heikal, he delayed his 
acceptance of the Soviet of fer in the hope that an American 
16 
arms package would come through. The United States con-
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tinued in its stubborn refusal to supply the types of weapons 
that the Egyptians felt were imperative for them to obtain. 
Finally, although the U.S. tried every means at its disposal 
other than force or acquiescence to prevent the deal, Nasser 
consummated the Czech Arms Deal in July. 
The interim between the forging of the Czech Arms Deal 
and the announcement of its true nature was not a period of 
complete quiet between the Soviets and the Egyptians. To 
some extent Nasser had given up on the United States and 
decided to improve his relations with the world's other 
superpower. Therefore, he decided to make other pacts with 
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the Soviet Union and their friends. On September 6, exactly 
three weeks before the Czech Arms Deal was announced, a 
barter agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt was 
signed. Under the terms of this accord, Egypt was to supply 
the U.S.S.R. with 60,000 tons of rice in return for 500,000 
17 
tons of crude oil. Eight days later, the Egyptians exchanged 
trade offices with the Chinese. These agreements were quite 
possibly intended - at least secondarily - as warnings to the 
U.S. that the Egyptians would not wait much longer for a 
change in attitude. As it turned out, they did not. 
The Czech Arms Deal with Egypt was the first major 
Soviet breakthrough into the Middle East. It was of major 
significance for both signatories and, indeed, the entire 
world. It allowed the Soviets to break through the con-
tainment barrier of NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO that 
the Americans and the British had attempted to set up. It 
also gave the Soviets a foothold in an area that was ripe 
for the expansion of their influence because of its blossom-
ing nationalism and independence. Egypt gained the arma-
ments that it needed and, more importantly, an alternative 
to the West as a source of aid. It now had leverage in its 
political dealings with both the West and the Communist 
bloc. As later events were to prove, this leverage was to 
become an important factor in maintaining an independent 
18 
course for Egypt in its policies. 
The Czech Arms Deal opened the door for improved 
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Soviet-Egyptian relations. It did not, however, advance the 
Soviet Union to the position of Egypt's closest friend and 
ally, nor did it make the Soviets the nation that Egypt 
looked first and foremost to when it sought major aid pack-
ages. In fact, the Soviets offered the Egyptians aid for 
the Aswan High Dam on October 10, 1955. The Egyptians, how-
ever, chose not to immediately pursue this informal offer by 
the Soviets for what was the most important project on the 
agenda for Egypt. What the Czech Arms Deal did do immediate-
ly was cause the Egyptians to accept a great many more minor 
assistance packages from the Soviet Union and its allies. 
In February 1956, Egypt and the Soviet Union came to agree-
ment on the cooperative exploitation of atomic energy for 
Egypt. In March, Egypt concluded a trade agreement with the 
People's Republic of North Vietnam which exchanged Egyptian 
cotton for Vietnamese coal and cement. Also in March, Egypt 
19 
and Bulgaria concluded a trade agreement. These accords 
were typical of Egyptian relations with the Soviet bloc 
following the Czech Arms Deal. They were indications of the 
quickly growing friendship between Nasser and the Soviet 
Union. 
While the relationship between the Soviets and Egypt 
was becoming more and more cordial, the West was by no means 
excluded from Egypt. In December of 1955, Great Britain and 
the United States tendered offers of economic aid for the 
Egyptian project of building a large modern dam on the Nile 
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at Aswan. Aswan was the site of an already existing dam, 
but it was inadequate for Egypt's needs. Nasser and the 
Egyptians had long dreamed of augmenting their hydroelectric 
capabilities as well as the cultivatable acreage of Egypt by 
improving the facilities at Aswan. As a result, they had 
been attempting to get assistance for this project almost 
since the successful completion of the Egyptian revolution 
in 1952. The Western powers had long procrastinated about 
granting this aid to Egypt, but following the Czech Arms 
Deal and the subsequent Soviet offer of aid for the project 
20 
at Aswan, they began to view the granting of aid to the 
Egyptians as an imperative step in weaning Egypt away from a 
possible turn toward the Soviet Union. 
The first step in the Western aid package for what was 
to become known as the Aswan High Dam Project was the ad-
vancement of a 270 million dollar credit package from the 
World Bank to Egypt. The assistance offered by the World 
Bank was made contingent upon British and American funding 
of the project as well as large amounts of Egyptian capital. 
It contained many conditions that President Nasser found 
objectionable. He felt that the inspection and supervision 
clauses in the off er amounted to an attempt by the West to 
gain control of the Egyptian economy. Further, he feared 
the stage by stage supply of aid was an attempt to wrest 
total control of his nation's economy and political life 
from him by making each stage of aid contingent upon more 
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and more conditions until Egypt was nothing more than a 
puppet dancing to Western tugs on its strings. Eugene Black, 
president of the World Bank, flew to Cairo to discuss the 
problems with the aid program with Nasser. After a dis-
cussion that lasted several days, Black and Nasser came to 
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an agreement upon the conditions of the loan. One important 
provision that remained unchanged was that the loan would be 
conditional upon American and British aid packages. 
Great Britain and the United States had sent their aid 
packages along with that of the World Bank, following its 
report that the project was financially feasible. They made 
their offers contingent upon the same conditions as had the 
World Bank. When they made their offers of aid, both the 
British and the Americans intended to reassert their influ-
ence in Egypt. As John Foster Dulles, then American Secre-
tary of State, told Nasser through Eugene Black, "I want 
Nasser to understand that the Russians can give him weapons 
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for death, but we alone can give him and his people life." 
An admirable sentiment, and one that almost certainly would 
have - if carried through - defused the nascent Egyptian-
Soviet friendship. However, the British and American offers 
of assistance were to be withdrawn almost as soon as Black 
returned from his mission to Cairo. 
The reasons for the sudden reversal of the Western 
position are extremely confused and unclear. Some students 
of the question claim that the Americans and the British de-
cided that Egypt could not pay her share of the dam's costs 
23 
because her economy was unsound. (Under the terms of the 
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loans, Egypt was to match the funds supplied by the West with 
an equal amount of her own money.) Since the dam was a 
financially unsound project, according to this line of rea-
saning, the American and British offers were withdrawn and 
the World Bank's loan automatically lapsed. 
In his memoirs, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime 
Minister at the time, also asserted that the Egyptian econo-
my was becoming increasingly unsound. Finally, Eden says 
that there was only so much aid that the West, especially 
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Great Britain, could afford. The British had more important 
projects in the aid department (e.g. helping their close 
ally, Nuri a-Said, in Iraq). 
Another claim as to the reasoning behind the with-
drawal of the loan offers is that American internal politi-
cal problems caused the Americans to withdraw their loan 
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offer. This line of reasoning holds that Dulles was annoyed 
at Nasser's independence. In the face of tight congression-
al purse strings, arguments that the money was better used 
at home, and the Zionist lobby, Dulles reneged on his part 
of the offer when Nasser recognized the People's Republic of 
China. This action caused the China lobby to side with the 
other forces that opposed the loan. With such strong oppo-
sition in Congress, the loan for the Aswan was almost cer-
tain to be rejected. This being the case, Dulles wished to 
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avoid an embarrassment for the Administration and so with-
drew the proposal. 
A fourth suggestion as to the reasons for the with-
drawal of the aid package to Egypt is put forward by Kennett 
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Love. He advances the notion that the assistance funds were 
withdrawn because of the failure of an American initiative 
for peace on the Palestinian issues between Egypt and the 
Israelis. Love blames this failure on David Ben-Gurion 
whose obstinancy led him to set conditions on the peace pro-
posals that were impossible for Nasser to accept. 
There are other notions as to why the West dropped its 
offer to loan Egypt money for the Aswan High Dam Project. 
Some of these are Nasser's unreasonable foreign policy be-
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havior, Eden's personal enmity for Nasser, and that the 
West's more obedient Arab allies (Iraq, etc.) pressured 
against Nasser and Egypt receiving aid in preference to them. 
Most of these reasons undoubtedly carry a modicum of 
the true reasoning behind the withdrawal of the Western 
offers. From the point of view of the West, a point of view 
that was still deeply imbued with the Two-Camp view of the 
world, Nasser was unreasonable, especially in foreign policy 
matters. He refused to acquiesce to Western foreign policy 
dictates in such important matters as the signing of the 
Baghdad Pact and the recognition of the People's Republic of 
China. He had allowed the Soviets to break through the ring 
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of encirclement the West had placed around them when he con-
eluded the Czech Arms Deal. He continually attempted to re-
move Western influence from the Arab nations and to replace 
it with his own. He further contributed to the rise of 
neutralism and independence in the policies of Third World 
nations by supporting and attending the Bandung Conference. 
All of these factors combined to make Nasser and his 
policies objectionable in the eyes of the West and its 
leaders. His refusal to defer to Anglo-American policy in 
return for aid made it difficult for the West to aid Nasser. 
This was especially true in view of the internal politics of 
the West at the time. 
In Great Britain there was a strong lobby that de-
manded the cessation of British aid to Egypt. They felt 
that Nasser was bent upon destroying Britain's influence in 
the Middle East. They were adamantly in favor of the harsh-
est possible measures being taken against him. This lobby 
was strongly imperialistic and was highly critical of Great 
Britain's declining role in the post World War II world, 
especially during Eden's tenure as Prime Minister. They 
insinuated that Eden was a weakling, a jibe to which Eden 
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was particularly sensitive. 
The United States also had a strong faction in its 
legislature that opposed aiding Egypt in its Aswan High Dam 
Project. The opponents of the loan contended that, since 
Egypt was unwilling to follow the American line in return 
for aid, there was no good reason for such a large expendi-
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ture of money. This reason combined with those of the 
pro-Israeli lobby in Washington to make it difficult to get 
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Congressional approval for the loan. However, Congressional 
reluctance is rarely a sufficient reason for an American 
administration to abandon a foreign loan, especially one 
that has already been offered (e.g., the 1982 American sale 
of the A.W.A.C. radar system to Saudi Arabia). It would al-
most have to be combined with other strong reasons for an 
administration to kill such an important foreign policy 
initiative. 
The argument that Dulles and Eden felt that Egypt was 
unable to carry its economic share also has some credibility. 
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In fact, Eden himself even lends it credence in his memoirs. 
Certainly Dulles and Eden might have believed this despite 
the assurances of Eugene Black and the World Bank that the 
Egyptian economy was sound and the project was feasible ten 
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short days before the withdrawal of the American offer. 
Throughout the period from his meetings with Nasser in 
late January of 1956 until the official withdrawal of the 
British and American offers of aid on July 19th, Black rnain-
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tained that the High Darn was "entirely feasible." He stated 
on several occasions that Egypt was capable of contributing 
its share of the expenditures. When the United States and 
Great Britain withdrew their offers of aid, Black regarded 
their contention that " . the ability of Egypt to devote 
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adequate resources to assure the project has become more un-
certain than at the time the offer was made," as both an un-
truth and a cruel diplomatic ploy designed to damage 
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Nasser's position. Black's belief in the Egyptian economy 
was later given support by Senator William Fulbright. In 
his statement about the findings of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Foreign Relations which he chaired, Senator Fulbright 
indicated that they had not found any evidence to give 
credence to the claim that the Egyptian economy was rapidly 
deteriorating. 
Another set of indicators that discredits the American 
and British claims that the Egyptian economy was becoming 
incapable of carrying its share of the load for the Aswan 
High Darn Project are the economic statistics for the 
Egyptian economy during the period in question. First, 
during the two-year period from 1955 to 1957, the Egyptian 
national income increased from 918 million Egyptian pounds 
to 1086 million Egyptian pounds. Second, the Egyptian 
foreign debt decreased from 34 million Egyptian pounds to 
31.2 million pounds. The claim that Egyptian foreign ex-
penditures (especially those for arms from the Soviet bloc) 
were going up in proportion to national income are also 
demonstrably false. In 1955, imports by Egypt as a percent-
age of their national income were 28 percent. In 1956, this 
same ratio was 27 percent. Finally, in 1957, the percentage 
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of income that imports provided was 25 percent. 
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These figures indicate that, if anything, the Egyptian 
economy was becoming more sound, not less so. Its national 
income was increasing. The Egyptians were reducing their 
national debt. The Egyptians were also decreasing their 
foreign expenditures. These conditions are directly opposite 
to those that the American and British governments were 
claiming had been the cause for their withdrawal of their aid 
packages. 
Given these indicators of the strength of the Egyptian 
economy, one must look elsewhere for the reasoning behind the 
withdrawal of the Western aid packages. Was the American 
withdrawal of aid simply a blunder based on misinformation, 
or was it a concerted attempt at disciplining a wayward 
foreign government? Whichever is the case, it was certain-
ly one of the most disasterous blunders made by the govern-
ments of the West in the Middle East since World War II. 
The American withdrawal of aid to Egypt for its Aswan 
Dam project caused a chasm to be opened between the West and 
Nasser that could never be bridged. Nasser turned to the 
Soviets first and foremost from that point in time until his 
death. It cost the West any hope for the friendship of the 
most influential Arab nation in the world. It gave their 
Soviet opponents a strong position in a thitherto inacces-
sible area of the world. It further polarized a world that 
was already near the brink of the final holocaust. What was 
worse from the American point of view is that it was an error 
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that could have been avoided simply by honoring a commitment 
that had already been made. Whether Egypt's economy was in 
a state of disrepair or not, from hindsight it is quite 
obvious that the investment of Western funds in Egypt's 
Aswan High Darn Project would have paid much greater dividends 
than it could have cost. It would have decreased the aid 
needed to rebuild the armies of the region by almost certain-
ly limiting the rise in tensions that led to hostilities that 
led to the Arab-Israeli wars that were to follow. It would 
have delayed, if not totally prevented, Soviet encroachment 
into the Middle East. It would have slowed the rise of 
enmity in the Third World toward the United States. If all 
of these benefits were not in themselves sufficient to grant 
the aid package to Egypt, there are also the humanitarian 
benefits that would have come from having a lasting monument 
to the generosity of the West. 
The most immediate benefit of honoring the commitment 
to aid Egypt in the construction of the Aswan High Darn be-
came apparent immediately after the withdrawal of the aid 
packages was announced. Nasser's reaction to the Western 
renege was not long in corning. Exactly one week after the 
United States withdrew its offer to aid Egypt in the con-
struction of the Aswan Darn, Egypt nationalized the Suez 
Canal Company. It had owned this company in conjunction with 
Great Britain and France prior to the act of nationalization. 
Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal came 
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four days after the United States announced the withdrawal 
of its aid package for the construction of the Aswan Dam. 
According to Mohammed Heikal, Nasser's decision to national-
ize had come almost immediately after he learned of the re-
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nege. He delayed in making this response public until he had 
ascertained the military strength of Great Britain in its 
Middle Eastern protectorates and dependencies. When he was 
convinced that the British were incapable of immediate mili-
tary action against him, he announced his decision to nation-
alize the Egyptian holdings of the Suez Canal Company in a 
speech delivered in Alexandria on the evening of July 26th. 
This decision by Egypt's leader came out of annoyance toward 
what he perceived as the West's mistreatment of Egypt. 
Nasser felt that the withdrawal of aid by the United States 
and Great Britain was unconscionable. In Nasser's eyes, the 
West's cancellation of the aid packages was an attempt to 
pressure him into making concessions to Israel over the 
issue of Israeli passage through the Suez Canal (Egypt had 
blockaded both terminals of the canal, refusing the allow any 
Israeli shipping through) . 
The nationalization of the canal seemed to Nasser to be 
the perfect response to the pressure he perceived emanating 
from the West. Beyond indicating to the West that Egypt re-
fused to be pushed around, the nationalization of the canal 
provided Egypt with another major source of income. The 
profits from the canal could be applied to building the 
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Aswan Dam in place of the withdrawn Western funds. 
The British response to Nasser's action was immediate. 
The entire nation was outraged. The London Times commented 
that "an international waterway of this kind cannot be 
worked by a nation of as low technical and managerial skills 
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as the Egyptians." The leader of the British opposition 
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party, Hugh Gaitskell, denounced Nasser as another Hitler. 
These reactions were typical of the tide of sentiment that 
was sweeping through Great Britain at the time. The nation-
alization of the canal was condemned on political, moral, 
and economic grounds by an outraged British populace. 
The most important reaction of anyone in Great Britain 
was that of Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister. Ac-
cording to Anthony Nutting, his Foreign Minister at the 
start of the crisis, the nationalization of the Suez gave 
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Eden the opportunity for which he had been waiting. Eden 
had been spoiling for an opportunity to destroy Nasser. He 
now had his chance to take down the man whom he so detested. 
Whether or not Nutting's characterization of Eden's 
motives is correct, his description of the response of Eden 
as ". . an all-out campaign of political, military 
pressures on Egypt . ." is a particularly apt appraisal of 
what the British did under the leadership of Eden. When Eden 
heard the news of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez, he was 
dining with King Feisal of Iraq, Prince-Regent Abdullah, Nuri 
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a-Said, Lord Salisbury, and Selwyn Lloyd. They were nearly 
as outraged as was Eden. The Iraqis encouraged Eden and the 
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British to initiate an immediate harsh response. This re-
action on the part of the Iraqi leaders probably came out of 
their long rivalry with Egypt for a position of primacy in 
the Arab world, as well as pique from the failure of Nasser 
to inform them of his intentions in advance. Whatever the 
motives behind the Iraqi reaction, it gave Eden political 
support from an Arab nation in his chastisement of Nasser. 
From Eden's point of view, things could not have worked out 
better, or so it seemed. He had what seemed to be the per-
feet opportunity to reassert British influence in the Middle 
East and even had Arab support in doing so. 
The day after Eden was informed of the nationalization 
of the Suez Canal, he began to take steps to regain the 
British interest in the canal. Egyptian assets in Great 
Britain were frozen. The export of arms and military 
materiels was banned. A formal note of protest was sent to 
the Egyptian Embassy in London. The note was returned to 
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the British in its own envelope. 
These were the major steps taken by Great Britain in 
the initial period following the Egyptian seizure of the 
property and assets of the Suez Canal Company in Egypt. No 
immediate military action was taken. Nasser had been care-
ful in his planning to be sure that there was insufficient 
force available to the British in the Eastern Mediterranean 
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region for them to force an immediate solution favorable to 
their cause. 
The other major stockholder of the Suez Canal Company, 
France, was also harsh in its condemnation of Nasser's act of 
"piracy." They, just as had Mr. Gaitskell of Great Britain 
~alled the nationalization of the canal an act that compared 
to Hitler's seizure of the Rhineland in the late 1930's. 
They refused to accept the situation passively. They, just 
as Great Britain, were determined that Nasser would not be 
allowed to have complete control of the so-called "throat" 
of Europe. The loss of their interest in the Suez Canal 
Company was a severe economic blow to the French. In an 
attempt to counter that loss, they paralleled the British 
move and froze Egypt's assets in France. The French de-
manded that harsh and immediate action be taken against 
Egypt. Their Prime Minister, Christian Pineau, claimed that 
if the West did not react strongly, the Middle Eastern oil 
pipelines would be nationalized within three months and that 
Europe would, as a result, be at the mercy of the Arabs. He 
demanded American approval for the diversion of two squad-
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rons of Mystere IV jets that were bound for NATO to Israel. 
While the reaction of the West was in general, outrage 
and dismay, the rest of the world reacted quite differently. 
The Arab countries, and to some extent the rest of the Third 
World, were the scenes of outpourings of popular sentiment 
favoring the nationalization of the canal. Even the Iraqi 
leaders, who had initially encouraged harsh British action, 
were forced to ameliorate their stand in favor of one which 
was more in tune with the grass roots sentiments of the 
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Iraqi populace and supported Nasser's act. The Soviet Union 
was also evenutally supportive of Nasser's move to take over 
the running of the canal. The Soviets did not come immedi-
ately to Egypt's side. Instead, they maintained a brief 
period of silence. Presumably, the Soviet delay was en-
gendered by a desire on the part of the Soviet leadership to 
wait and see how things would turn out when the dust had 
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settled. 
After Nasser made his nationalization speech on July 
26, silence was the only thing emanating from !1oscow on the 
subject. In fact, according to Mohammed Heikal, the Soviet 
Union was so cautious in its response that on the day the 
canal was nationalized, no member of the Egyptian Embassy 
could do so much as "contact even a third grade civil servant 
in the (Soviet) Ministry of Foreign Affairs." The caution of 
the Soviet Union is highlighted even more strongly when one 
considers that this was only two days after the Soviets had 
renewed their offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam. It 
took a day before the Soviet leadership decided upon its 
response to Nasser's bold act of political defiance. 
The Soviet hierarchy from Khrushchev down to the lower 
echelons of the Soviet bureaucracy for foreign affairs began 
to issue statements that were warmly supportive of the 
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canal's nationalization. In a statement made in noscow on 
July 31st, Krushchev urged the international community to 
react calmly to the takeover. He claimed that "nationaliza-
tion was an action that the Egyptian government, as a sover-
eign government, is entitled to take." He also said, 
We think that the policy of putting the pressure 
on Egypt is a mistaken one. Rashness and haste in 
this matter can only bring undesirable consequences 
for the cause of peace and can only damage the in-
terests of the Western Powers themselves in the 
area. The Suez Canal's nationalization does not 
affect the people of Britain, France, the U.S., and 
other countries. Only the former Suez Canal 
Company, which received profits from the canal's 
exploitation, is now being deprived of the possi-
bility of self-enrichment at Egypt's expense. The 
Soviet Union, directly interested in the freedom of 
shipping through the Suez Canal and noting the 
Egyptian government's statement to the effect that 
the Suez Canal will remain free for all, considers 
that there is no grounds for alarm and concern over 
this matter. We are confident that the situation 
in the Suez Canal will not become aggravated if it 
is not artificially aggravated from the outside. 44 
Most of the other initial statements made by the 
Soviet leadership and their press organizations were also 
reasonable and relatively conservative in their support for 
Egypt and their warnings to the West. Izvestia, the 
semi-official voice of the Soviet government, took a some-
what more radical stance on the issue. It denounced the 
"threats of war" made by some Israeli leaders "aided and 
abetted by external imperialist quarters" against Israel's 
"peace-loving neighbors." The "external quarters" referred 
to in Izvestia were undoubtedly primarily France, which had 
an extremely close relationship with Israel at the time, 
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and secondarily, Great Britain. Perhaps this hard-line 
statement in Izvestia represented one element of opinion 
within the Communist Party hierarchy, or as it has been sug-
gested elsewhere, it was simply a sop to Arab opinion. What-
ever the case, it was a harbinger of the stance that Moscow 
was to take as the crisis over the canal's nationalization 
deepened. 
After the initial uncertainties which followed the 
nationalization of the Suez, relations between all of the 
interested parties began to settle into a pattern. The 
British and French governments established a pattern of es-
calating pressure with which they attempted to force Egypt 
to return the canal to its previous owners. The Egyptians 
resisted all pressure quite firmly. They maintained a calm-
ly reasonable tone in all of their replies to what were 
quite often vitriolic and extremely unfair and mendacious 
attacks by the British and French. The Soviets issued 
statements of support for Nasser and his government, and 
made increasingly bellicose threats directed against the 
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West. 
The United States supported the British and French, 
but only to a limited extent. The Americans attempted to 
aid their allies in gaining the return of the Suez Canal 
Company's assets through negotiations and also through 
economic and political pressure aimed at Egypt. Despite 
this support for the cause of the British and French govern-
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ments, the Americans did attempt to restrain them from any 
rash actions such as a military invasion of Egypt aimed at 
retaking the canal by force. In this atmosphere of bluster 
and economic and diplomatic warfare, the first stage of the 
Suez Canal crisis unfolded. It was an event that was to 
have major political consequences for the British, the 
French, the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Soviet Union, 
and even the Americans, in the ensuing years. 
During that first stage, the British, fueled by Eden's 
undisguised enmity for Nasser, began a series of diplomatic 
strategems designed to nullify Nasser's nationalization. 
Their first step was to meet with representatives of the 
French and American governments. In these meetings, Eden 
hoped to come to an agreement which would involve the United 
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States to the utmost in forcing a settlement of the crisis. 
The French also were insistent upon American involve-
ment. They wanted the Suez back. They had, after all, built 
it. Beyond that, Nasser's action would have profound con-
sequences for their entire position in North Africa, said 
the French. The nationalist elements in Algeria would take 
fresh heart. The Algerian nationalists would look to Egypt 
for even more support since it had successfully defied the 
will of the French. The Egyptians would undoubtedly supply 
such support in terms of both arms and clamor. As it turned 
out, the French had correctly predicted the course of events 
that would follow the conclusion of the Suez Canal crisis in 
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Algeria. The Americans were unsympathetic to these argu-
ments, probably because of their inveterate distrust of 
"colonialism." The French put forth another argument. The 
nationalization was a response to the renege by the 
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Americans and the British on the Aswan High Dam loans. 
Therefore, they should take some responsibility for the con-
sequences of their action. 
The Americans proved unwilling to accept any sort of 
responsibility for the nationalization. They took the posi-
tion that Nasser had been planning this move for a long time 
and it was not retaliatory in nature. The Americans did 
agree, however, that some action was necessary. Their con-
tention was that the best solution to the situation was 
international discussion of the problem. They felt that the 
U.N. was not the ideal forum for the situation. Instead, 
Dulles suggested that some sort of international committee 
would be better suited to deal with the exigencies of the 
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situation. 
The American proposals for an international conference 
were soon to become reality. The final outcome of this 
round of British-French-American tripartite discussions was 
the proposal of an international conference which was to 
take place in London in August l956. While the three 
Western powers were conferring in London, the Soviets and 
Egyptians were having discussions of their own. According 
to Mohammed Heikal, the Egyptians were careful not to appear 
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to be coordinating their policy with the Russians. However, 
Nasser's conference with the Soviets on August 6 and other 
hints of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation, such as Nasser making 
the announcement that the Soviets were going to attend the 
London Conference before the Soviets had officially accepted 
the invitation to attend, gave many reason to believe that 
the Soviets and Egyptians were in collusion. Eden was cer-
tainly one of the many who held this belief. In his memoirs 
he states, "Egypt took up a rigid position, after consulta-
tion with the Russians. The contacts between the two 
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countries were close." Eden's statement of the nature of 
Soviet-Egyptian relations during this period is undoubtedly 
(given the evidence of Nasser's statement about Soviet 
attendance at the London Conference and the frequency of 
Soviet-Egyptian meetings) much closer to reality than is 
that of Heikal. Although there was undoubtedly little 
strategic or tactical coordination between the two countries, 
there was probably a great deal of information sharing and 
political cooperation between them. 
The cooperation between the Soviet Union and the 
Egyptians continued through the first London Conference 
which was held from August 16 to August 23. The confer-
ence was one of the key events of the early stages of the 
Suez crisis. Twenty-four nations were invited to the 
conference. Eight of them (Egypt, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, Russia, and Great Britain) were 
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asked to attend because they were signatories of the 1888 
Convention on canal use. The other sixteen were invited 
because large amounts of their commerce passed through the 
canal. The nations who were asked to attend because of the 
frequency with which their ships plied the canal included 
Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, West Germany, Greece, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, 
Portugal, Sweden and the United States. Of the nations 
which were invited, Egypt and Greece were the only nations 
that refused to attend. 
Egypt did not completely refrain from participating in 
the conference. Instead of sending active delegates to the 
proceedings, the Egyptians sent a party of observers to the 
conference. The delegation was headed by Ali Sabri. The 
Egyptian party of observers was sent in order to present the 
Egyptian point of view without giving Egyptian sanction of 
the conference and also to report the results of the proceed-
ing to Nasser. 
In the stead of an active Egyptian delegation, the 
Soviets became one of the champions of the Egyptian cause. 
In their statement of their acceptance of the invitation to 
the conference, the Soviet leaders made it clear where they 
stood. They stated that the conference was convened in dis-
regard of a number of relevant provisions of the 1888 Con-
vention, that the list of participants was biased (according 
to Anthony Nutting, the British had purposely stacked the 
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deck in their favor - a look at the participants and a close 
look at their political positions at the time seems to con-
firm the charge), and that acceptance "in no way commits" 
the Soviet Union to anything that could "harm Egypt's sover-
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eign rights and dignity." Like India, Ceylon, and Indonesia, 
the Soviet Union rallied behind Nasser at the Suez Canal 
Users Conference in London. The Indians, led by Krishna 
Menon, were the main proponents of the arguments in favor of 
the Egyptians' nationalization of the canal. The Soviet 
delegation acted as Menon's second in the debates. The main 
issue over which the two sides wrangled was the structure of 
a proposed international group that was to be set up to aid 
the Egyptians in the running of the Suez Canal. The Anglo-
French bloc wanted a tight grouping that would effectively 
take control of the canal away from Egypt and put it in 
international hands. The Soviets and the other pro-Nasser 
nations argued for a loosely knit group, "a consultative body 
of user interests with advisory, consultative and liaison 
functions," the existence of which would be "without preju-
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dice to Egyptian ownership and operation." 
At the beginning of the conference, the Soviets had 
argued that the nations which were now present on the terri-
tories of what had formerly been the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
as well as the other nations of Eastern Europe and the Arab 
nations of the Middle East, should have been invited to par-
ticipate. By reiterating their pre-conference position that 
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the list of attendees was biased, the Soviets were clearly 
announcing their pro-Egyptian position. The next argument 
which the Soviet delegation, led by Dmitri Shepilov, advanced 
was that no binding decision could be reached without active 
Egyptian participation since much of what was at issue -
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nationalization - was an internal Egyptian concern. After 
having made their basic position quite clear, the Soviets 
aligned with India and the other supporters of Nasser to 
block a British proposal which would have instituted "a 
majority rules" policy on voted issues. As a result, the 
conference was reft of any teeth that it might otherwise 
have had and became nothing more than a forum for the ex-
change of ideas. 
The conference resulted in what can basically be 
termed a stalemate. Eighteen of the attending nations took 
the position that the canal should be international, as the 
British had proposed. The other four participating 
countries (India, Indonesia, U.S.S.R. and Ceylon) supported 
the Egyptian position of neutralization of the canal under 
Egyptian sovereignty. (Ironically, the British and the 
Soviet positions on the issue of internationalization or 
neutralization of the canal had switched from the positions 
which the representatives of their respective nations had 
taken in 1888 at the bargaining table of the Treaty of 
Constantinople. The Egyptian position, which the Soviets 
supported, was nearly identical to the position that the 
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British had assumed in 1888. The British agitation for in-
ternationalization was quite similar to the position that the 
Soviet Union had endorsed as recently as 1946. Both sides 
were quite fond of reminding each other of their respective 
about-faces.) The London Conference did not moderate 
Nasser's position in any way. If any affect upon the 
Egyptian position was noticeable after the conference, it 
was that Nasser and the Egyptians stood even more firmly be-
hind their refusal to return the canal or have it inter-
nationalized. 
The failure of the London Conference opened the door to 
British and French military sanctions. Only three obstacles 
remained in the way of immediate action: 1) their armed 
forces were not yet ready to invade; 2) the Egyptians had 
given them no justifiable provocation to invade (true they 
had seized a British and French-owned company; however, they 
had not done injury to British or French citizens, nor had 
they prevented British or French ships from plying the canal, 
despite the refusal by the owners of British and French 
vessels to pay dues to the Egyptian Canal Authority); and, 3) 
the United States was strongly opposed to a military in-
vasion. Of these three obstacles, the second was the most 
important to overcome. The first problem only required a 
bit of time to reach a solution. The third was insufficient 
in and of itself to stop the British and French from imple-
menting a plan which they believed would bring them success 
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on all fronts. They were certain that military action would 
result in a quick victory which would return the canal to 
their control and at the same time wreak the destruction of 
their hated nemesis - Nasser. 
The French took the removal of the lack of sufficient 
provocation into their own hands. Without saying a word to 
Eden or any British minister, the French had turned to Israel 
for help in manufacturing a pretext for the invasion of 
Egypt. Inunediately after the London Conference, the French 
began discussions with the Israeli Defense Minister, Shimon 
Peres, which were aimed at recapturing the canal with Israeli 
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assistance. 
While the French and Israeli governments were collabo-
rating in the development of a plan designed to gain each 
its respective desire vis-a-vis Egypt, the war of words be-
tween Egypt and its European opponents continued its rapid 
escalation. The mounting tension was highlighted by the 
London Conference's decision to send a team of negotiators to 
Egypt to try to arrange a settlement. Ostensibly this would 
seem to be a positive step toward achieving a peaceful solu-
tion to the crisis. However, the emissary who was delegated 
to head the negotiating team could hardly have been a less 
suitable selection. Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of 
Australia, was made head of the delegation. Henzies was 
extremely pro-British and anti-Nasser in his public state-
ments and his selection was made even more detrimental to the 
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possibility of a successful negotiation by his personal 
prejudice against non-Caucasians. Menzies described himself 
publicly as a "reasonably bigoted descendant of the Scottish 
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race." Naturally, with an emissary like rlenzies, the peace 
mission was a dismal and absolute failure. A second major 
step toward war came after the London Conference when French 
troops were stationed on British-controlled Cyprus in prep-
aration for an invasion of the Suez Canal Zone. 
With the predictable failure of the Menzies mission, 
the prospect of war loomed even more brightly on the horizon. 
All that remained between the prospect and the actuality was 
an acceptable pretext for a Franco-British invasion. An at-
tempt toward providing themselves with just such a pretext 
was made by the British at the second London Conference which 
was convened on September 16th. The conference resulted in 
the setting up of an association of the users of the Suez 
Canal (S.C.U.A.) which the British hoped would agree to di-
vert all users' fees from Egypt to a fund controlled by the 
membership of S.C.U.A. The British hoped that this would 
cause the Egyptians to deny ships of the S.C.U.A. members 
passage through the canal and thus provide the British with 
an excuse to invade. The British hopes were dashed, however, 
by what seemed to be an American insistence on maintaining 
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the then existent status quo. 
The Soviet reaction to the Anglo-French military build-
up was predictable. They responded immediately to the prep-
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arations for war by the British and French militaries in 
their press. An editorial which was signed by an "Observer," 
a sobriquet which generally indicates that the author was a 
member of the Politburo and that the statements contained 
within the piece represent official policy, stated that the 
Anglo-French troop movements were indicative of "a nervous-
ness (that was) in no way justified." The position put forth 
in the editorial by an "Observer" was repeatedly put forward 
by the Soviet press over the next few weeks. The articles 
were all indicative of both the Soviet desire to support 
Egypt and their concomitant belief in the necessity to keep 
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tension in the Middle East at a minimum. 
The Soviet hope that the brewing storm in the Middle 
East could be kept from breaking was to a large extent 
matched by similar hopes among American policy makers. In 
an American statement on the subject which was reported by 
Pravda on August 9th, President Eisenhower said that "force 
is a bad solution to the Suez problem," but that he did not 
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oppose the use of force "under any circumstances." The 
last phrase in Eisenhower's statement was undoubtedly moti-
vated by the political necessities of the alliance between 
Great Britain and France and the U.S., but it seems likely 
that they had no greater significance given the evidence of 
later American actions and the efforts of John Foster Dulles 
to arrive at a legal solution to the crisis over the Suez 
Canal such as the one represented by S.C.U.A. 
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The next step taken by the British in "setting the 
stage" for an Anglo-French invasion was to take the matter 
to the United Nations' Security Council. The British delga-
tion was led by Selwyn Lloyd who put forward six requirements 
for a settlement that Eden felt would be unacceptable to the 
Egyptians. These requirements were to become known as the 
Six Proposals, and they were: 
1) Free and open transit of the canal without dis-
crimination, overt or covert; 
2) The sovereignty of Egypt would be respected; 
3) The insulation of the canal's operation from 
the politics of any country; 
4) The manner of fixing tolls should be decided 
by agreement between the users and Egypt; 
5) A fair proportion of dues should be alloted 
to development; and 
6) In case of disputes, unresolved affairs be-
tween the Suez Canal Company and Egypt should 
60 
be resolved by arbitration. 
The British proposed that these six principles be implemented 
by an international board. This was something that Egypt had 
already rejected absolutely. The Soviets were adamantly 
against any strictures such as the ones the British proposed. 
The Egyptians, however, surprisingly proved willing to 
accept the original six proposals, but were still unwilling 
to accept internationalization of the canal. They were will-
ing to compromise as long as their sovereignty was not dimin-
ished. Selwyn Lloyd, Mahmoud Fawzi, and U.N. Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjold began discussions and eventually 




Eden and French Prime Minister Pineau were displeased 
at the turn toward a negotiated settlement of the canal 
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crisis. Such a conclusion to the dispute would destroy, 
temporarily at the very least, their plans for the eradica-
tion of Nasser and the restoration of Anglo-French influence 
in the Middle East. They did their best to delay the 
process of negotiation by making false and antagonistic 
accusations directed at the Egyptians in their public 
speeches. Their delaying tactics were successful enough to 
keep a settlement from being reached before Israel had in-
vaded Egypt. 
During the period of verbal sparring following the 
first London Conference, the French and the Israelis had 
been quietly working out a plan in which Israel was to mount 
a rapid attack on Egyptian positions in the Sinai. Given 
this opening, Britain and France would wait until Israel had 
seized all or most of the Sinai and would then intervene 
demanding that both sides withdraw their forces from the 
Suez Canal. The invasion by the two erstwhile controllers 
of the canal would take place on the pretext that the Anglo-
French forces were attempting to prevent the canal from sus-
taining damage during the fighting. Given this scenario, 
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Britain and France would have, according to the plan, a per-
feet excuse for re-establishing their control of the Canal 
Zone and for taking over the terminal ports which had hither-
to been used by Egypt to implement their blockade of the 
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canal from use by Israeli ships. 
The French presented this plan to Eden and his top 
advisors on October 14. As reported by Anthony Nutting, 
Eden's reaction was scarcely concealed glee. Despite the 
objections and warnings of his Foreign Ilinister and his 
Foreign Secretary, Nutting and Selwyn Lloyd, Eden went to 
Paris two days after the French proposal had been broached 
to him. There he had several meetings with his French oppo-
site number, Guy Mollet. In those meetings, he agreed to 
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the French plan for an Israeli attack. 
The Israeli attack took place on October 30. It was 
a complete and rapid success. Inside of one week, the 
Israelis had driven Egypt out of the Sinai in a series of 
paratroop and armored attacks that devastated the Egyptian 
army. The Israelis had Franco-British aid in their attacks. 
In addition to the physical aid of British and French air 
strikes, the Israelis were benefited by the Egyptian prepara-
tions to defend Alexandria from an Anglo-French invasion. 
The expectation of an attack from Cyprus helped the Israelis 
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to achieve a nearly total surprise of the Egyptian forces. 
Almost immediately after the Israeli invasion, the 
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British and French governments sent an ultimatum demanding 
that both sides cease hostilities and withdraw ten miles 
from the Suez Canal. If these conditions were not met, the 
French and British threatened military intervention in 
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twenty-four hours. Perhaps the most significant thing to 
note about the ultimatum is that it demanded that the 
Israelis withdraw ten miles from the canal four days before 
they had even come near it. By granting this territory to 
Israel and allowing Egyptian forces only twenty-four hours 
to withdraw (an impossible task), the British and French 
served notice to anyone who cared to look that they were in 
collusion with the Israelis. 
By the time that Israel had consolidated its hold on 
the Sinai (one week after their initial attacks), Britain 
and France were prepared to intervene physically with their 
own troops. Their "efforts" at "peacemaking" had failed as 
was intended, and they had provided the French and British 
with an excuse to intervene since the Egyptians had not com-
plied with the terms of their ultimatum. So on November 5, 
a force of Anglo-French paratroopers invaded Port Said. 
Their invasion was the beginning of the final stage of the 
Israeli-French-British plot to destroy Nasser. According to 
their plan, this last stage was to end with an Egyptian 
popular revolt which was to oust Nasser. If such a revolt 
failed to materialize, the allies were prepared to invade 
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Cairo and eliminate Nasser themselves. 
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The last stage of the plan came to an abrupt and 
abortive halt on November 7. The British pound sterling 
had taken a nose dive on the world market and, as a result, 
the British economy was in danger of collapse. A cease-fire 
in the Sinai was the price of American intervention to stave 
off such a fiscal disaster for Great Britain. 
The American desire for a cease-fire was the result of 
their view of the Anglo-French adventure as a dangerous 
folly. They had agitated from its inception to halt it and 
had tried to prevent it from occurring in the first place. 
The American view was generated out of a well-placed sense 
of timidity. Despite the bitter resentment of Nasser that 
had been engendered in Dulles, the Americans apparently 
realized what an armed incursion into an independent Arab 
nation would do to damage their image in the Middle East 
whether or not it was successful in its short term goal. 
Any attack on Nasser would make him a martyr to the 
rapacious desires of Western imperialism - especially if it 
was successful. If the attempt was unsuccessful, it would 
heighten Nasser's prestige in the Third World also. If it 
was successful, it would probably cause a drastic shift 
toward the Soviet Union. Thus, any military action to re-
gain the canal could only result in a serious loss for the 
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United States. 
The Soviet Union had also agitated from the beginning 
for a halt to the Anglo-French invasion. Unlike that of the 
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Americans, the Soviet role was limited to vociferous saber-
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rattling that did little to end the conflagration. The 
Soviets were limited to a secondary role because, unlike the 
U.S., the Soviet Union had no political and very little 
economic leverage with the participants in the invasion. The 
Soviet leaders did gain much more than the United States as a 
result of the invasion. A drastic improvement in the Soviet 
position in the Arab world was built into the situation. 
They were able to be quite public in their condemnation of 
the invasion of Egypt because their allies were not involved 
in it. The United States could not possibly gain anywhere 
near the kind or amount of prestige that the Soviets did 
despite the fact that its quiet machinations were the instru-
ment that actually halted the allied agression. 
Soviet saber-rattling came in a series of communiques 
to Britain, France and Israel. Implications that were read 
into their communiques included the threat of nuclear war, 
and the dispatch of communist volunteers to aid Egypt. As 
the result of such bellicose diplomacy, the Soviets have 
often made the claim to have been responsible for the cessa-
tion of the hostilities between Egypt and her foes. It is a 
claim which is quite often given credence in the Arab world 
(but a claim which even Nasser discounted) . In their com-
munications with the Egyptian government, the Soviets were 
much more cautious. Perhaps the most significant communica-
tion with Egypt was one that came just after the Franco-
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British invasion of Port Said. It informed the Egyptian 
government that no material aid was forthcoming and that 
they (the Egyptians) would have to "strengthen their will to 
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resist." Thus, the Soviet contribution to the Egyptian war 
effort was limited to rhetoric and the agreed upon arms 
shipments which stemmed from the 1955 arms deal. The Soviets 
risked nothing. However, their minimal contributions did 
provide them a great deal of benefit in the years to come. 
When the hostilities were over, the balance sheet 
seemed fairly clear. The Israelis had achieved their prob-
able objectives by increasing their own territory and open-
ing up the sea lanes. The French had not succeeded in 
quelling the Algerian revolution by destroying Nasser, but 
then neither had they lost anything of significance. They 
were already friendless in the Arab world and their conduct 
of the war cost them none of their other friends. They had 
regained a damaged and inoperative canal at minimal loss. 
The British had won an easy military victory along with 
their allies, but they had failed to dislodge Nasser, lost 
prestige in the Arab world, and antagonized the U.S. In 
reality, they had gained nothing but woe for all of their 
troubles. A particularly apt description of the results 
of the Suez war for Britain came from Dulles, who described 
the British post-incursion position by saying, "Eden had 
wrested one end of the (Suez) canal out of Nasser's throat 
but the piece now stuck in his own and Eisenhower was pound-
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ing on his back to get it loose." 
The U.N. had shown itself to be ineffective by its 
failure to keep the Israelis from invading, the manner in 
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which its authority was flaunted by the Anglo-French inter-
vention and through their threats (albeit threats which none 
of the participants seemed to take seriously) and vitupera-
tion. The U.S. had gained some prestige through its role in 
stopping the war, but its propaganda gains in the Third 
World were severely tarnished by its continued alliance with 
Great Britain. The Soviet Union had, by bellowing its out-
rage, made important gains in attracting the Arab nations 
toward its side. They had also been provided with a diver-
sion from their own actions in Hungary. Egypt had lost a 
military victory. The overwhelming force that had been 
arrayed against it made such a defeat one without disgrace. 
The very fact of the combined aggression against Nasser had, 
instead of weakening him, made him even more clearly the 
focal point of Arab unity. He had emerged as one of the 
major spokesmen for the entire Third World, but most 
especially Africa and Asia. 
With the cessation of hostilities, this episode in the 
history of the Middle East entered a new phase. Combat was 
over, but negotiations were just beginning. The negotia-
tions turned out to be one of the most unusual postwar 
palavers that ever took place. They were extremely 
one-sided. In itself this is not unusual, quite often the 
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victors on the battlefield completely dictate the postwar 
settlement as they did at Versailles in 1919. The negotia-
tions following the Suez War were unique in that the military 
victors were forced to give up their gains and the loser was 
given nearly everything that it desired. France, Great 
Britain, and Israel were forced by political pressure and 
economic fact to give up all of their military gains. The 
only concession that the allies were able to gain was a 
face-saving measure. Instead of immediately implementing a 
total withdrawal, the 'victors' were allowed to withdraw 
their troops in phases. 
The end result of the Suez Canal War and its immediate 
aftermath was the cementing of the friendship between the 
Soviet Union and Egypt. By concluding an amicable relation-
ship with the leader of the Arab world, the Soviet Union 
succeeded in spreading the roots of its influence even more 
widely in the politically fertile soils of the Middle East. 
They accomplished an extremely important victory in the arena 
of international influence without any immediate risk to 
themsleves. The Soviets had managed in one fell swoop to 
acquire new friends in the Middle East and to strengthen 
their ties with the region's leading Arab power. 
Although the Suez Canal War improved the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and Egypt, all of their contacts 
were not necessarily positive. For example, the Egyptians 
disbanded their National Guard because of its apparent 
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attempts to gain credit for the victorious settlement of the 
Suez dispute by associating with the popular Soviets. The 
disbanding of the National Guard was greeted with intense 
displeasure in Moscow because the Guard had strong communist 
elements within its ranks. Nasser also made attempts to im-
prove relations with the United States which caused conster-
nation in Moscow that they might be losing their recently 
acquired gains. 
According to Mohammed Heikal, these attempts to improve 
relations with the Soviet Union's primary foe were the re-
sult of Nasser's gratitude for the role which the U.S. had 
played in halting its allies' incursion, as well as a con-
scious ~~licy of playing the two superpowers off of one 
another. Because of the relatively tight bipolar makeup of 
the world political system at the time, this was obviously 
bound to be displeasing to the Soviet government. Another 
indication of the minor abrasiveness that still pervaded the 
the Soviet-Egyptian relationship was the closure of a Soviet 
film festival in Cairo by the Egyptian authorities. The 
Egyptians called the films blatant communist propaganda and 
no amount of Soviet effort was able to get the film festival 
reopened, even though they did make strenuous attempts in 
this regard. They even went as far as sending the Minister 
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for Cultural Affairs to straighten out the contretemps. 
Contacts between the two nations were increased 
despite the problems which occasionally developed between 
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them. After the cease-fire was declared, an Egyptian Trade 
Union delegation was sent to the Soviet Union by the Nasser 
government. This was the first step in the resumption of a 
more normal pattern of cultural and economic relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and the Egyptians. In the days fol-
lowing the cease-fire, the Soviets also continued to support 
the Egyptian position vis-a-vis their opponents when they 
threatened to allow Soviet "volunteers to go to Egypt's aid 
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should there be no foreign withdrawal." In December, Nasser 
publicly declared that he was seeking closer ties with the 
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Soviet Union in a speech he made over Radio Moscow. 
The year following the Suez War was one of continued 
tightening of the ties between the Soviet Union and Egypt. 
In mid-January, a Soviet industrial fair opened in Cairo. 
Four days later, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 
of China both demanded that Great Britain, France, and 
Israel pay Egypt reparations for the damage done in their 
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joint invasion of Egyptian territory. In February, a dela-
gation of atomic physicists from the Soviet Union visited 
Egypt to participate in discussions with their Egyptian 
counterparts regarding the development of nuclear power in 
Egypt. These and other like meetings resulted in the July 
6 announcement from Moscow which stated that an atomic 
electric station was to be set up in Egypt with Soviet aid. 
Between the visit of the Soviet physicists to Egypt and the 
announcement of Egypt's entry into the production of electric 
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energy via the use of atomic power, there were other impor-
tant contacts between the Nasser regime and the Soviet 
government. Two of the most important were the May visit to 
Egypt of a Soviet governmental delegation and the visit by 
members of the Egyptian Trade Union to the Soviet Union in 
that same month. 
The Soviet governmental delegation was headed by its 
Foreign Minister, Dmitri Shepilov. It is quite probable 
that the two major topics which the Soviet delegation and 
Nasser's government discussed during the conferences were 
the forthcoming atomic electric plant and the renewed pos-
sibility of Soviet aid in building Egypt's Aswan High Dam. 
The Western renege on their promise to help Egypt build the 
dam has been cited previously as one of the proximate causes 
for the Suez Canal War, and getting such a project under way 
was still in the forefront of Nasser's thoughts. Nasser 
still believed that the improvements in irrigation and 
electric production that would result from the project were 
a vital step in bringing Egypt into the modern world as an 
equal with the nations of the West. Building the dam would 
increase Egyptian agricultural production, thus increasing 
both its capacity for feeding itself and the levels of crops 
such as rice and cotton which it had available for export. 
It would help it industrialize. The dam would provide 
power and raw materials for the development of industries 
like the steel industry and the chemical fertilizer industry. 
The latter would again be beneficial to agriculture and 
further fuel its growth. The dam would also be extremely 
valuable as a tool to control the destructive flooding of 
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the Nile such as that which occurred in 1955. With advant-
ages as important to the growth of the Egyptain economy as 
these, it is little wonder that Nasser felt that without 
such a project, Egypt would never be anything but a poor 
relation unable to stand on its own two feet in the eco-
nomic and political world that was developing around it. 
Curiously enough, despite their earlier assertions 
that they were willing to aid Egypt in the Aswan High Dam 
project, the Soviets did not immediately make a firm offer 
of aid to the Egyptians after the dust of the Suez Canal 
crisis had settled. They did not make an offer in the fol-
lowing year. They did not make an offer to aid the 
Egyptians' project until October 1958, nearly two years 
after the West's withdrawal of aid had precipitated the 
Suez Canal crisis. When the Soviet offer finally came, it 
came at a time when Soviet-Egyptian relations were beginning 
to feel the strain brought on by another of Nasser's cam-
paigns against the Communist Party of Egypt. 
During the interim between the end of the Suez Canal 
War and the Soviet of fer of aid for the Aswan High Dam, 
diplomatic contacts between Egypt and the Soviets continued 
apace. The contacts were, however, on a substantially lower 
policital level than had been the case during the Suez Canal 
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and its immediate aftermath. In fact, 1957 and 1958 most 
accurately would be called a period of consolidation, a 
period when the developing friendship between the two 
countries was cemented by the broadening of the infra-
structure of middle-level contacts in the realms of econo-
mies, culture, and the military. 
During the nearly two dozen months between the signing 
of the Aswan Dam deal between the Soviet Union and Egypt and 
the placement of the U.N. peacekeeping force in the war zone 
around the Suez Canal, there were twenty-six agreements or 
exchanges which helped to widen and deepen the scope of con-
tact between the U.S.S.R. and the Egyptians. Nearly half of 
them were cultural in nature, but the rest ran the gamut from 
diplomatic initiatives to military coordination and economic 
cooperation. By the end of this period, the infrastructure 
of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship was sufficiently well 
established to allow Nasser to visit Moscow for consulta-
tions with Soviet leaders about the stance and course of 
action which each of their respective nations would take in 
reaction to the international crisis in Lebanon in July of 
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1958. 
There were two events of major international signifi-
cance in which either the Soviet Union or Egypt was involved 
in 1957 and early 1958. Ultimately, neither had much direct 
effect upon the relationship between the two countries. The 
first, the Soviet Union's launch of the first artificial 
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satellite to orbit the earth, was important both because of 
its impact upon the scientific communities of the United 
States and the rest of the world and because of its effect 
upon the thinking of the military strategists in the West and 
79 
the Soviet Union. Its immediate effects upon Egypt, however, 
were minimal. Over the long term the ancillary benefits of 
the Soviet space program (such as the improvements in its 
guided missile technology and launching capacity) had an im-
portant effect on the world strategic situation, and thus the 
ability of the Soviet Union to assist its allies, and in its 
political and military strategy. In these respects, there 
were long term effects upon the relationship between Egypt 
and the U.S.S.R. from the launching of the Sputnik satellite 
and its effect on world politics. 
The second event of note occurred in February 1958 when 
Syria and Egypt signed an accord which bound the two nations 
in a federal republic. Known as the United Arab Republic, 
the union between the two Arab nations did not last long. 
As a result, it had little overall effect upon the relation-
ship between the Soviet Union and Egypt. In fact, the 
little effect it did have was negative, not positive as one 
might expect. Instead of applauding the assumption of con-
trol of the presidency of Syria by their ally, Nasser, the 
Soviets were somewhat dismayed by the prospect (which 
eventually did become a reality) of Nasser suppressing the 
strong and growing Communist Party of Syria. 
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Nasser's suppression of the Syrian and Egyptian Commu-
nists later in 1958 did engender quite a bit of tension in the 
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relationship between the Soviets and Egypt. Yet the strain 
was insufficient in October to stop the process begun years 
earlier which resulted in the Soviet loan of 80 million dol-
lars to Egypt for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. In 
mid-October, Egyptian Vice President Marshal Amir went to 
Moscow. During Amir's visit, Khrushchev announced the Soviet 
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decision to aid the Egyptians in the building of the dam. 
The signing of the agreement between the Egyptians and 
the Soviets on financing the Aswan Dam was the beginning of 
steadily increasing Egyptian economic and military depend-
ence upon aid from the Soviet Union. It was also the final 
act of the first period of cordial diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries which had begun with the Czech Arms 
Deal. 
The deterioration of the relationship between the 
Soviets and the Egyptians had its roots in Nasser's anti-
communism and in Khrushchev's unwillingness to accept 
Nasser's decision to suppress the communists of the U.A.R. 
without at least attempting to do something to stop it. 
Nasser's drive against the Communists in the U.A.R. 
was brought on by two parallel developments. The first, a 
purely internal matter, was the result of the political 
situation in Syria. Unlike the parties in Egypt before its 
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revolution, the political parties of Syria were broadly 
based and deeply rooted. They ran the gamut from the ex-
treme left to the far right. Another difference between the 
situations of the two countries when they came under Nasser's 
sway, and perhaps the one which ultimately was the key to the 
failure of the union between Syria and Egypt, was the posi-
tion of Nasser himself in relation to the political structure 
of the country. 
In Egypt, Nasser had been a member of an indigenous 
group of political elites which represented the aspirations 
of the majority of the Egyptian populace. He had solidified 
his position as the dominant figure in the political hier-
archy because of his understanding of Egypt and the 
Egyptians and the latent political desires of the mass of 
the Egyptian elite. In Syria, on the other hand, Nasser was 
an outsider, albeit an outsider who was looked upon by much 
of the Syrian political elite as some sort of demigod, but 
an outsider nonetheless. He did not understand the Syrians 
nor did he comprehend their political system. Without the 
basic knowledge of the Syrians and their political system 
that a native would have possessed, Nasser made a series of 
political miscalculations that destroyed the political alli-
ance that had resulted in the Syrian request for union with 
Egypt. 
While the twists and turns in the political situation 
in Syria that would eventually rupture the U.A.R. were 
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taking their course, the second of the two developments that 
helped to bring about Nasser's drive to suppress Syria's 
communists was taking place in Iraq. 
In July 1958, the Iraqis had overthrown the Hashemite 
monarchy which had long been in place in their country. In 
its place, there emerged a "progressive" government which 
was composed of several different factions, including Iraq's 
communists. This new regime in Iraq immediately recognized 
the Soviet Union and soon thereafter established relations 
with the rest of the world's communist states. The Soviets 
hailed General Abdel Kareem Kassem, the leader of the new 
Iraqi government as "a truly democratic ruler." Suddenly, 
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Iraq had become more democratic than Egypt and the U.A.R. 
The foundation of a new regime in Iraq which had a 
strong communist element and which seemed to be Moscow's 
new darling in the Arab world caused two distinct problems 
for Nasser. First, along with the communists, there was a 
strong pro-Nasser element in the Iraqi coalition, including 
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the Ba'ath party. The Ba'ath party, the Sunni Moslem minor-
ity, and the other pro-Nasserites were led by General Abdel 
Salaam Aref and they sought union with the U.A.R. on much the 
same basis as that upon which Syria had joined Egypt. The 
Communists, the Kurds, the majority of the Shi'ite Moslems, 
and other elements were led by Kassem. While at first they, 
too, desired links with the U.A.R., they wanted a very loose 
federal arrangement which would have kept their country 
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autonomous for the most part. 
The two factions in Iraq quickly clashed. The opening 
salvo of their battle was fired in November when Kassem had 
his Deputy Prime Minister, Aref, arrested. As a result of 
the arrest, the groups which opposed union with the U.A.R., 
including the Communists, gained predominance within the 
government of Iraq. In December, the pro-union group led by 
Rashid Ali Gaylani attempted a coup. It failed. The anti-
U .A.R. faction gained even more strength. In late February 
and early March of 1959, the pro-Nasser forces in Iraq made 
one last-ditch effort to change the political course of 
Iraq. Led by Colonel Abdel Wahhab Shawwaf, they once more 
attempted to overthrow Kassem and his supporters by force. 
They failed once again, and with their failure the last 
hopes for an Iraqi union with the U.A.R. died. 
The defeats of the Nasserites in Iraq bolstered the 
position of the Iraqi communists and strengthened their dis-
like for Nasser and his policies. They began to agitate 
vigorously against Nasser and sought the breakup of the 
U.A.R. Along with Kassem and the other foes of Arab union, 
the communists made sure that it would not come to pass in 
Iraq. 
That was the first problem which the new Iraqi govern-
ment presented Nasser. The second had its roots in the 
struggle for preeminence in the Arab world which had existed 
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for centuries between Cairo and Baghdad and which had re-
surfaced with the political duels between Nasser and Nuri 
a-Said. The emergence of a viable new regime in Iraq with 
the support of the Soviet Union could threaten Egypt's 
cultural and political dominance (and with it Nasser's own 
prestige) and possibly represent an alternative center for 
Arab unity. This, in turn, threatened the relatively weak 
ties which had been established between Syria and Egypt. 
Both the growing power of the Iraqi Communist Party 
and its support against Nasser encouraged the Syrian commun-
ists to begin to work actively against the Nasser regime. 
In November of 1958, soon after the arrest of Aref in Iraq, 
the Syrian Communist Party issued a thirteen point program 
which assailed the recently formed Union and asserted that 
Arab unity would fail unless more democratic freedoms were 
allowed and the differing conditions in each country were 
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fully considered. What made the charges of the Syrian 
communists particularly damaging to Nasser and the Union was 
the accuracy of their commentary. 
Nasser began the suppression of the Syrian Communist 
Party in December. He effectively shattered their organiza-
tion with the arrest of the majority of their leaders. 
During the process of the destruction of Syria's communists, 
Nasser leveled a series of broadsides at both the Syrian 
party and its Iraqi counterpart. Indirectly, these attacks 
were also aimed at the Soviet Union. The first of Nasser's 
verbal assaults came on December 23 at Port Said, where 
Nasser accused the Syrian Communist Party of attempting to 
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undermine Arab unity. Nasser's choice of time and place for 
the opening salvo of the war of words between him and his 
communist adversaries was extremely significant. He chose 
Port Said, the symbol of Egyptian resistance to the foreign 
incursion by Britain and France in 1956, on the anniversary 
of the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces. At least 
subtly, Nasser was equating communism with Western imperial-
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ism. 
Freed by Nasser's barrage, the Egyptian press un-
leased a violent polemical campaign against Arab communism. 
At the same time, they tried to soften their statements for 
the Soviets to some degree by coupling them with assurances 
of the goodwill of the U.A.R. toward the Soviet Union. 
Despite these attempts to lighten the blow, the attacks by 
the Egyptian press aroused Soviet ire. Khrushchev took up 
the gauntlet at the 21st Party Congress of the CPSU and 
attempted to defend his fellow communists against the un-
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just attacks. 
The Egyptians parried Khrushchev's attack by claiming 
that he was attempting to violate the principles adopted at 
the Bandung Conference by interfering in the internal 
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affairs of the U.A.R. By April, Soviet-Egyptian relations 
had deteriorated to the point where Khrushchev and Nasser 
had begun to exchange personal insults, and the Soviets were 
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threatening the withdrawal of their aid. 
Eventually, the war of nerves between the two erst-
while allies subsided. The Egyptians apparently realized 
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that a break with Moscow was not in their own best interests. 
As a result, they halted their public attacks on the U.S.S.R. 
The Soviets, on their part, came to understand that a break 
with Nasser would only benefit the West. So they also de-
cided to call a halt to the hostile comments directed toward 
Egypt by their press. 
However, in less public situations, there were still 
problems bewteen the two nations. For example, the condi-
tions under which Egyptian students in the Soviet Union were 
living began to worsen. The students were forced to live 
two to a room when in the past they each had been provided 
with a single room for themselves. The Egyptian students 
were also forced to attend classes on communist doctrine 
which was a violation of the agreement between the two 
governments that there was to be no indoctrination of ex-
change students, an agreement which was one of the bases 
upon which they had been sent. 
In October, Nasser and the Egyptians withdrew their 
students from their schools in the U.S.S.R. They sent them 
to the U.S. instead. They arrived there in a blaze of 
publicity and enrolled in the various U.S. universities in 
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which places had been made for them. Incidents of this 
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sort, while having relatively little significance in and of 
themselves, nevertheless kept the relationship between Egypt 
and the Soviet Union from progressing smoothly. They kept 
tension at a level where neither side could really trust the 
other or consider it an ally. 
In January 1960, both sides determined that things had 
gone far enough and decided to further ease the tension that 
had beset the Soviet-Egyptian relationship for more than a 
year. The Soviet Minister of Power Stations, Ignatti 
Novikov, came to Egypt early in the month to attend the 
start of work on the Aswan Dam. He brought with him a 
polite message from Khrushchev and a modest gift. Nasser 
met him and during the discussion of the forthcoming cele-
bration of the dam's opening, Nasser showed Novikov a medal 
which he had struck to commemorate the occasion. Nasser 
told Novikov that he wanted to send one of these medals to 
Khrushchev in honor of the role that he and the Soviets had 
played in bringing the plans for the construction of the dam 
to fruition. 
Later in the conversation, the question of the status 
of the dam project came up. Novikov pointed out that the 
distinction between the first and second stages of the dam 
was artificial and that it was going to result in a good 
deal of wasted effort. Nasser agreed, and asked, "But would 
Mr. Khrushchev be willing to discuss the second phase now? 
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I am making this request officially." 
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Novikov got in touch with Khrushchev and after a few 
days he received Moscow's reply. In a Politburo meeting on 
January 17, the Soviet leaders had decided to help finance 
the second stage of the dam. The agreement was made official 
in an exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Nasser. 
The attempts at reconciliation between the countries 
had finally borne fruit. The Egyptians were being relative-
ly friendly toward the Soviets in the press, while the 
Soviets were allowing Egypt to conduct its own affairs with-
out Soviet interference. Overt Soviet participation in 
Egyptian affairs was now limited to that which the Egyptians 
themselves had requested - arms supply and economic loans. 
As Khrushchev put it at an embassy party in Hoscow, "We have 
forgotten our quarrels with Egypt. 
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standing and a waste of time." 
It was all a misunder-
The crisis in Soviet-Egyptian relations had passed. 
The two countries were now successfully patching up many of 
their quarrels and the Soviet supply of aid was flowing un-
diminished to Egypt. Still, the problems in the relation-
ship between the two countries had not yet quite come to an 
end. During the final months of the year, beginning at the 
November meeting of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in 
Moscow, the Soviets started to shift their foreign policy 
toward a new more militant posture which outside pressures, 
such as their growing conflict with China, had forced them 
to adopt. 
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The changes in foreign policy were in large part only 
differences in their ideological stance upon certain issues. 
Perhaps the most important alteration in Soviet policy came 
in regard to the stance which they took on the internal 
structure of the nations of the underdeveloped world. The 
new Soviet ideological posture was predicated on the exist-
ence of a "new" stage of political development which 
nations went through on the path to socialism. This new 
phase, the phase of so-called "national democracy," was 
defined as being a period in which a state consistently up-
held its political and economic independence and fought 
against imperialism and its military blocs; a period in 
which a state fights against new forms of colonialism and 
the penetration of imperialist capital; a period character-
ized by a state's rejection of dictatorial and despotic 
methods of government and by the assurance of broad demo-
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cratic rights and freedoms for the people. 
Another question which the new Soviet foreign policy 
line took a different tack toward than the old one had was 
the role of Communist parties in national liberation move-
ments (during the phase of national democracy as well as 
during earlier periods). It was a question which had been 
ignored for the most part by the Soviets since Stalin's 
death. Now, at least temporarily, the Soviet hierarchy, 




With these changes in attitude toward the countries of 
the Third World, tension between the Soviet Union and Egypt 
was bound to rise once more. A series of articles attacking 
the repressive policies of the Egyptian government appeared 
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in the Soviet press. According to the Soviet journalists, 
the U.A.R. was resorting to "dictatorial" and "repressive" 
methods and therefore was not "a state of national 
democracy." 
Initially, this campaign did not have too much effect 
upon the relationship between the Soviets and the U.A.R. 
The top leadership of both countries seemed content to let 
the issues raised in these articles remain undiscussed. In 
May 1961, however, a serious breach of the temporary truce 
that had been arranged between the two nations occurred 
during Anwar Sadat's visit to I1oscow for the Hay Day cele-
brations there. When Khrushchev received Sadat in his 
office on May 3, he launched into a tirade during the 
course of which he lambasted everything American. When 
Sadat tried to placate him, he told Sadat that Arab 
"nationalism wasn't the summit of happiness." He went on to 
claim that the Arabs were politically backward and that they 
were falling into an imperialist trap. Sadat was shocked, 
but he refrained from responding until he had consulted with 
Nasser. 
Nasser was furious. He told Sadat that he must answer 
strongly. Sadat responded in a written draft that was pre-
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pared by Heikal. It defended Arab nationalism and suggested 
that Khrushchev was making the same mistake as the imperial-
ists were when he claimed that his was the only path to 
political maturity and happiness. Sadat concluded with the 
suggestion that there were alternative paths to political 
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adulthood and that each nation must choose its own. 
Sadat's letter ended the incident, and a period of 
relative calm in the relationship ensued. Mid-level con-
tacts between the two nations were still maintained, and 
cooperation in the economic, military, and cultural realms 
continued to develop. 
The breakup of the union between Egypt and Syria in 
September 1961 coincided with new less repressive policies 
at home in Egypt. Nasser's belief that the U.A.R. had been 
sabotaged by the Syrian feudal and bourgeois classes and by 
conservative elements in the rest of the Arab world caused 
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him to cling more tightly to the ideals of Arab socialism. 
His adherence to those principles isolated him in the Arab 
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world, and was one of the factors which led to the be-
ginnings of rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt in 
1962. 
During 1962, the levels of trade between the two 
nations once again increased sharply. Other indicators, 
such as cultural contacts, showed that important new con-
nections were being developed between the U.S.S.R. and 
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Egypt. The ideological questions raised in late 1961 were 
still obstacles to smooth relations, however. They were 
still under debate and Khrushchev, the primary force in 
Soviet politics behind the U.S.S.R.'s interest in Egypt, was 
in the midst of a period of relative political decline in 
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his personal power because of the U-2 incident. As a re-
sult, there were no high-level exchanges between the two 
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countries during the year. In the meantime, the ideological 
debate was continuing in the Soviet Union, with Ponomarev 
and the Ideological Department for Foreign Policy of the 
Central Committee coming down in favor of the hard-line 
stance discussed in the preceding paragraphs, and experts 
on the Middle East and its affairs like Georgi Mirskii and 
R. Ulianovskii adopting a more positive attitude toward 
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Egypt. 
The. favorable stance of the Middle Eastern experts 
was in part a reaction to the new National Charter which 
Nasser and the Egyptians had instituted in May 1962. In 
it, Nasser created a new party, the Arab Socialist Union, 
which took up the mantle of the National Union as Egypt's 
sole political party. The charter also declared Egypt's 
rejection of the capitalist path and emphasized the need to 
eliminate class differences within the country. Finally, 
it reserved 50 percent of all parliamentary seats for the 
elected representatives of the workers and the peasants. 
The positive outlook that Soviet Middle Eastern ex-
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perts displayed toward Egypt was also partially due to 
Egypt's intervention on behalf of the republican forces in 
Yemen in late September. Nasser's intervention on behalf 
of the Yemeni revolutionaries was a sign of just how impor-
tant the role that he could and did play in Arab politics 
was. Clearly, there were practical advantages to be derived 
from - as well as theoretical justifications for - dealing 
with him as a friend and ally. 
The theoretical dispute over foreign policy continued 
to rage unabated in the U.S.S.R. in 1963, but the Middle 
Eastern experts seemed to slowly be getting the upperhand in 
influencing decisions regarding regional affairs in their 
own area of expertise. Nasser's generally progressive 
stance in both his domestic and external policies seemed to 
be overcoming the miasma of negativism that his anti-
communism had engendered among the members of the Soviet 
political elite. In June, Khrushchev sent Adzhubey back to 
Egypt as his proxy. His mission was to try to convince 
Nasser to try to relax his hard-line anti-communist position. 
The Soviet politician argued that the cessation of the 
attacks upon Egypt's communists by Nasser and the state ap-
paratus would remove the last obstacles in the way of the 
improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the 
Egyptians. Nasser relented. He must have seen that there 
was relatively little point in the continued persecution of 
Egypt's communists. He had already effectively destroyed 
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most of their influence in the country and severely crippled 
their organization. He no longer had any reason to worry 
about their subversive activities. In July, he announced 
that all political prisoners were to be released, that con-
centration camps were to be closed, and that communists were 
to be invited to the ASU as individuals and to aid it in the 
building of socialism. This change in policy was greeted 
with enthusiasm in the Soviet Union and resistance to a 
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visit by Khrushchev evaporated. 
Khrushchev visited Cairo in May 1964. The visit, his 
first to Africa, was in honor of the completion of the first 
phase of the Aswan High Dam. The Egyptians accorded 
Khrushchev a massive reception and invited him to perform 
the opening ceremony for the dam. During his speech at the 
dam's opening, Khrushchev awarded Nasser and Amer (then 
Vice-President) the honor of naming them each a "Hero of 
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the Soviet Union." 
Khrushchev's visit to Egypt lasted sixteen days. The 
visit has been called a "festival of Arab-Soviet coopera-
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tion." And, to a certain extent, it was. The Soviets had 
proffered a 250 million dollar loan for economic develop-
ment, and they had made Nasser and Amer "Heroes of the 
Soviet Union." Most importantly, the occasion for 
Khrushchev's visit was the completion of the first phase of 
the most important symbol of Arab-Soviet cooperation that 
has been constructed to date, the Aswan High Dam. The 
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visit also had its low points. One example is the row be-
tween Khrushchev and Iraqi President Aref over that country's 
communists. Another is Khrushchev's embarrassment of Gromyko 
and Marshal Andrei Grechko, his Minister of Defense, at a 
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luncheon in Alexandria. 
Both the positive and negative aspects of Khrushchev's 
performance played a minor role in the political events which 
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took place in the Soviet Union over the next few months. 
They were added to a long list of faux pas and political 
blunders which Khrushchev had made during the course of the 
years he spent in power. These errors cost Khrushchev his 
position in October when the other members of the Politburo 
dismissed him from both his job as Prime Minister and his 
position as First Secretary of the Communist Party. 
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt 
during the period in which Khrushchev was in power in the 
U.S.S.R. was one of "sturm und drang." There were tremen-
dous highs like the Czech Arms Deal and the intervals which 
the building of the Aswan Eigh Dam produced, but there were 
also years of strain and tension which were brought about by 
the tempestuousness and flamboyance of both Khrushchev and 
Nasser. Those came about when Khrushchev could not contain 
himself in the face of what he saw as the extreme provoca-
tion of Nasser's anti-communism and his attempts to improve 
relations with the West. Nasser reacted in kind, bickering 
with Khrushchev and the Soviets despite the strong friendship 
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which had developed between the two men. 
The friendship between Khrushchev and the Egyptians 
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was the basis for a good deal of consternation following his 
dismissal. The loan agreement which Khrushchev had arranged 
for the Egyptians was rumored to be in jeopardy with the 
change of leadership in the Soviet Union. Nasser and the 
Egyptians need not have worried. In November 1964, the 
Egyptians sent Amer and Heikal to Moscow to attend the 
annual Military Day parades in Hoscow. During their first 
meeting with Leonid Brezhnev they were told they had nothing 
to fear. "What happened has nothing to do with you or our 
policy towards the Arab world . . ," said Brezhnev. "Our 
relations with you are based on long-term decisions taken 
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by the party, not by Khrushchev." 
The collective leadership did have some criticisms of 
Khrushchev's method of dealing with Egypt. They disliked 
his personal style of diplomacy. Contacts with Egypt had 
only developed between Nasser and him. They claimed that 
there was no solid basis for contact with Egypt outside of 
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Nasser. Some members of the oligarchy - most notably 
Hikhail Suslov - took up the argument of the local Arab 
CP's that the stronger Nasser became, the weaker they would 
become, and if he achieved Arab union, they would find them-
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selves dissolved. 
The arguments about which course of foreign policy the 
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Soviets should pursue in the Third World were flaring once 
more. Suslov, Ponomarev, and Nikolai Podgorny backed the old 
hard-line stance, while Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and 
Alexander Shelepin favored the more moderate position. This 
time, however, the ideological arguments did not have a sig-
nif icant effect upon the relationship between the two 
countries. 
In December, Shelepin followed up Amer's visit with a 
visit of his own for the victory day celebrations at Port 
Said. His visit underscored the desire on the part of the 
new Soviet leadership that their relations with Egypt stay at 
the same high level at which they had been when Khrushchev 
had been ousted. They were successful in achieving their 
goal. Throughout the first half of 1965, a potpourri of 
cultural, military, economic, and governmental delegations 
passed between the two countries. 
The middle level exchanges between the Soviet Union and 
Egypt paved the way for a five-day visit by Nasser to the 
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U.S.S.R. in August. It was his first meeting with the new 
leaders and was intended to develop a personal rapport be-
tween the leaders of the two countries. Huch of the visit 
was spent at a hunting lodge just outside of !1oscow where 
Nasser and his entourage got to know the leaders of the new 
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Soviet oligarchy better. At the end of his visit, Nasser 
decided to find out just how close his new relationship with 
Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and the other leaders of the 
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Soviet Union could be. He asked the Soviets to cancel some 
of the debt which the Egyptians had incurred from arms pur-
chases from them since 1962 when they began their interven-
tion in Yemen. The Soviets agreed that the Yemeni civil war 
was a war of "national liberation" and decided to cancel 500 
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million dollars of Egypt's debt. 
During the next two years, the Egyptian-Soviet rela-
tionship was smooth and stable. Contacts between the new 
regime in Moscow and the old one in Cairo were strengthened 
and personalized. In May of 1966, Kosygin came to Cairo to 
ensure that the positive contact that had been established 
the previous August during Nasser's visit between the new 
Soviet leaders and the Egyptian head of state were main-
tained. During the course of the visit, Kosygin apologeti-
cally informed the Egyptians that the Politburo had not yet 
had time to respond to an Egyptian request for more arms 
which had come just before his departure from Moscow. He 
explained that such requests must now come far in advance 
because the Soviet Union had a planned economy and each re-
quest must be carefully weighed before it could be acted 
upon. This was his reply to an Egyptian request for addi-
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tional wheat supplies as well. He told Nasser that he could 
not promise anything; Soviet wheat supplies were a weak point 
in the economy, and nature and the entire Politburo must 
decide. 
Two months later, the Egyptian request for wheat was 
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answered positively. The Soviet harvest had been sufficient 
ll5 
and the Politburo was willing. From the foregoing, it is 
clear that the new Soviet regime was much more deliberate 
and dependent upon the wheels of bureaucracy than the im-
petuous and headstrong Khrushchev had been. Despite this 
ll6 
and the occasional flareups which it caused, the new Soviet 
leadership and the Soviets were beginning to understand one 
another and build a strong, stable, mutually beneficial re-
lationship. 
Nasser wanted Brezhnev to visit in 1967 to cement the 
newly developed relationship. Tentative plans were made, 
but they were abandoned when the Soviets had second thoughts. 
Apparently, the Soviets were concerned that such a visit 
would be compared unfavorably with that of Khrushchev in 
1964. They excused themselves on the grounds that 1967 was 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian revolution and 
Brezhnev must focus his attention at home in order to prepare 
for the occasion. There had also been some criticism of 
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Brezhnev for the amount of time he was spending abroad. 
Gromyko came instead. In March, he spent three days 
in Cairo. While he was there, Nasser brought up the subject 
of arms, a topic which was often in his thoughts during the 
period just before the Six Day War. A considerable portion 
of Nasser's preoccupation with armaments and Israel may have 
been derived from a series of Soviet intelligence reports 
which were purportedly transmitted by Soviet naval vessels 
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in the Mediterranean to Egypt and Syria. These documents 
contained information that Israel was preparing to attack 
Syria. Coupled with a string of vitriolic expostulations by 
Israeli leaders, the documents and the Soviets' own apparent 
concern would certainly have alarmed Nasser and convinced 
him that the period of calm between Israel and the Arab 
states was about to end. If that was the case, he must have 
reasoned, Egypt had to stockpile arms and prepare for war. 
Early in 1966, a new regime seized power in Syria. 
Led by Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, an extremely radical and 
pro-Marxist wing of the Ba'ath party took control of the 
Syrian government and declared its increased support for 
Palestinian efforts at "national liberation." The Soviets 
were quick to recognize and encourage the isolated and 
politically insecure new regime in Syria. Izvestia, in 
particular, was effusive in its praise of the new Arab 
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government. The Soviet leadership, while somewhat more 
restrained toward the Syrians than Izvestia, also gave them 
strong support and began to pressure Nasser into helping the 
new Syrian regime as well. 
Nasser was still suspicious of the Syrian Ba'athists. 
His caution stemmed from the ill-fated attempts at union be-
tween Syria and Egypt. However, Soviet pressure and Israeli 
threats and attacks convinced him to conclude a mutual 
defense pact with the Ba'athist regime in Syria in November 
1966. 
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The pact with Syria was the first in a series of events 
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that led Nasser into what has been termed by some a trap. 
Oddly enough, the Soviets, who in November 1966 had 
counseled restraint, seemed to be promoting a more belli-
gerent attitude on the part of the Egyptians. In fact, the 
Soviet actions and the attitudes which they expressed in 
early 1967 could only be characterized as inflammatory. 
'They gave Nasser unsupported information about American and 
Israeli troop movements and joint intents and persistently 
urged him to take a more militant stand vis-a-vis Israeli 
"provocations." 
Throughout early 1967, the Syrians and the Israelis 
had been engaging in air battles, artillery duels and other 
hostilities. While this was taking place, the Egyptians 
were having abuse heaped upon them by the Syrians, 
Jordanians, and Saudis for 11 l1iding behind the skirts of the 
D.N. Emergency Force" and failing to aid their Syrian 
brothers against the Israelis while at the same time they 
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were killing their fellow Arabs in Yemen. 
In April, the growing crsis advanced another step. On 
April 7, one of the by now routine artillery battles between 
the Syrians and Israel escalated sharply into a large scale 
aerial dogfight. The Israelis shot down six Syrian jets and 
then "flew on to Damascus, making victory swoops over the 
city." Two weeks later the Soviets warned the Israeli 
ambassador about Israel's provocations in areas near the 
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Soviet Union. On the 25th of April, the Soviets once more 
called Israel's ambassador to the Soviet Foreign !1inistry. 
There he was given a note warning the Israelis about their 
troop concentrations on the borders of Syria. Two days later 
an Egyptian parliamentary delegation arrived in !1oscow for 
consultation with the Soviets. It stayed two weeks. 
By mid-May, tension on the Syrian-Israeli border had 
reached the critical level. The Soviet press had joined with 
that in the Arab countries and began calling for a united 
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Arab front and condemning the Israelis. On I1ay 15, following 
a series of inflammatory speeches by Israeli leaders and the 
return of the Egyptian delegation from Hoscow, a state of 
alert was declared in Egypt. The following day the Egyptians 
requested a limited withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force 
from their posts on the Sinai border. U Thant, the U.N. 
Secretary General, informed Nasser that either a full with-
drawal or none at all was the only acceptable alternative as 
far as the U.N. was concerned. Egyptian troops were already 
moving east across the Sinai in order to occupy the UNEF 
positions, so Nasser was faced with a difficult choice -
humiliating retreat or another step along the path toward war. 
He chose the latter, perhaps hoping that he still had 
time to prevent the approaching conflict. In articles in 
Izvestia, Krasnaia Zvezda, and Pravda, the Soviets lauded the 
123 
Egyptian actions. The Egyptians formally requested the with-
drawal of UNEF forces on May 18. The Egyptians occupied all 
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of the U.N. posts on their side of the border except the 
crucial post of Sharm el-Sheik. Nasser hesitated to take 
this key port on the Gulf of Aqaba because it would have 
meant barring Israeli shipping from the Tiran Straits which 
would have brought the lliddle East to the brink of war. 
On the evening of May 21, due to a combination of the 
pressure from Arab public opinion and the Egyptian military's 
wish to avenge its defeat in 1956, Nasser took the final step 
and occupied Sharm el-Sheik. Two days later the Egyptian 
Defense Minister, Shams Aldin Badran visited the U.S.S.R. 
During his visit, the Soviets emphasized the necessity of 
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avoiding military conflict. They expressed their willingness 
to support Egypt to the hilt diplomatically, but stressed 
that military assistance would not be forthcoming from the 
U.S.S.R. 
At the end of Badran's visit to r1oscow, an unfortunate 
incident occurred. 11arshal Grechko told Badran, "Stand firm. 
Whatever you have to face, you will find us with you. Don't 
let yourself be blackmailed by the Americans or anyone else." 
As it turned out Grechko did not mean exactly what he implied, 
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he was just giving Badran "one for the road." But Badran was 
the wrong person to say such things to. A militant, he was 
one member of the Egyptian upper echelons who wanted Nasser 
to take a hard, aggressive stance. He returned to Cairo and 
told Nasser that the Soviets had pledged unconditional sup-
port to Egypt in its conflict with Israel. 
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On Hay 30, the Jordanians, despite their many contre-
temps with both Egypt and Syria earlier in the year, joined 
the Syrian-Egyptian mutual defense alliance. By doing so, 
they physically encircled Israel and gave the Israelis one 
more excuse to start hostilities. An American mission came 
to Cairo to try to find a solution to the impending conflict. 
Apparently it had some success and there was some possibility 
of the two sides reaching an agreement. Zacharia Hohieddin 
was scheduled to visit Washington on June 7 to work out a 
solution in conjunction with the Americans. Nutting quotes 
Dean Rusk as saying that this helped "to press the trigger" 
of war by making the Israelis fearful that a solution would 
be imposed upon them before they could teach the Arabs a 
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lesson. 
The story of the Six-Day War has already been told. 
The Soviet role in the conflict was limited to support for 
Egypt and the other Arab states in their press, diplomatic 
pressure, and eventually, convincing the U.N. to censure 
Israel. In the eyes of most Arabs, this support, such as it 
was, was insufficient. They believed that the Soviets 
sllould have physically intervened to save them from what many 
believed to be a joint American-Israeli attack. The failure 
of tlle Soviets to enter the arena of combat engendered 
long-term hostility in the Arab populace. However, despite 
the Arab view that the Soviets had deceived and abandoned 
them, they still needed Soviet support to shore them up after 
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the war. In fact, they needed it now more than ever. 
Egypt, as Israel's main target in the brief conflict, 
was the most devastated by it, and it needed the most bol-
stering. Nasser, in particular, was in a tenuous position. 
He had been the architect of both Arab radicalism and 
Egyptian policy. His plans and strategems had been shat-
tered. In the aftermath of the war, a distraught Nasser had 
decided in conjunction with his military advisors that, since 
the Israelis had inflicted such a humiliating drubbing upon 
the Egyptian military in the war which his policies had led 
to, he must resign. He did so, but almost immediately was 
back in power because the Egyptian populace, upon hearing of 
his decision, had responded with a spontaneous groundswell 
of emotional backing and demanded that he remain as head of 
state. 
Nasser remained in power, and soon consolidated the 
three most powerful offices in Egypt in his hands by adding 
the Secretary-Generalship of the ASU to his own portfolio. 
He also conducted a mini-purge of the military, getting rid 
of both those responsible for the debacle in the war against 
Israel and those whose discontent might make them dangerous. 
Having strengthened his power base, Nasser turned his 
attention toward rebuilding the Egyptian military which had 
been devastated by the war. To accomplish this task, he had 
to turn once more to the Soviets for massive aid. There was 
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some concern on the part of Nasser and the Egyptians that the 
Soviets would be unwilling to resupply them given the breadth 
of the military losses. Another factor which undoubtedly ag-
gravated Egyptian disquietude was the exchange of recrimina-
tions and charges of responsibility (or lack of it) that had 
been going on between the Egyptian military at all levels and 
its Soviet advisors. The Egyptian misgivings turned out to 
be baseless. The Soviets were indeed willing to resupply the 
l27 
Egyptian military and to do so rapidly. 
By this time Nasser had decided that he had to use 
diplomatic proxies to deal with the Israelis. He was certain 
(probably with more than adequate justification) that any 
direct negotiations with them would be just like the Germans' 
efforts at negotiating with the Allies at Versailles -
fruitless. Nasser believed that the Israelis would simply 
dictate terms to the Egyptians which the Egyptians would be 
forced to accept. The Soviets seemed to be the perfect 
choice of proxies for the Egyptians. They could deal with 
the Americans as one superpower to another. They could not 
be intimidated by the Israelis. They could represent them-
selves as a relatively disinterested party. Host important-
ly, they were willing to assume the role of mouthpiece for 
the Egyptians. 
Therefore, Nasser made it a policy to increase Soviet-
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Egyptian involvement whenever and wherever he could. He was 
quite successful in doing so. Soviet military, economic, 
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and diplomatic involvement with Egypt all rose drastically 
after the June war. During the next three years, the re-
lationship between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. was smoother and 
the policies of the two nations were more closely coordi-
nated than they had ever been before. 
The desperate needs of the Egyptians caused them to 
rely more and more heavily upon the largesse of the Soviets. 
To some extent, it appeared that they were forced to give up 
their sovereignity in return for the aid which the Soviets 
provided. In fact, they did abandon some of the policies 
which had been followed during the previous years of tJasser's 
dominance of Egyptian politics in return for a clear increase 
in the commitment of the U.S.S.R. to the Arab cause. Nasser 
gave up any thoughts he may have had of resuming the persecu-
tion of the ECP. Egypt pursued more radical internal 
policies. And in response to Soviet suggestions, the purge 
of the military following the June war included its right 
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wing. In return, the Soviets identified themselves with the 
Arabs, going so far as to conunit their own personnel, first-
line weaponry, prestige, and capital resources to what at 
times may have seemed to be a bottomless pit. 
Despite this seeming dependence upon the Soviets, 
Nasser never gave up control of Egypt's policies or of its 
destiny. He never made any changes which he would not quick-
ly reverse. Even when he promoted the pro-Soviet faction in 
the ASU to positions of enhanced power, he kept enough con-
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trol over them to eliminate any threat to his position or the 
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policies which he wanted to institute which they might pose. 
In these instances, and others like it, Soviet wishes were 
clearly not a determining factor in any way. 
On the diplomatic front, the Soviets championed the 
Egyptians. The U.N. Security Council had been in nearly con-
tinuous session since the fighting had begun on June 5. On 
the 13th of June, the Soviets proposed a resolution branding 
Israel as an aggressor and calling for the immediate with-
drawal of Israel's armed forces from the territories which 
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they had seized. The bill was defeated by a coalition of 
nations spearheaded by the U.S., which was committed to a 
veto of any plan which would eliminate Israeli gains without 
giving them a complete peace in return. With American oppo-
sition blocking any progress in the Security Council, the 
Soviets turned to the General Assembly. Even there, the 
Soviets were unable to garner sufficient support for the 
Arab cause to censure the Israelis and force a withdrawal. 
While the U.N. deliberations were in progress, the 
Soviets also resorted to other avenues to try to aid Egypt 
and the other Arab countries. On June 9, the states of 
Eastern Europe attended a conference in Moscow which was held 
to discuss the crisis in the Middle East. The conference 
produced a declaration which condemned Israel and promised 
"to do everything necessary to help the peoples of the Arab 
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countries give a firm rebuff to the agressor . II All 
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of the nations involved in the conference except Rumania 
signed the declaration and, by June 11, they all (again with 
the exception of Rumania) had severed diplomatic relations 
with Israel. 
Twelve days after the Soviets and their East European 
allies condemned Israel, the first major Soviet diplomatic 
mission to Egypt arrived in Cairo. Led by President 
Podgorny, the mission, which also included Chief of Staff 
Marshal Matvei V. Zakharov, was crucial for Nasser and the 
Soviets both. It provided Egypt with massive military and 
economic aid and the promise of political support. This 
ensured that Nasser had the means to carry on the struggle 
with Israel and thus to avoid the diktat which he feared. 
By providing Nasser and Egypt with massive aid and political 
encouragement, the Soviet visit demonstrated the solidarity 
of the U.S.S.R. with Egypt and curbed to some extent the 
anti-Soviet sentiment which was spreading through the 
Egyptian populace. 
Soviet efforts at mediation of the Arab-Israeli crisis 
continued throughout the months following the cessation of 
active hostilities. In mid-July, they presented a proposal 
to Nasser which they had developed in conjunction with the 
Americans on the basis of a suggestion put forward by a group 
of Latin American countries. Since it called for Israel's 
withdrawal from all Arab territories coupled with immediate 





considered the proposal to be the sort of compromise that 
might satisfy both sides in the conflict. However, despite 
its possibilities, the proposal failed to address the 
Palestinian problem, something which Nasser was politically 
bound to try to solve. 
Although the joint Soviet-American proposal of July had 
failed as had the earlier Soviet attempts to mobilize the 
U.N., both the Soviets and the Egyptians continued to seek a 
diplomatic solution to the problems at hand in the Middle 
East. On November 7, the Egyptians called a meeting of the 
U.N. Security Council. Over the next two weeks the Egyptians 
and their Soviet allies fought to get a favorable resolution 
adopted. On November 22, the Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 242. Despite some discrepancies in the wording of 
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the text of the resolution in various languages, the resolu-
tion in essence called for Israeli withdrawal from Arab 
territories which would be accompanied by the acknowledge-
ment of the right of all states to exist within recognized 
boundaries in peace. It also maintained that there should 
be freedom of navigation through international waterways in 
the region, that a just solution of the refugee problem 
should be sought, and that a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East would be found with this resolution as its basis. 
Resolution 242 became a weapon with which both Egypt 
and the Soviet Union would scourge the Israelis in the years 




when they stopped abiding by the spirit of the resolution and 
began to fortify the territories which they had occupied (the 
Bar Lev line, the fortifications in the Golan Heights and 
along the West Bank) and announced that they were in those 
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territories to stay. This made them vulnerable to charges of 
bad faith which were put to good use by the Soviets and the 
Egyptians when they were attempting to mobilize opinion in 
the U.N. and other international forums. 
Even for the Egyptians, however, this diplomatic 
byplay was little more than window dressing because, accord-
ing to Heikal, "Nasser was always skeptical about Resolution 
242." He believed that what was "taken by force can only be 
recovered by force," and that, "If you look at what the 
Israelis are doing in the occupied territories, it is per-
fectly obvious that they are never going to evacuate those 
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territories unless they are made to do so." 
The strengthening of the ties between Egypt and the 
Soviet Union was progressive. The next step came on January 
7, 1968, when Kirill Mazurov led a Soviet delegation to Egypt 
to help celebrate the eighth anniversary of the start of work 
on the Aswan Darn and the tenth anniversary of the first 
Soviet-Egyptian economic agreement regarding the construction 
of the dam. The visit was played down by the Egyptians and 
at its end a relatively terse joint communique was issued 
which, by its omission of any statement of gratitude for 
Soviet aid, did two things: 1) it implied that such assis-
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tance was a matter of course; and 2) that Egypt wanted the 
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levels of aid increased. 
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Later, in January, the first tangible sign of a change 
in Egyptian internal policy which was specifically designed 
to please the Soviets came when Nasser resigned the post of 
Secretary-General of the ASU in favor of Ali Sabri. Sabri 
had long been identified with the pro-Soviet faction among 
Egypt's elite and his promotion was greeted with muted ap-
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plause in Moscow. 
On March 30, another Egyptian internal development 
which was viewed with pleasure in Moscow came to pass. 
Nasser instituted a program of reforms which were intended 
to move Egypt closer to Nasser's ideal of socialism. The 
Soviet press applauded Egypt's most recent reforms (as it 
had others in the past) as another step forward in the 
permanent process of revolution. Like its press, the Soviet 
government responded positively to Egypt's internal re-
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structuring. 
Cooperation between Moscow and Cairo was becoming in-
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creasingly deep. The Soviets seemed to be identifying them-
selves more and more with the Arab cause. On July 1, at the 
signing of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Kosygin pre-
sented a nine-point proposal for arms control which included 
an arms freeze in the Middle East as one of its stipulations. 
He linked the freeze with an Israeli withdrawal from occupied 
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Arab territories. The Soviets had apparently made obtaining 
a solution to the crisis in the Middle East on Arab terms 
one of their primary goals in the arena of international 
politics. Clearly, Nasser was succeeding in his attempts to 
entangle the Soviets in his webs of diplomacy and dependence. 
Nasser continued those efforts later in the year 
during his visit to Moscow on July 7. By the end of this 
consultation between Nasser and the Soviet leaders, they had 
agreed to issue a joint communique which set out joint 
positions on most of the major issues of the day, thus 
indicating a consonance of views. A further indication of 
the growing unanimity in world outlook of the two countries 
which was brought to light in the joint communique was the 
announcement in its text of the establishment of direct 
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party-to-party contacts between the CPSU and the ASU. 
In September, Egypt started to raise the level of its 
hostilities toward Israel along the Suez Canal. Soon there-
after, both Egypt and the Soviet Union stepped up their 
diplomatic activity as well. On September 25, 1968, the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement sharply con-
demning Israeli intransigence. Two days later, Al-Ahram 
reported a peace plan which the Soviets had presented to the 
U.S. two weeks earlier that called for an Israeli pullback 
to its prewar borders, an expanded U.N. presence in the areas 
evacuated, an Arab statement ending the state of belliger-
ency which had existed since 1949, great power guarantees of 
peace, and the setting aside of the Palestinian issue for 
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later discussion. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. upped the 
level of its military aid to Egypt. 
The September initiatives of the Egyptians and their 
Soviet allies were not successful in bringing peace to the 
Middle East. In the meantime, domestic pressures upon 
Nasser had begun to mount. In November widespread student 
unrest and rioting spread through Egypt while, at the same 
time, the military once again began to get increasingly 
restive at being restrained from retaliating against the 
Israelis. The most important underlying cause for the 
growing civil disorder and the impatience in the military 
was Nasser's failure to liberate the occupied Arab territo-
ries and avenge the humiliation which the Israelis had 
inflicted upon the Arab nations. In response to the growing 
discontent of the Egyptian populace, Nasser decided to 
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escalate the level of conflict along the Suez Canal. 
In December, Moscow once more presented a peace plan 
to the U.N. which was based upon Resolution 242. At the 
same time, Gromyko was sent to Egypt to discuss matters with 
Nasser. In the joint communique, which was the product of 
the meeting between the Egyptian head of state and the 
Soviet Foreign Minister, it was clear that the policies of 
the two nations had once again converged. Both realized 
that the time had come to cause some movement in the situa-
tion in the Middle East. 
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The new peace initiative which the Soviets presented in 
the U.N. was a failure. The Israelis once again rejected a 
position which was based upon a maximalist interpretation of 
U.N. Resolution 242. By January 1969, Nasser was once again 
speaking in terms of force rather than diplomacy as the 
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solution to the tense situation in the Middle East. By the 
end of February, a state of emergency had been declared in 
Egypt. The Soviets, realizing the costs of renewed warfare, 
tried to dissuade Nasser from his chosen course toward war. 
At the end of January, Shelepin returned to Cairo along with 
a trade union delegation. His mission was to try to convince 
Nasser that political manuever was his best bet for an ad-
vantageous solution and that the resumption of open conflict 
would be disasterous for Egypt and the Soviet Union. Try as 
he might, Shelepin could not persuade Nasser to alter his 
course. Nor could the other Soviet leaders alter Nasser's 
decision without producing a clear change in the situation 
between Israel and the Arabs, a change which, given Nasser's 
intransigence, had to come on the terms of the Arabs, some-
thing which was extremely unlikely because of the stubborn-
ness of the Israelis which matched or exceeded that of the 
Arabs. 
The Soviets were unsuccessful in their attempts to 
avert the suddenly acute crisis. As a result, on March 9, 
1969, Nasser declared a new phase of the Arab-Israeli con-
f lict open - the "war of attrition" had begun. The "war of 
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attrition", while begun witlwut Soviet approval, was the 
perfect tonic for the maladies which beset Egypt. The com-
mando raids and artillery duels gave the Egyptian army a 
taste of the action for which its officers had been spoiling. 
The renewal of conflict with Israel gave the populace a 
measure of renewed pride and diverted their attention from 
the other factors which had led to the student rioting 
earlier in the year. 
At this juncture, the Soviets were determined to do two 
things if they possibly could - give Egypt their full sup-
port, and at the same time lower the level of conflict in the 
Middle East. They were successful in the former, but the 
latter proved to be more difficult. The Soviet press mounted 
a campaign for a peaceful solution to the hostilities along 
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the Suez Canal. The mild pressure of a press campaign was 
completely unable to convince Nasser to moderate his posi-
tion. In one last effort to change Nasser's mind, the 
Soviets sent Gromyko back to Cairo. The Soviet Foreign 
Minister's mission was a failure just as that of Shelepin 
had been. At the end of Gromyko's three-day visit, Moscow 
finally accepted the fait accompli and endorsed the Egyptian 
stance in a short joint communique. 
The failure of the Gromyko mission was a harbinger of 
things to come. The Soviet acceptance of the Egyptian 
position vis-a-vis Israel brought Soviet-American discussion 
of the problems of the Biddle East nearly to a halt. The 
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fighting along the Suez Canal escalated once again in July. 
In recognition of the Soviet acceptance and support of 
Nasser's position, the Egyptians sent Ali Sabri to Moscow 
again for a three-week visit. The visit was intended to 
assure the Soviets of the "progressive'' character of Egypt's 
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government. In another gesture of thanks to the Soviets, 
Nasser also decided to extend full diplomatic recognition to 
the DDR. 
As the "war of attrition" raged on and Soviet weaponry 
in the hands of the Egyptian military proved itself to be 
inadequate to halt Israel, the Soviets were once again drawn 
further into Nasser's webs of entanglement. The Soviets had 
been conducting desultory talks regarding peace in the 
Middle East with the Americans, but in October the Soviet 
leaders decided to break them off and proposed a resumption 
of Four Power talks in their place. The move was one which 
Nasser had encouraged and the Soviet acquiescence further 
encouraged "Arab belligerence" by making a diplomatic solu-
tion even more remote. 
In November, Sadat went to Moscow on a mission intended 
to raise the level of Soviet military assistance. Israel's 
air superiority had proven to be too much for Egypt to handle 
and the Egyptian air defense system was now in tatters. 
Israeli planes could now range freely throughout Egypt. 
Sadat went to the U.S.S.R. to find some means of deterring 
those attacks. On December 12, after more than two weeks of 
161 
discussions, the Soviets and the Egyptians issued a joint 
communique which outlined the outcome of the talks. The two 
sides stressed the importance of improving bilateral ties. 
More concretely, the Soviets agreed to take "urgent and con-
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structive steps" to counter the Israeli attacks. 
These "constructive steps" did not come quickly enough 
for the Egyptians. In mid-January, the military situation in 
Egypt had deteriorated even further from the position that 
had prompted Sadat's visit. As a result, another indication 
of just how close the ties between Nasser and the Soviets had 
become became apparent almost immediately. On January 10 a 
Soviet delegation headed by Politburo member D. A. Kunaev 
visited Egypt for ten days to assess the situation there. 
Two days after the Soviet contingent departed, Nasser flew 
secretly to Moscow to ask that direct military aid from the 
Soviet Union be sent to Egypt forthwith. The commitment 
which he received during his four-day visit far outstripped 
anything which the Soviets had previously been willing to 
offer Egypt or any other non-communist country since the 
Soviet regime had come to power in Russia in 1917: the 
active involvement of Soviet military personnel in the 
defense of a non-communist nation. 
Nasser's plea to the Soviet leaders had come for a 
variety of reasons which ranged from his own political in-
stability to his avowed desire to enmesh the U.S.S.R. as 
deeply as possible in the political imbroglio of the Middle 
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East. The Soviets had responded with a major commitment of 
military personnel and hardware for an equally wide range of 
reasons. They had already invested a great deal of time and 
effort in supporting Nasser and Egypt and his fall quite 
probably would have been extremely expensive for them in 
terms of both prestige and military might. By making a major 
commitment to Egypt, they were improving their strategic 
position in the Mediterranean basin and, by extension, the 
world as well as broadening - or at the very least maintain-
ing - their political pull in Egypt and the rest of the Arab 
world by bolstering the position of the man who they felt 
was the key to their influence in the region. 
The Soviets took responsibility for Egypt's air de-
fense. It was the first time that the Soviet Union had 
undertaken such a task and committed its personnel to the 
active defense of a non-communist country. The Soviets sent 
both fighter pilots and missile technicians to the fracas 
along with their new SAM-3 missiles. At the same time, the 
Soviets took a stance which was more visibly supportive of 
Egypt in its conflict with Israel. Led by Kosygin, the 
Soviets issued what were interpreted in the West as a series 
of purely polemical statements which expressed their will-
ingness to render all "necessary aid to the Arab states in 
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strengthening their ability to uphold their just interests." 
In reality, these statements represented the actual commit-
ment of the Soviets to Egypt and its allies. 
In return for the Soviet commitment of its personnel 
and their assumption of responsibility for the defense of 
Egypt's air space, Nasser turned six airfields over to the 
Soviet military. He also gave them a free hand in the de-
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ployment of Soviet weaponry and personnel. With these con-
cessions, the Soviets now had control over both the Egyptian 
skies and parts of Egyptian territory for the first time. 
The military commitments of the Soviet Union were soon 
matched by similar diplomatic commitments. In March, when 
the Soviet military presence had allowed Egypt to regain 
some semblance of control of the air space over the area 
west of the Suez Canal, the Soviets adamantly refused to 
compromise their commitment to Egypt in any way when the 
American government suggested such a move in order to de-
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crease "tension" along the canal. 
While the Soviets were rejecting the overtures which 
had been made by the Americans, their Deputy Foreign 
Minister for Middle Eastern Affairs, Vladmir Vinogradov, 
went to Cairo to serve as a liaison between his government 
and Nasser for the next six weeks. His trip was indicative 
of both the newfound closeness of the Soviet and Egyptian 
governments and the importance which Egypt's problems had 
taken on for the Soviets. The implications presented by 
Vinogradov's visit were to some extent confirmed when Ali 
Sabri, who had once again recovered much of the power that 
had been stripped from him, visited Moscow for the Lenin 
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centenary and consultations with Soviet leader,s in April. 
A little over a month later, two events took place 
which were to have an important affect upon Middle Eastern 
affairs. The first of these was the submission by the 
American government of the final draft of the so-called 
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"Rogers Peace Plan" to the Egyptian government on June 25. 
The Rogers Plan offered a chance for negotiations between 
the Israelis and the Egyptians on a mutually acceptable 
basis as well as arranging for a cease-fire along the Suez. 
The Rogers Plan precipitated the second of the two 
developments which influenced the course of events in the 
Middle East. Four days after the American proposal was an-
nounced, Nasser flew to Moscow to discuss its ramifications 
with the Soviet leadership. He spent nineteen days in the 
U.S.S.R., and after his discussions with Brezhnev, Kosygin, 
Podgorny, Gromyko, Vinogradov, and the other members of the 
Soviet ruling elite, the two sides issued a joint communi-
que which reaffirmed the commitment of the two sides to 
one another and to the search for a "just peace." The 
communique also announced that Brezhnev had agreed to make 
his first visit to Egypt and that Kosygin and Podgorny had 
accepted invitations from the Egyptians for them to return 
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there. 
On July 23, the real reason for Nasser's visit became 
more apparent than it had been from the communique. The com-
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munique had not mentioned the Rogers Plan at all; however, 
that afternoon, three days after he had returned from the 
Soviet Union, Nasser announced Egypt's acceptance of the 
American proposal at a stormy session of the ASU party con-
gress and agreed to a three-month cease-fire along the Suez. 
The announcement incurred the wrath of the radical Arab 
regimes and the PLO. Both groups hurled invective and 
charges of treason at the Egyptians. Nasser scoffed at the 
charges and soon thereafter began a crackdown on the radical 
Palestinian organizations in Egypt. 
Nasser's crackdown on the radical Palestinians within 
his borders was followed by a much harsher assault by 
Jordan's King Hussein on the Fedayeen in his country. The 
trouble in Jordan had been brewing for a long time and in 
mid-September, Hussein decided to send his army against 
Palestinian units throughout his country. In order to stop 
the internecine warfare in Jordan and to keep it from in-
volving much of the Arab world (the Syrians were threaten-
ing to intervene on the side of the Palestinians and the 
more moderate regimes of the Arabian Peninsula were offering 
to aid Jordan if the Syrians should take military action), 
Nasser, whose health had been deteriorating for some time, 
interrupted a rest which had been prescribed for him by his 
physicians. He invited the two sides to Cairo for dis-
cussions with each other and the other Arab heads of state 
which he would mediate. The conference proved successful in 
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heading off the incipient tempest in Jordan, but it also 
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brought about a drastic deterioration in Nasser's health. 
The downturn in Nasser's health quickly proved fatal. 
He died on September 28. Nasser left a legacy of a diplo-
matic involvement between the Soviet Union and Egypt that to 
varying extents had helped to shape the foreign policy of 
both countries and the internal policy of Egypt. Both 
countries became involved with situations that they might 
not have otherwise. Egypt would have been unable to pursue 
its internal development and modernization if the conduit 
for necessary Soviet economic aid had not been developed by 
Nasser's diplomacy. 
The political ties between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. had 
given Egypt valuable support for its positions in such in-
ternational forums as the U.N. and S.C.U.A. They had pro-
vided Egypt with a staunch ally which lent both military and 
economic support when the Egyptians needed it most. The re-
lationship had provided an avenue for cultural contacts 
which, to some extent, broadened the cultural horizons of 
the Egyptian people. 
The benefits of relations with the Soviet Union for 
Egypt are clear: It received money, arms, and technical ex-
pertise when it needed it; it was given diplomatic support 
which bolstered its positions during such international con-
tretemps as the Suez Canal crisis and the Six-Day War; and, 
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the relationship gave Egypt flexibility in its overall inter-
national posture by providing it with an alternative to the 
West as a source of aid and support. 
While the benefits of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship 
to the Egyptians are evident, the advantages to the U.S.S.R. 
are also apparent, even if they are for the most part intan-
gible. First, the Soviets gained egress to an area from which 
they previously had been excluded by Western influence. 
Second, they had gained some influence in the affairs of a 
region which for a variety of reasons had an important impact 
upon the Soviet Union and on world politics. Third, the 
Soviets had also gained prestige throughout the Third World 
by helping Egypt to assert its independence from the West. 
Despite the obvious benefits to both countries, the re-
lationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt was often stormy. 
During periods like l958-59 and 1963-64, distinct chills in 
the association between the two nations were manifest as a 
result of Egypt's suppression of its Communist Party and the 
ineffective attempts by the Soviet leadership to pressure 
Nasser into halting his anti-Communist drives. In 1969 
Soviet dismay at their lack of influence upon Egyptian 
policies was again evident in the Soviet press when Brezhnev, 
Kosygin, and other Soviet leaders were unable to dissuade 
the Egyptians from plunging headlong into the "war of attri-
tion" with Israel. 
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The causes of the discord between the Soviet Union and 
Egypt are evidence that the controlling influence in the re-
lationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt lay in Nasser's 
hands. Nasser was always able to control his own destiny, at 
least insofar as his dealings with the Soviet Union were con-
cerned. Whenever he chose to pursue a course of action, he 
did so, and there was little or nothing that the Soviets 
were both willing and able to do to stop him. Eventually, 
despite whatever reservations the Soviet leaders may have had 
about a course of action which Nasser took, they would, how-
ever grudgingly, give him their support. Nasser's entrance 
into the "war of attrition" is particularly illustrative of 
this facet of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. The Soviet 
leadership "begged" Nasser not to embark upon what they con-
sidered to be a rash course of action. He did so anyway. 
When his adventure proved disasterous, they bailed him out 
of what might have proved to be a situation which would have 
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led to his humiliation and political downfall. 
By 1970, Soviet policy in Egypt and the entire Middle 
East had become based upon Nasser and his influence to such 
an extent that they clearly believed that - if they were to 
maintain the level of influence in the region which they had 
attained - it was imperative for them to support him at al-
most any cost. However reluctantly, they gave him some of 
their most advanced defensive military equipment to fight 
his wars despite the risk of its eventual capture by the 
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Israelis. They spent hundreds of millions of dollars on and 
in his country. They even went so far as to send their own 
troops to defend him when his fate hung in the balance. The 
situation which one might have expected - Egyptian depend-
ence upon Soviet arms, money, and technical support - had 
come to pass; the Egyptians did need the arsenal and the 
economic support with which the Soviet Union had supplied 
them to pursue both their domestic and foreign policies. 
Unfortunately, from the Soviet point of view, the Soviets 
had fallen prey to a countervailing pressure: they had be-
come so dependent upon Nasser and his influence throughout 
the Arab world that their dependence upon him played a 
greater role in determining the interrelationship between 
the two countries than did Egypt's dependence upon the 
material and spiritual support which the U.S.S.R. provided to 
it. 
In part, Soviet dependence was a result of the situa-
tion which the two nations faced: the issues upon which the 
two governments collaborated were usually ones which Nasser 
chose. They were questions in which Egypt was more deeply 
involved and upon which Egypt inherently had more influence 
because of its more direct involvement. As a result, Egypt 
was more concerned with the solutions of the problems with 
which the two countries were forced to cope and the U.S.S.R. 
was primarily interested in its relationship with Egypt and 
only secondarily in the problems themselves. Because of 
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this divergence in the primary concerns of the two nations, 
the Soviet Union was placed in a support role while Egypt 
took the lead and acted as its leaders felt best whether or 
not the Soviets approved. 
It was within this context that the Soviet-Egyptian 
relationship developed. The two nations cooperated closely 
on issues which were essential concerns of the Egyptians and 
Nasser, while the Soviets, who were less concerned with the 
issues themselves, put the weight of their prestige and 
power behind the positions which the Egyptians took. The 
relationship flourished. The Egyptians were allowed to pur-
sue policies which they might not otherwise have been 
capable of pursuing. The Soviets gained prestige and in-
fluence in both the Third World in general and the Middle 
East in particular. The relationship deepened throughout 
the years in which Nasser was in power in Egypt despite 
temporary fluctuations in the level of agreement and cor-
diality between the two countries which occurred when the 
Soviet Union's leadership disapproved of a course of action 
which its Egyptian counterpart chose to take. 
In general, it can be said that both sides benefited 
from the relationship although each occassionally paid a 
price in situations where their chosen ally cost them some 
of the flexibility they might otherwise have had. Usually 
this influenced the Soviet Union more than it did Egypt, but 
the Egyptians were also affected in situations where either 
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the U.S. would have been more effective as an ally or no 
ally at all would have been more useful. (An example of the 
former is the building of the Aswan Dam, where superior 
Western technology and more freedom in the choice of spare 
parts suppliers helped to make the U.S. and the rest of the 
West Egypt's first choice as a partner despite greater sur-
face costs. 1'he latter situation is exemplified by the 
situation which arose from the Soviet suppression of the 
Hungarian revolution, a circumstance which put the Egyptians 
in the position of having to at least nominally support what 
was ostensibly an imperialistic war because of its own inter-
national situation, i.e. the diplomatic machinations which 
followed the Suez Canal crisis.) Despite its occasional 
debits for both sides, the diplomatic relationship between 
the U.S.S.R. and Egypt during the years from 1953 to 1970 
seems to have been one from which both nations benefited 
enormously and one with which, on balance, both sides were 
satisfied at the time of Nasser's death. 
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NOTES (Chapter III) 
1) See Anthony Nutting, Nasser, pp. 39-45, for an account 
of the first few weeks after the revolution in Egypt. 
2) The break between the RCC and the old parliamentary 
system had begun long before, but it hardened into its 
final form when the Wafd party stubbornly resisted the 
reforms which the Free Officers wanted to institute. 
See Nutting, ibid, pp. 52-53. 
3) This drive and the military and middle-class backgrounds 
of the majority of the members of the Revolutionary 
Command Council were among the many reasons which helped 
to develop strong initial distrust in the Soviet 
leadership for the new regime in Egypt. See Nutting, 
Nasser, pp. 43-44, 54, and 57. Also see Walter Laqueur, 
The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York: 
Praeger, 1959), p. 195. George Lenczowski brings up 
Soviet suspicions (which were probably unfounded) that 
the Egyptian revolution was actually the product of a 
CIA operation. If true, CIA involvement would bring 
into question the standard accounts of the chain of 
events that led to the military coup in Egypt like the 
one Nutting provides. Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in 
the Middle East, p. 76. 
4) The Cormnunist Party of Egypt - much diminished because 
of Nasser's drive against it after the revolution - also 
supported Neguib against their old adversary. For a 
discussion of the political events of this period, see 
Marlowe, A History of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Re-
lations, pp. 381-407, and Nutting, ibid, pp. 56-73. 
5) The ECP had actively worked against Nasser. The Soviets 
on the other hand initially were very quiet about the 
Egyptian revolution. Presumably they had other things 
on their minds (such as the impending death of Stalin). 
Although Soviet statements were initially somewhat 
hostile, they were few and far between. See Heikal, 
The Sphinx and the Commissar, pp. 53-54; Lenczowski, 
op cit, p. 75-76; and Laqueur, op cit, p. 195. 
6) See the articles on the Anglo-Egyptian Pact in Pravda 
and Izvestia on October 21 and 22, 1954. 
7) Robert O. Freedman points this out in Soviet Policy 
Toward the Middle East Since 1970, where he suggests 
that it was in large part due to the premiership of 
Georgi Malenkov. Freedman, p. 10. 
8) This agreement, which was related to cooperation between 
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the banking and financial institutions of the two 
countries, will be more fully discussed in the following 
chapter. 
9) Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, p. 11. 
10) For a more complete look at the Czech Arms Deal and the 
rest of the Soviet-Egyptian military relationship, see 
Glassman, Arms for the Arabs. 
11) Nutting, op cit, p. 104. 
12) The Baghdad Pact was the Middle Eastern link in the 
chain of defense treaties which the U.S. and its NATO 
allies were attempting to forge to place as a contain-
ment barrier around the Communist Bloc. 
13) For a discussion of the evolution of Chou En-lai's 
mission and the text of his report, see Mohammed Heikal, 
op cit, pp. 57-60. 
14) Ibid, p. 5 9 . 
15) Ibid, p. 59. 
16) See Heikal's description of the negotiations with the 
Americans about financing for the dam. Ibid, pp. 68-69. 
17) See Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, #1 (Winter 1956) for 
a report of this agreement, as well as a chronology of 
the key events in the foreign relations of the nations 
of the Middle East during the quarter. The agreement is 
also mentioned in McLane, Soviet-Middle Eastern Re-
lations, p. 35. 
18) Anthony Nutting cites Joseph Broz Tito as being Nasser's 
teacher - the man who instructed him on the advantages 
of playing the West and the Soviet Bloc off of one an-
other (Nutting, op cit, p. 117). Nasser continued to 
use this technique throughout his sojourn in power. 
19) The agreement with the Bulgarians was signed on March 
17. See Middle East Journal, Vol 10, #3 (Summer 1956), 
p. 282. 
20) The Soviet offer came on October 11, 1955, when Solod 
came to Nasser with a proposal for Soviet aid in the 
building of the dam that was to cover a 25-year period. 
Love, Suez, p. 255. 
21) Love, ibid, p. 311. The discussions were apparently 
long and arduous and had to overcome initial antipathy 
between Nasser and Black. 
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22) See John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: 
Macmillan, 1957). Dulles commented further that the 
loan to Egypt was "a cheap price to pay for peace." 
Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice 
of His Diplomacy (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964), p. 38. 
23) This contention is brought out by both Nutting and Love 
in their discussions on the subject. Nutting, op cit, 
pp. 141-142; and Love, op cit, p. 316. It also appears 
in Chester L. Cooper, The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1978), on pages 94-99. Black, 
who had determined otherwise for the World Bank, always 
considered such a contention ridiculous. Nutting, p. 
135 and Love, p. 316. 
24) Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & 
Co., 1960), p. 469. 
25) The most detailed versions of this contention appear in 
Cooper, ibid, pp. 95-98, and Love, ibid, pp. 323-324. 
The contention also appears in Nutting, ibid, p. 135. 
26) Love claims that this angered Dulles so much that it was 
responsible for his abrupt change of heart regarding the 
financing of the dam. Love, ibid, pp. 307-310. 
27) Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Story of the Suez 
Conspiracy (New York: Atheneum, 1965), pp. 35-37. 
Robertson supports the claim that Nasser was unreason-
able. Nutting, who was Eden's Foreign Minister as the 
Suez crisis evolved, is one of the foremost proponents 
of enmity as a primary cause. See his statements re-
garding Eden's dislike for Nasser in Nasser, pp. 89, 
136, 183, and 383, and No End of a Lesson, (New York: 
Potter, 1967), pp. 23, 40-41, and 45-46. Love is even 
more certain that Eden's enmity was a factor and re-
peatedly makes and remakes the point in Suez. 
28) The Daily Telegraph was often a spokesman for this 
lobby. It was one of its editorials that resulted in 
Nutting saying he had "never seen Eden so stricken" when 
it impugned Eden's courage. Nutting, No End of a 
Lesson, p. 26. 
29) Nutting, ibid, p. 24. 
30) Eden, Full Circle, pp. 468-469. 
31) The costs of Soviet armaments were relatively high for 
the Egyptians. However, later events and Black's assur-
ances both argue that they were not too high. See foot-
note #23 for Black's reaction. A few years later, the 
U.S. Embassy in Cairo reported that the yearly costs of 
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the first three arms deals between the Egyptians and the 
Soviets were 25 million dollars and "no strain on the 
"' Egyptian economy at all." Love, Suez, pp. 316-317. 
32) Black made this statement in a speech before the 
Connecticut Chamber of Commerce on May 8. He stead-
fastly held to this position thereafter. Love, ibid, 
p. 314. 
33) Love, ibid, p. 316. 
34) See The U.A.R. Yearbook for the years 1955, 1956, and 
1957. The gross national product figures given there 
are compared with the import figures and the given per-
centages result. 
35) Heikal chronicles the role of Nasser in the nationali-
zation of the Canal and the events immediately there-
after on pages 67-69 of The Sphinx and the Commissar. 
36) Love, op cit, pp. 362-363. 
37) Gaitskell was endorsing a comparison originally made by 
Guy Mollet, the French Prime Minister. Love, ibid, p. 
383. A similar comparison had been made about the first 
years of the new Egyptian regime. See Laqueur, op cit, 
p. 195. 
38) Nutting spends a good deal of time making the point that 
Eden was spoiling for Nasser because of what Eden per-
ceived as Nasser's role in the dismissal of General 
Glubb by the Jordanians. Nutting, No End of a Lesson, 
pp. 40-47. Eden's distaste for Nasser is also readily 
apparent throughout Eden's memoirs. 
39) Nutting, ibid, p. 47. 
40) Eden, Full Circle, p. 478. See pp. 477-478 for Eden's 
description of the actions taken by the British as re-
taliation for the nationalization of the Canal by the 
Egyptians. 
41) Pineau also claimed that the Suez Canal Company had 
ordered its employees to defy Egyptian work orders, a 
claim that was untrue. Love, op cit, p. 367. For more 
on the role of the Suez Canal Company in the crisis, 
see the memoirs of its head, Jacques Georges-Picot, The 
Real Suez Canal Crisis (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanich, 1978). 
42) The popular unrest in Iraq over Nuri a-Said's friend-
ship with the French and the British is mentioned along 
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with a similar upheaval in Jordan on pages 173 and 193 
of Nasser by Nutting. 
43) Love reports that initially Khrushchev "told workers at 
at a stadium rally that the West had reacted with 'too 
much excitement'". Love, op cit, p. 377. The reasoning 
that the Soviets were slow to get involved in the Suez 
crisis out of simple caution only addresses a part of 
the whole situation. The Soviets also had their hands 
full in Hungary and Poland at the time and, as a result, 
could do little of substance to support the Egyptians. 
Their Hungarian adventure, which began on October 24, 
was also a weak spot in their international posture. 
Undoubtedly, it was another reason that they kept a lower 
profile than they otherwise might have. 
44) The speech was reported in Pravda on August 1, 1956. 
45) See the articles in Izvestia on July 31 and August 3, 4, 
and 5, 1956. 
46) To get an idea of the increasingly belligerent and in-
transigent stand the Soviets took in support of the 
Egyptians (in response to the clearly hostile intent of 
the British and French), see Love, op cit, pp. 428, 580, 
612-613, and 652. 
47) The specter of this hope appears throughout Eden's 
recollections of the genesis and evolution of the crisis. 
See Eden, op cit, pp. 481-489. 
48) This information comes from Eden, ibid, pp. 485-486, who 
attributes the French charge to Christian Pineau, the 
French Foreign Minister. 
49) Love, op cit, pp. 376-381. 
50) See Heikal's description of the events following nation-
alization on pages 65-73 of The Sphinx and the Commissar. 
According to Heikal, the reason behind the placement of 
this calculated distance between Egypt and the Soviets 
by the Egyptians was the need to maintain an independent 
road in foreign relations. 
51) Eden, op cit, p. 493. 
52) Pravda, August 10, 1955. 
53) Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (New York: The Linden 
Press, 1981), p. 198. 
54) For a record of the arguments of the Soviet delegation 
and the other participants in the Conference, see The 
Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956 (Wash-
ington: U.S. Department of State, 1956). This 
compendium presents the statements and proposals made 
at both users' conferences as well as a record of the 
Menzies' mission to Egypt. 
55) Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 56-57. 
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56) Menzies' statement appears in Love, op cit, on p. 412, 
where Love points out Menzies' lacks in the way of 
qualifications for the task which he was purportedly 
attempting to accomplish. 
57) Love, ibid, pp. 435-442. 
58) See the articles in Pravda on August 3, 6 and 10, 1956, 
for a look at the Soviet response to the Anglo-French 
buildup. 
59) Pravda, August 9, 1956. Also see Finer, op cit, pp. 
114-115, for an analysis of Dulles' reaction. 
60) The "Six Principles" were dictated "off the cuff" by 
Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, during his 
visit in New York in October. Love, ibid, pp. 445-446. 
61) Love, ibid, pp. 445-452. 
62) According to Nutting, Eden was "distraught". The French 
however, had their Israeli ace up their collective 
sleeve. For more on this, see Nutting, No End of a 
Lesson, pp. 66-69. 
63) The Franco-Israeli plan was presented to Nutting and 
Eden by General Maurice Challe and French Labor Minister, 
Albert Gazier. Nutting's reaction was immediate re-
jection. Eden, on the other hand, thought it was a 
wonderful idea and convinced Lloyd to accept it. See 
Love, ibid, pp. 449-452. 
64) Love, ibid, p. 452. This entire episode is described in 
detail by Nutting in No End of a Lesson on pages 90-99. 
A much more self-righteous version of the story appears 
in Eden, op cit, pp. 569-574. 
65) See Love, ibid, pp. 495-497 for an account of Egypt's 
preparation for the invasion from Great Britain and 
France which Nasser feared. 
66) Eden discusses the events leading up to the notes from 
the British and French to the Egyptians and Israelis, 
and the Egyptian rejection of theirs, but he fails to 
give the terms of the notes. Eden, op cit, pp. 584-592. 
The text of the notes appears in Love, op cit, p. 386 
and in Nutting, No End of a Lesson, Appendix VIII, 
178 
pp. 193-194. Coming as they did at a time when the 
Canal was still approximately 100 miles behind the 
front, these notes stand out as one of the many trans-
parent pretexts throughout history for an undeclared 
invasion of a sovereign country. Nutting was, for 
example, indignant at such bald-faced aggression and 
resigned his post in the British government. See No 
End of a Lesson, p. 116. 
67) This plan is reported by Nutting on pages 163-164 of 
Nasser, where this perfidy is attributed to Guy Mollet 
in his discussions with David Ben-Gurion. It may not 
have been an element in the British conception of the 
scenario, however. Certainly, Eden does not mention it 
in his memoirs despite his ill-concealed dislike for 
Nasser. 
68) Ultimately, as Karen Dawisha has pointed out, Nasser was 
the chief beneficiary of the prestige in the Arab world 
which was derived from the conclusion of the Czech Arms 
Deal and his victory over the Anglo-French-Israeli 
alliance at the postwar conference table. Dawisha, 
Soviet Policy Towards Egypt, p. 15. The losses which 
the U.S. would have suffered would undoubtedly have been 
much like those the British and French were forced to 
endure as a result of their roles in the Suez adventure. 
Both suffered through a long period of poor economic and 
diplomatic relations with the Arab nations of the Middle 
East. 
69) Arguably, the Soviet role was somewhat more important. 
Heikal states that, "Russian attitudes made a signifi-
cant contribution to the final result." Heikal, The 
Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 72. However, even he--
admits that it was American, not Soviet, pressure which 
ultimately forced a positive resolution to the situation 
for the Egyptians. 
70) Love, op cit, p. 610. 
71) Love, ibid, p. 633. 
72) Heikal provides this information on page 74 of The 
Sphinx and the Commissar. 
73) For more on this see Chapter V. Also see Dawisha, op 
cit, p. 195, and Spector, The Soviet Union and the 
Muslim World, 1917-1958, p. 261. 
74) Nutting reports this in No End of a Lesson, on p. 144. 
In the U.N. Security Council emergency meetings, the 
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Soviets even went so far as to propose a joint Soviet-
American military action against the Anglo-French 
forces if those forces failed to withdraw. The threat 
to send Soviet volunteers appeared in Pravda and 
Izvestia on November 11. See CDSP, Vol. VIII, #45, p. 
26 for the English text. ~~ 
75) The speech was made on December 27. It is cited without 
reference to the location from which it was given in 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 11, #1 (Winter 1957), p. 76. 
The location is given in Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 8, 
#2 (February 1957), p. 85. 
76) In the aftermath of the 1955 flooding in Egypt, the 
Soviets sent gifts of food and medical supplies to the 
country for relief of the victims. These were the first 
of many gifts and packages of aid with which the Soviets 
were to supply the government which Nasser and the other 
Free Officers had set up. 
77) The crisis in Lebanon was brought about when the Moslem 
minority of the country rebelled against the reelection 
of Camille Chamoun as president, a post which, under the 
Lebanese Constitution, was to be in the hands of a 
Christian. The Moslem rebellion brought American 
marines into Lebanon in an effort to "protect American 
citizens and their property." The Soviets and Arab 
nationalists feared that it was merely a pretext to 
bring down the U.A.R. government in Syria. As it turned 
out, the Americans apparently were in Lebanon to achieve 
their stated goals and not to stage an invasion of 
Syria. Nasser, Chamoun, the U.S. and the leaders of the 
Moslems reached an agreement whereby a compromise 
candidate was placed in the presidency and the rebel-
lion was stopped. Nutting, Nasser, pp. 218-244. 
78) The Sputnik launch brought a complete reorientation of 
American education which was designed to eliminate the 
perceived gap between American science and that of the 
Soviets. It also brought the threat of nuclear devas-
tation - which had theretofore been confined to Europe 
for the most part - to the entire world. Accordingly, 
military strategists in both Moscow and Washington were 
forced to recalculate the possibilities and dangers of 
war. 
79) The suppression of the U.A.R.'s communists was the re-
sult of an ongoing campaign in Egypt and the banning of 
political parties in Syria. The Egyptian CP was the 
victim of continuing efforts to destroy it throughout 
the year. The Syrians, on the other hand, were left to 
their own devices until December when Nasser and the 
Syrian intelligence apparatus made its move to elimini-
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nate their influence. 
80) For more on the Soviet aid package for the building of 
the dam, see Chapter IV. 
81) Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East, p. 84. 
82) The Ba'ath party was a part of an international organ-
ization of Arabs whose goal was the union of all of the 
Arab people. In fact, their political philosophy has 
been said to be the "purest milk" of Nasser's own 
philosophy. Nutting, Nasser, p. 247. The headquarters 
of the organization was in Damascus and Nasser's 
banning of parties in Syria when the U.A.R. was formed 
was a severe blow to the organization. That, along with 
Nasser's subsequent failure to favor the Ba'athists as 
much as they believed was their due, was a big factor in 
the failure of the U.A.R. to survive. 
83) Mizan, Vol. VIII, #1 (January 1959), pp. 10-11, and 
Dawisha, op cit, p. 22. 
84) Dawisha, ibid, p. 22 
85) Later, Nasser would call the Syrian and Iraqi communists 
"agents of a foreign power." Dawisha, ibid, p. 22. 
This crisis is described in detail in Oles Smolansky, 
"Moscow-Cairo Crisis, 1959". Slavic Review, Vol. XXII, 
#4 (December 1963), pp. 713-726 
86) Khrushchev called Nasser "a passionate and hot-headed 
young man" who had "taken more upon himself than his 
stature permitted." Laqueur, op cit, p. 85. Nasser 
replied by claiming that it was the very passion and 
hot-headedness of the Arab people that had prevented 
Egypt from becoming a missile base with its weapons 
pointed at Moscow. Nasser also suggested that the 
Russians were trying to turn the Middle East into a 
"red'' fertile crescent. Khrushchev reminded the 
Egyptians that the Soviets hadn't forced their aid upon 
them, thus intimating that perhaps it could be with-
drawn if the Egyptians were afraid that the Soviets 
were trying to fiscally blackmail them. See Smolansky, 
op cit, pp. 715-723. 
87) Nasser made this charge in a speech he made at Damascus. 
An excerpt of the speech is reported by Heikal, The 
Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 104. Excerpts also appear 
in Lenczowski, op cit, p. 87ff. 
88) Khrushchev made an oblique reference to this possibil-
ity in his speech to the 21st Party Congress. Heikal, 
op cit, pp. 103-104. According to Nasser, however, 
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the Soviets never threatened to stop their aid to Egypt. 
For a discussion of the Soviet-Egyptian dispute see 
Walter z. Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East, 
pp. 84-86. 
89) This incident is reported by Heikal on page 109 of 
The Sphinx and the Commissar. 
90) Heikal, ibid, p. 110. 
91) Ibid, p. 111. 
92) Dawisha, op cit, p. 25. The U.A.R. came up short in the 
last two categories of the definition for one reason: 
its suppression of its communists. 
93) See Boris Ponomarev, "O gosudarstve natsionalnoi demo-
kratii," Kommunist, Vol. XXXVIII, #8 (May 1961), pp. 
33-49. Ponomarev also attacked the terroristic methods 
of Nasser in the article. Prominent Arab Communists 
such as Khalid Bakdash also took this position. It 
seems likely, however, that their support had largely 
ulterior motives. 
94) See Ponomarev, op cit, and articles in Pravda on January 
20 and February 5. 
95) Heikal, op cit, pp. 112-114. 
96) Dawisha, op cit, p. 30. This belief was not entirely 
accurate. Many of the problems arose from Nasser's own 
mishandling of the situation. Others arose from the 
opposition of the far left, particularly the Syrian Com-
munist Party which was led by Khalid Bakdash. In fact, 
Syrian opposition to the union was voiced by nearly 
every element in its political spectrum by the time of 
the U.A.R.'s dissolution. 
97) Nasser's move to the left isolated him from the right. 
He was already alienated from the countries of the Arab 
left (except Algeria, Iraq and Syria) by the events 
which led to the dissolution of the U.A.R. 
98) For a discussion of the effect of the U-2 incident on 
internal politics and foreign policy in the U.S.S.R., 
see Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York: 
Viking Press, 1969). 
99) Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubey, did visit the 
U.A.R. However, his official position in the Soviet 
hierarchy was relatively low and this visit at least 
could not be construed as a "high-level" contact. 
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100) See Heikal, op cit, p. 119, and Mirskii's article "The 
UAR Reforms," New Times, #4 (1962), pp. 12-15, for 
examples of the arguments that the Soviet Middle 
Eastern expert made. Also see Dawisha, op cit, pp. 
30-31. 
101) See for example the Pravda article of August 16 which 
is reprinted in CDSP, Vol. XXV, #15, p. 20. 
102) Giving Amer the award was apparently one of many 
"sins" which Khrushchev committed on his trip to 
Egypt. Others purportedly included his promising the 
Egyptians a substantially larger loan for the second 
development plan than the Politburo had authorized 
and engaging in a heated dispute with Aref, who was 
now President of Iraq, having overthrown Kassem by 
way of a military coup. Dawisha, op cit, pp. 32-33. 
Khrushchev contended that the dispute with Aref was 
not really heated. He also claimed that he had been 
asked to respond to Aref by Nasser. Nikita S. 
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1970), pp. 443-445. 
103) Heikal, op cit, p. 20. 
104) Khrushchev handed Gromyko a plate and told him to 
"make music" and then told Gromyko to dance to the 
tune. Heikal, ibid, p. 137. 
105) There were rumors that Khrushchev's favorable treat-
ment of the Egyptians had been the cause of his down-
fall. The new Soviet leaders disproved this hypoth-
esis soon after they assumed power. Heikal, op cit, 
p. 146. 
106) The relationship between the two men was character-
ized as a friendship by Nasser's confidant, Heikal, 
when he discusses Khrushchev's downfall. Heikal, op 
cit, p. 138. Nutting claims that Nasser was ''serious-
ly put out by the fall of Khrushchev." Nutting, 
Nasser, p. 358. 
107) Heikal, ibid, p. 159. 
108) Their claim was not entirely accurate. Close rela-
tions had been developed by the Soviet leadership with 
Ali Sabri and other members of the "Soviet" lobby in 
Egypt. Their connections with Sabri played a major 
role in his later demotions. 
109) The Egyptian Communist Party had decided to accept 
Nasser's offer of entry into the ASU and had volun-
tarily dissolved itself. The other leaders of Arab 
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dangerous precedent. Heikal, op cit, p. 156. Dawisha 
claims that the dissolution of the Egyptian CP was 
done with the encouragement of the Soviet leadership. 
Dawisha, op cit, p. 35. 
110) Heikal suggests that Nasser's visit was in response 
to a request from the new Soviet leaders that he visit 
in reciprocation for Khrushchev's visit. According to 
Heikal, the request had been precipitated by the 
crisis at the second Afro-Asian conference in which 
the Soviets and the Chinese had clashed. The Egyptians 
had proven unwilling to support the Soviets and Heikal 
says that the Soviet leaders interpreted this as a 
sign of Nasser's lack of confidence in them. Heikal, 
ibid, p. 143. 
111) The visit is described by Heikal, ibid, pp. 143-147. 
112) Heikal, ibid, pp. 146-147. 
113) The Egyptians were being pressured by the Americans to 
make changes in certain aspects of their foreign 
policy - the incursion into Yemen in particular. The 
American supplies of wheat which were being shipped to 
Egypt were being used by the American government as a 
lever. 
114) The 1966 Soviet wheat harvest was their best ever. 
For statistical information on the 1966 harvest, see 
Sel'skoe Khoziaistvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik 
(Moscow: Statistika, 1971), pp. 161-171. 
115) An example of the flareups which occurred because of 
the bureaucracy failing to take into account special 
circumstances comes in Heikal, op cit, where he des-
cribes another incident when the Soviets attempted to 
indoctrinate Egyptian students despite an agreement 
not to. This time, however, it was a group of 
Egyptian military officers studying in the U.S.S.R. 
which was the target. The incident was resolved much 
more easily than the 1959 incident had been when the 
Soviets stopped trying to indoctrinate the Egyptian 
officers. Heikal, op cit, p. 166. 
116) Heikal, op cit, pp. 168-169. 
117) Israeli author Ilana Kass mentions these reports in 
Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Policy Formu-
lation, 1966-1973 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1978), p. 27. Nutting claims that these reports were 
the product of "a clever combination of calculated 
leakage, for the benefit of the Soviet Embassy in Tel 
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Aviv, and fictious radio messages ..• 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: 
HOW THE TIES WERE FORGED 
One of the most important elements of the Soviet-
Egyptian relationship during the period when Nasser was in 
power was the economic relationship between the two nations. 
The Soviet-Egyptian relationship was composed of two sepa-
rate parts: economic assistance and trade relations. The 
former was, like military assistance, extremely undirection-
al. The flow of aid was, predictably, exclusively from the 
Soviet Union to Egypt. Unlike military aid, however, eco-
nomic aid returned little to the Soviet Union in terms of 
benefits that it could have gained only through Egypt. Eco-
nomic aid did not provide the Soviets with bases or testing 
grounds for equipment that were unique in their advantages. 
It did make Egypt somewhat dependent on the Soviet Union for 
machinery and spare parts. This was true in part because 
most Soviet aid to Egypt came in the form of project aid 
which utilized Soviet personnel, Soviet equipment, and Soviet 
training for Egyptian personnel. 
Soviet economic aid to Egypt came in two different 
types. The most common type of Soviet assistance was a loan 
or credit to Egypt for a specific project. These loans, 
like all Soviet loans and loans from one nation to another 
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in general, provided the Soviets as lender with some return 
on their investment. That return was, however, minimal. 
Usually, the loans were extended to Egypt in rubles and were 
to be paid with 2.5 to 3 percent interest in equal yearly 
installments over a ten to twelve year period, beginning a 
l 
year after the completion of a project. Repayments were 
generally made in Egyptian pounds, although most agreements 
did contain a clause which stated that payments "may be con-
verted to pounds sterling or any freely convertible currency 
2 
which will be agreed upon between the two governments." Ap-
parently the Soviets never requested repayment from the 
Egyptians in hard currency at any time - even after Sadat 
expelled the Soviets from Egypt in 1975. 
The other form of direct Soviet aid to Egypt, the eco-
nomic grant, was utilized very rarely and the amounts of 
Soviet grants were always quite small. In fact, Soviet 
grants to Egypt played a negligible role in developing 
Egypt's economy and had little impact on Soviet-Egyptian 
relations as a whole. One of the few instances in which 
anything which could be termed a Soviet grant to Egypt 
played a significant role in supporting the Egyptian econo-
my and in bolstering Soviet-Egyptian relations was during 
the singular circumstances of the aftermath of the June 1967 
war between Egypt and Israel. Actually, even in that in-
stance, the Soviets did not provide a large grant to the 
Egyptians outright, but instead simply cancelled half of 
Egypt's prior debt to the Soviet Union and rescheduled the 
3 
remainder. 
The sum of these two types of economic assistance to 
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Egypt made up over 28 percent of the total of all Soviet aid 
to developing nations and approximately 15 percent of its 
total aid from 1954 to 1970. Much of the dominant element 
of project aid went toward the development of Egyptian heavy 
4 
industry and hydroelectric power. Of this portion, the most 
important single project was the building of the Aswan Dam 
and its attendant industries. The Soviet Union contributed 
over 325 million dollars for the project, a sum which con-
5 
stituted 27.7 percent of the total cost of the project. 
Much of the remainder of the project aid with which the 
Soviets provided Egypt was for heavy industry and came in 
the form of complete industrial plants which the Soviets 
shipped to Egypt. This form of aid was especially prominent 
in the mid and late 1960's when an average of approximately 
80 million dollars worth of complete industrial plants were 
6 
sent to Egypt by the u.s.s.R. annually. 
The element of economic assistance was added to the 
Soviet-Egyptian economic relationship in the 1950's. There 
had already been a commercial relationship on a small scale 
between the two countries for many years. Begun in 1923, 
the trade relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt 
continued with few interruptions up to and through the Nasser 
era (see Appendix A). Throughout the Nasser era, trade be-
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tween the Soviet Union and Egypt was handled on a state to 
state basis. From the beginning of the Nasser regime until 
its end, the commerce between the two countries increased 
steadily from a minimum value of 15.6 million rubles in 1954 
7 
to a maximum of over 600 million rubles in 1970. 
Soviet trade with Egypt was always of only minor sig-
nificance to the Soviet economy. This is particularly ap-
parent when that trade is viewed in light of the total 
volume of Soviet trade with the entire world. Soviet-
8 
Egyptian trade made up only approximately 3 percent of the 
entirety of Soviet trade. Clearly, the Soviet Union was in 
no way economically dependent upon its trade relationship 
with Egypt. That fact stands out even more when one con-
siders the fact that the major portion of Soviet imports 
from Egypt came not in the form of some rare but crucial 
mineral for industry that was not produced in the Soviet 
Union, but rather in the form of raw materials - cotton and 
oil - which the Soviets produced in quantities sufficient 
or nearly sufficient for their own needs within their own 
borders. 
For Egypt, on the other hand, its trade relationship 
with the Soviet Union was extremely important. Not only did 
its trade relationship with the U.S.S.R. and the other 
centrally-planned economies of the world account for over 
60 percent of its exports, but it was also dependent upon 
the Soviets for machinery and technical expertise necessary 
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for its industrial development. This situation was ex-
acerbated by the nature of the Soviet-Egyptian trade re-
lationship. The commercial relationship between the two 
nations followed a trade pattern that was characteristic of 
much of Soviet trade: the bilateral trade pattern. This 
pattern heightened the dependence of Egypt upon the Soviet 
Union by providing a single buyer for its cotton crop. For 
a single crop economy like Egypt's that could be disasterous 
if it wished to retain its independence. Dependence upon 
the Soviet Union for its industrial supplies also put Egypt 
in a position where it seemed to have little alternative 
for assistance. No other country could offer technical 
familiarity or spare parts for the machinery on which Egypt 
relied. Given this situation, the inception of Egypt's com-
mercial relationship with the U.S.S.R. in 1954, while minor 
in terms of capital, undoubtedly changed - and changed 
drastically - the course of Egypt's economic development. 
The economic relationship between Nasser's regime be-
gan quietly enough with the signing of a routine commercial 
banking agreement between the two governments in August of 
10 
1953. It was the first official agreement of any sort be-
tween the two countries. Although it seemed at the time to 
be nothing more than a rather inoffensive and unimportant 
step toward the normalization of relations between one of 
the world's emerging superpowers and a nation which had only 
recently regained its political independence, it was in 
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reality the first step in a binding process which would 
eventually shake the foundations of peace in the Middle East 
and which, by doing that, would bring to the fore ominous 
possibilities for the entire world. The agreement itself, 
however, was nothing more than an agreement by the commer-
cial institutions of the two countries to honor each others 
credit arrangements. 
The commercial banking agreement between Egypt and the 
U.S.S.R. opened the doors for much more extensive and impor-
tant economic agreements between the two countries. A year 
later, the banking agreement was followed by the first trade 
agreement between the revolutionary government of Egypt and 
11 
its Soviet counterpart. The trade agreement itself had 
relatively little immediate impact upon the economy of 
either country. It involved very little in terms of money -
the total flow in both directions for 1954 and 1955 amounted 
to only 39.3 million rubles worth of goods - and exchanged 
small amounts of unwanted surplus items such as Egyptian 
cotton and non-crucial machinery from the Soviet Union. It 
was, however, the first step in the broader and much more 
significant - particularly for Egypt - trade relationship 
that was to develop over the next decade between the two 
countries. 
After 1954, the economic relationship between Egypt 
and the Soviet Union quickly blossomed. In January of 1955, 
the Soviets sent their first direct economic aid to Egypt 
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in the form of money and supplies for the relief of the 
victims of the disasterous flooding of the Nile that year. 
In April, the economic relationship expanded to include 
the Soviet Union's erstwhile ally, the People's Republic of 
China. In September, the Egyptians and the Soviets signed 
a trade protocol which was indirectly related to the Czech 
12 
Arms Deal which had been arranged at the same time. 
These relatively minor steps toward an economic rap-
prochement between the Soviet Union and Egypt combined with 
the much more ominous Czech Arms Deal to help prod the U.S. 
and the United Kingdom to offer Egypt the financial assist-
ance which it had been seeking to build the Aswan Dam. The 
terms of the aid from the West for the building of the dam 
were too harsh as far as Nasser was concerned for Egypt to 
accept. He threatened to go to the Soviets for aid for his 
project just as he had gone to them for arms when the West 
13 
had proven ''unreasonable." Despite Nasser's threat and 
continuing evidence of the ever increasing number of con-
nections between Egypt and the Soviets such as the coopera-
tive agreement on the development of nuclear energy in 
Egypt which had been announced by the two countries in 
14 
February of 1957, the United States withdrew its offer of 
aid for Egypt in July. Great Britain and the World Bank 
soon follwed suit. Nasser's response was the nationaliza-
tion of the Suez Canal. 
Nasser's action led to the Suez Canal War and the 
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international turmoil which followed from it. Despite that 
turmoil, the development of closer Soviet-Egyptian economic 
relations continued apace. In July of 1956, the Soviet 
Union established a permanent trade mission in Cairo. In 
October, the Chinese, who were still relatively closely 
allied with the Soviet Union, extended a credit to Egypt for 
commodity purchases. Most importantly, the negotiations be-
tween the U.S.S.R. and Egypt regarding Soviet aid for the 
Aswan Darn which had begun casually in May now became earnest 
discussions between two parties actively seeking mutual ac-
cornrnodation. 
Serious negotiations between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union about the Aswan Darn continued throughout 1957. While 
they were going on, agreements regarding other sorts of 
Soviet economic assistance for Egypt were held in abeyance. 
Only the expansion of trade between the two countries con-
tinued as before. By 1957, trade between the Soviet Union 
and Egypt had broadened to the point where Soviet exports 
to Egypt had increased from their 1954 minimum value of 8 
million rubles to almost 100 million rubles in value. 
Egyptian exports to the Soviet Union had also increased 
dramatically from their 1954 value of 7.6 million rubles to 
15 
74 million rubles in 1957. The figures for trade in 1957 
represent a level for the value of trade between Egypt and 
the Soviet Union which would not substantially change for 
three years. 
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Even after that initial three-year period, the total 
value of trade would stay approximately the same for another 
three years. During that period, only the balance of trade 
between the two countries would change. By 1963, the value 
of each nation's trade had been approximately reversed so 
Egypt stood as the larger exporter of the two. 
In January of 1958, the Egyptian Minister of Industry, 
Samir Ibrahim, went to the U.S.S.R. and arranged a credit 
agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt for industrial 
projects. It was the first in a series of middle level 
meetings and economic agreements during 1958 which would 
lead to the announcement in October of that year of an agree-
ment between the two nations under the terms of which the 
Soviet Union would provide Egypt with financial and techni-
16 
cal assistance in the building of the Aswan High Dam. The 
second step in the development of an economic infrastructure 
which would facilitate the building and utilization of the 
dam was an April protocol which specified uses to which the 
credit which had been agreed upon in January would be put. 
The April meeting regarding the uses to which the 175 
million dollar credit with which the Soviet Union had pro-
vided Egypt would be put was followed by a June visit to 
the Soviet Union by Egypt's Minister of Trade. During 
August, the Soviet Union's Minister of Agriculture visited 
Egypt to arrange for closer cooperation between the two 
nations in his realm. In September, Aeroflot and the 
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Egyptians reached an agreement upon air service between the 
17 
two countries. 
The visits and agreements between the Soviet Union and 
Egypt during the first nine months of 1958 were merely a 
prelude to the vastly more important agreement between the 
two nations regarding Soviet support for the first stage of 
Egypt's Aswan High Dam project. The October 23 agreement 
between the two countries provided the Egyptians with a 
credit worth up to 100 million dollars worth of technical 
expertise and equipment for the building of the dam. It was 
by far the most important agreement of an economic nature 
which had been or would be signed between Egypt and the 
Soviet Union. 
Some of the reasons behind the construction of the dam 
were discussed in the previous chapters. Others and their 
ramifications still need to be reviewed. By agreeing to 
help the Egyptians finance their project, the Soviets were 
guaranteeing that, for a time at least, they would be able 
to maintain a strong presence in the Middle East. To gain 
this advantage, the Soviet Union had to agree to provide 
Nasser with the low interest capital which he desired for 
his project without forcing him to mortgage the entire 
Egyptian economy in return. For Nasser, the Soviet loan was 
a dream come true. He had successfully defied the West and 
still gotten the economic aid he needed to modernize Egypt. 
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The initial Soviet loan to Egypt to help the Egyptians 
with the financing of the Aswan High Dam project was for the 
first stage of the construction of the dam only. As it 
turned out, the Egyptians utilized 80 million dollars worth 
of the possible 100 million dollars that the Soviets had 
18 
provided. The dam was scheduled to be built in four 
stages. The Soviets and Egyptians announced a Soviet loan 
of 180 million dollars for the second stage of the dam on 
July 27, 1960, shortly after the Egyptians had already re-
ceived a firm offer of assistance from West Germany for the 
19 
remainder of the work necessary to complete the dam. Over 
300 factories in the Soviet Union participated in the Aswan 
Dam project. They manufactured over 500,000 tonnes of 
20 
equipment for the dam. 
The Soviets provided the Egyptians with technical ex-
pertise and equipment and a portion of the financing for the 
dam. Just how great a portion of the financing the Soviets 
provided is open to question. According to Marshall Goldman, 
the Soviets provided a total of 325 million dollars (100 
million in the first installment and 225 for the second 
21 
stage) worth of aid for the Aswan High Dam project. Accept-
ing that figure would mean accepting that the Soviets 
financed only 27.8 percent of the total cost of the dam and 
22 
that Egypt bore the brunt of the costs. Another source 
puts the total of Soviet assistance at 559 million dollars, 
a figure which encompasses approximately one-half of the 
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total cost of the project. The second set of figures seems 
more credible. Despite some improvements in Egypt's finan-
cial situation, the Egyptian economy was far from capable 
of producing a surplus of three quarters of a billion 
dollars even for so vital a step in its industrialization as 
23 
the construction of the Aswan High Dam. 
The Aswan Dam was completed in 1972. Its construction 
was vital to the Egyptian economy. By 1974, it was supply-
24 
ing Egypt with nearly 53 percent of its electricity. It had 
also allowed the Egyptians to reclaim approximately 590,000 
hectares of land in the Nile Valley. By aiding the 
Egyptians in the construction of the dam, the Soviet Union 
had made what was perhaps the greatest possible contribution 
that could have been made to the Egyptian economy. It had 
helped to make possible the development of Egyptian heavy 
industry, it had helped provide Egypt with an alternative 
power source to the Sinai oil fields, and it had helped im-
prove the agricultural situation of Egypt both by adding to 
the arable land and providing irrigation systems and by 
25 
adding to Egypt's capacity to produce chemical fertilizers. 
In the years following the initial Soviet-Egyptian 
agreement on credit for the Aswan Dam, there were no other 
agreements of comparable value. The Egyptian-Soviet eco-
nomic relationship contined to develop despite that, how-
ever. In January of 1959, an Egyptian business delegation 
visited the U.S.S.R. to widen trade contact between the two 
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nations. In March, the Soviets gave the Egyptians mill 
equipment for oil refineries. In May, an accord on shipping 
between the two nations was signed. In August, a contract 
between the two nations was signed under the terms of which 
the Soviets would undertake the building of an irrigation 
project in Egypt. In September, the Egyptians signed a con-
26 
tract to purchase Soviet factory equipment. 
1960 saw the continued expansion of the economic 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt. In Feb-
ruary, protocols on the trade of oil and of pharmaceuticals 
were signed. In September, a protocol on the development of 
the Alexandria shipyard was signed. In September, an agree-
ment regulating trade between the two nations for the next 
two years was signed when the Egyptian Minister of Economics 
and Foreign Trade, Mohammed Shokose, visited the U.S.S.R. 
In December, protocols on several industrial projects were 
27 
signed. 
Along with the more mundane contacts detailed above, 
discussions regarding the financing of the Aswan High Dam 
continued in 1959 and 1960. In May of 1959 for example, the 
Egyptian Minister of Public Works, Mohammed Salama, was in 
the Soviet Union for talks about continued Soviet support 
of the dam project. In November, Soviet experts on the 
construction of dams visited the Aswan site in Egypt to in-
spect the progress of the dam. In February 1960, the 
Deputy Minister of Economics of Egypt visited Moscow for 
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more talks with the Soviets about their continued financial 
28 
assistance in the construction of the dam. 
In August, the efforts to reach an agreement on Soviet 
aid for the next stage of the dam came to fruition. Salama 
returned to the Soviet Union where he signed an agreement 
under the terms of which the Soviets would provide an addi-
tional 180 million dollars for the construction of the second 
stage of the Aswan project. The agreement, which was an-
nounced on August 27, marked an important step in the 
cementing of Egypt's ties with the Soviet Union, coming as it 
did in the face of a West German offer to aid the Egyptians 
29 
with the final phases of the dam. The West German offer, 
while genuine, should not be taken overly seriously however. 
It would seem that neither the Egyptians nor the Soviets took 
it extremely seriously. Neither displayed any pressing ur-
gency to get the agreement signed. The discussions were 
quite leisurely. Another fact which would seem to lend sup-
port to the argument that the West German offer was not a 
serious challenge to the Soviet position in Egypt is the 
level at which the discussions were held. Unlike the dis-
cussions on the first phase in which Nasser and Khrushchev 
participated directly, the discussions on the second stage 
were held exclusively between middle-level members of the 
two governments. It seems unlikely that the Soviets would 
be so laconic about the discussions if the West German of fer 
was a serious threat to their position in Egypt. 
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In 1961, another milestone in the development of 
Egyptian industry occurred with Soviet assistance. In July, 
the first Egyptian atomic reactor was completed. The re-
actor was small and played only a small role in the develop-
ment of power for Egypt. Egypt's joining the ranks of the 
countries which produced atomic power had tremendous poten-
tial military significance, however. It gave them the 
potential capability of building an atomic bomb and using it 
30 
on Israel if they so chose. 
July also saw internal changes in Egypt which ultimate-
ly had much greater effects on its economy than did the 
development of a small nuclear reactor. The last vestiges 
of private investment in its major industries were removed 
31 
by Nasser's decree on nationalization. A program of 
agrarian reform was also undertaken which spread the wealth 
and land of the countryside more evenly among the peasantry. 
Although these steps did make the economy of Egypt somewhat 
more like that of the Soviet Union and were hailed in the 
Soviet Union as a welcome change in the Egyptian economy, 
the changes were accomplished without the Soviet Union 
being actively involved in any way. 
The Soviet Union was involved in the construction of 
the Helwan steel mills. In March of 1962, a contract was 
signed between the Soviet Union and Egypt which provided 
Soviet aid in the building of the steel plant. In June, 
V. F. Garbuzov, the Soviet Minister of Finance, was in 
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Egypt where he arranged for a three-year agreement which de-
tailed the trade between the two nations during that time 
32 
period. At the same time, the Egyptian Minister for the 
Aswan Dam went to the U.S.S.R. to study dams and their 
utilization in the Soviet Union. Garbuzov also negotiated 
an agreement by which the first two agreements between Egypt 
and the Soviets were refinanced to ease the strains of re-
payment on the Egyptian economy. In September, a pair of 
protocols between the two nations was signed under the terms 
of which the Soviet Union would aid Egypt in the building of 
a new coal tar chemical plant and a calcium carbide and 
33 
ferrosilicum factory. 
Economic contacts between Egypt and the Soviet Union 
in 1963 continued in much the same manner as they had ended 
in 1962. In January, the Soviet Minister of Power was in 
Egypt for the anniversary of the construction of the first 
stage of the Aswan Dam. While he was there, a protocol was 
signed which guaranteed Soviet support for the final stages 
of the dam. In June, a credit agreement was signed which 
gave Egypt the wherewithal to purchase Soviet power equip-
ment. At the same time, a Soviet aviation delegation was in 
Egypt. While there, the delegation arranged a new air ser-
vice agreement between the two countries. In October, pro-
tocals regarding radio and a television plant were signed. 
In November, the Egyptian Minister of Industry went to the 
34 
U.S.S.R. for talks about getting more Soviet aid. 
In February 1964, a cooperative agreement on fishing 
was signed between the two countries. February 1964 also 
marked the completion of two major factories that the 
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Egyptians had built with Soviet aid. One was a coking plant 
and the other manufactured pharmaceuticals. In March, a 
contract for Soviet aid in building a chemical plant in 
35 
Egypt was signed. 
On May 23, 1964, the third and last package of Soviet 
aid for the Aswan High Dam project was announced. Worth 
over 250 million dollars, the third loan contributed sig-
nificantly more Soviet financial capital to the project than 
either of the first two aid agreements regarding the dam. 
It brought the total value of Soviet assistance for the 
project to over a half billion dollars. The agreement was 
followed by the June visit of a Soviet economic delegation 
to Cairo. The Soviet visit was the first in a series of 
discussions about the specifics of the third aid package. 
The next in this series of discussions came in August when 
the Egyptian Minister in charge of the Aswan Dam project, 
Mohammed Sidqi Sulaiman returned to the Soviet Union. The 
discussions were terminated in September when the two nations 
signed a protocol which finalized the details of the aid 
project's first half. The last important economic contact 
between the Soviet Union and Egypt in 1964 came when Egypt's 
Deputy Prime Minister, Abdel Munim Qaysul, visited Moscow 
and signed a protocol with the Soviets regarding trade for 
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the coming year. 
The year 1965 opened with what the Soviets must have 
considered an ominous note: the People's Republic of China 
extended a credit to Egypt for industrial projects. The 
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offer was the beginning of an attempt by the Chinese to more 
actively assert themselves in the Middle East. The Chinese 
effort marked an escalation of their conflict with the 
Soviets, a conflict which had been simmering at least since 
1957 and which may well have begun earlier. 
The Chinese threat was certainly something which the 
Soviets had to take seriously. Chinese relations with Egypt 
and the rest of the Third World had been strongly positive 
on the whole for some time. The developing countries per-
ceived China as one of their own and had since the Bandung 
Conference in 1955. The Chinese also had the advantage in 
their relations with the newly formed governments of the 
Third World of being at the very minimum a match for the 
Soviets in "revolutionary" prestige. These factors forced 
the Soviets to take the Chinese challenge in the Middle East 
seriously even though China's economic infirmity ultimately 
militated strongly against its success. Still, the Soviets 
weren't about to take any risks in any area which they had 
just entered. They maintained the pace of their assistance 
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to Egypt throughout 1965 as a result. 
The year's contact between the Soviets and Egypt began 
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with the February visit of a Soviet agricultural delegation 
to Egypt. The February visit to Egypt by Soviet agricultur-
al personnel was followed in June by a visit of Soviet 
Deputy Premier, I. T. Novikov. These two missions were the 
harbinger of a Soviet credit of grain to Egypt in July. The 
credit was extended to prevent the possibility of starvation 
there due to a projected bad harvest. Contact between the 
two countries for 1965 closed in December when the new 
Soviet Minister of Trade, Nikolai Patolichev visited Egypt 
and negotiated a new five-year pact detailing the trade re-
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lationship between the two nations. 
1966 marked the first year of the new trade package. 
It also marked another active year for Soviet-Egyptian eco-
nomic contacts of other sorts. In January, a Soviet delega-
tion visited Egypt and signed protocols which promised 
Soviet aid on several different industrial projects in 
Egypt. May was marked by an agreement between the two 
nations through which the remainder of the package of aid 
for the Aswan Darn was disbursed. During June, another 
Soviet trade delegation arrived in Egypt to arrange for 
additional deliveries of Egyptian cotton to the U.S.S.R. In 
August, the Egyptian Deputy Minister for Electrical Energy 
visited the Soviet Union to study the electrical industry of 
the Soviet Union and a trade protocol worth 30 million 
dollars between the two countries was signed. In October, 
Egyptian engineers visited the Soviet Union for a six-month 
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study of cotton growing and irrigation in the U.S.S.R. 
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The next four years were probably the most active years 
of the Soviet-Egyptian economic relationship during the years 
that Nasser was in power in Egypt. In January of 1967, the 
Soviet Minister for Land Reclamation visited Egypt to inspect 
its irrigation projects. During February, a Soviet trade 
delegation visited Egypt. One month later, a Soviet dele-
gation visited Caiiro to discuss Soviet aid to the Egyptians. 
At the same time, the Soviet Minister of Fisheries was in 
Cairo to discuss cooperation on fishing between the two 
countries. 
After the Six Day War in June between Egypt and the 
other Arabs and Israel, the Soviet-Eygptian economic rela-
tionship continued apace. In July, the Soviets sent a gift 
of foodstuffs to the Egyptians. That month, a protocol on 
an oil pumping station in Egypt was also signed between the 
two countries. Approximately one month later, a new trade 
protocol was signed to regulate Soviet-Egyptian trade. 
Finally, in September, a protocol detailing the shipment of 
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Soviet equipment for the Aswan Dam was announced. 
During the course of 1968, there were seven major 
economic developments which directly affected Egyptian-Soviet 
relations. The first was a protocol which detailed the 
trade relationship between the two countries for the year. 
The next three involved the extension of Soviet assistance 
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in the development of Egyptian industry in such widely 
diverse areas as the steel industry, the Egyptian tele-
communications network, and the shipbuilding program which 
was being built up in Alexandria. In November, Soviet 
Deputy Premier Mikhail T. Efremov visited Egypt to discuss 
continued Soviet aid for the Aswan project. During Efremov's 
stay in Cairo, several more protocols were signed which de-
tailed the administration of the aid which he agreed to ex-
tend in his discussions with Egyptian leaders. The year 
closed with two more important developments that affected the 
Soviet-Egyptian economic relationship. The first was almost 
certainly the more important of the two. The Soviets ap-
pointed a new Deputy Minister of Electrification whose sole 
duty was to advise the Egyptians in the development of their 
electrification, a network which was expanding with more and 
more haste as the Aswan Dam approached completion. Finally, 
a joint Soviet-Egyptian commission met in Moscow to arrange 
for heightened cooperation in the fishing industry between 
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the two countries. 
1969 was another busy year in the Soviet-Egyptian eco-
nomic relationship. In January, the work of the joint com-
mission on fisheries came to fruition when the two nations 
signed an agreement on cooperation in the fishing industry. 
At the same time, the two countries signed an agreement 
which contracted for the Egyptians to build ships for the 
Soviets in their Alexandria shipyard. A month later, a 
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trade protocol for 1969-70 was signed. During May, the two 
nations signed a protocol which arranged for joint oil 
prospecting in Egypt. A gift of industrial safety equipment 
was sent from the U.S.S.R. to Egypt in June. In July, the 
Egyptian Minister of Industry visited Moscow. During that 
visit, he arranged for a protocol which called for the joint 
Soviet-Egyptian development of an aluminum plant and a 
phosphates plant in Egypt. The Soviets signed an agreement 
during November to purchase sheet metal from the Helwan com-
plex. At the same time, Deputy Premier V. N. Novikov was in 
Egypt for talks about aid and an Egyptian delegation was in 
the U.S.S.R. for a farm conference. In December, an Egyptian 
economic delegation visited Russia. While there, they 
arranged a trade protocol which supplemented the agreement 
that had been reached in February. Also in December, a 
Soviet shipping delegation was in Alexandria. As a result 
of their discussions with their Egyptian counterparts, the 
Soviet delegation negotiated a protocol which updated the 
42 
1959 agreement between the two countries on shipping. 
In 1970, the last year of Gamel Abdel Nasser's life, 
the Soviet Union and Egypt were in the midst of a period of 
close economic cooperation. Contacts between the two 
nations were deep and frequent. In March, Egypt's Minister 
of Communication was in Moscow to arrange for Soviet aid in 
the development of Egypt's communications industry. Two 
months later, a trade delegation from Odessa visited Egypt. 
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At the same time, the director of Egypt's airline went to 
the U.S.S.R. and bought commercial aircraft from the 
Soviets. During July, the Egyptian Minister of Industry 
went to Moscow and opened an Egyptian industrial exhibition 
there. The Soviet Minister of Land Reclamation went to 
Egypt to present the Egyptians with the gift of a mechanized 
farm in early August. In September, Soviet scientists made 
a fishing survey of the Red Sea in order to investigate its 
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potential as a site for large-scale harvesting. 
Economic contacts between the two nations came to an 
abrupt but temporary halt on October 3 when Nasser died. 
From the foregoing it is clear that economic contacts be-
tween the Soviet Union and Egypt were broad and deep. The 
economies of the two countries were completely intertwined. 
The Soviets were involved in areas as diverse as fishing, 
farming, and heavy industry. The Egyptians depended on the 
Soviets both as a buyer of goods that the Egyptians pro-
duced and as a supplier of the goods that they needed. 
Soviet purchases (which were usually purchases of goods for 
which the Soviets had little need) helped nascent Egyptian 
industries like the shipyards in Alexandria and the Helwan 
steel complex get off the ground. They also helped keep the 
economy of Egypt on an even keel during years like 1965 when 
the cotton market was depressed. 
As the years progressed, the dependence of the Nasser 
regime on Soviet purchases and aid became more and more 
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acute. The increasing levels of dependence are demonstrated 
by the progressive escalations of the ratio of Egypt's trade 
with the Soviet Union versus its trade with the rest of the 
world in 1957, l963 (see figure 5) and each year there-
after except l968. 
Despite the dependence of Egypt's economy on Soviet 
largess, trade, and technical expertise, the economic re-
lationship between the two was not the Soviet-dominated 
proprietary relationship that it might seem to be on the sur-
face. The Soviets were purchasing the influence in the 
Middle East that they wanted so badly with their aid and 
were trying to secure it by tying the Egyptian economy to 
theirs through trade. However, that influence was much more 
limited than the Soviets would have liked because the 
Egyptians nearly always had aid alternatives. So curiously 
enough, despite Egypt's dependence on the Soviet economy, 
it was Nasser, not the leaders of the Soviet Union, who con-
trolled the relationship between the two countries. 
For Egypt the advantages and disadvantages of its 
economic relationship with the Soviet Union are readily ap-
parent. The first, and perhaps most important, advantage 
which Egypt gained from its economic relationship with the 
u.s.S.R. is obvious: it gained a partner that was willing 
to finance a large portion of the Aswan Dam's construction 
and which was willing to provide technical expertise as 
well. With the building of the dam came several ancillary 
benefits, such as irrigation systems, the reclamation of 
large tracts of arable lands, and sufficient power for the 
development of heavy industry. 
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Over the years, the tangible benefits of Soviet aid 
built up as Egypt industrialized. There were few if any 
similarly tangible debits. Perhaps American aid would have 
proved more effective in building a lasting base for in-
dustrialization. Even that seems debatable, however. 
American industrialization programs in the Third World have 
often proved ernpherneral. It seems that the effectiveness 
of Great Power aid in the industrialization of a Third World 
nation often is much more dependent upon the wisdom of the 
leaders of that nation than on which Great Power provided 
the aid. American aid may well have had costs which Egypt 
simply could not afford to pay. Certainly, that was ulti-
mately the case with regard to aid for the Aswan High Darn. 
Soviet trade also provided advantages to Egypt that 
were available in few if any other places. One of the most 
important of these was the ability of the non-market Soviet 
economy to absorb surplus goods during periods when the 
international commodity market slumped. Another advantage 
of trade with the Soviet Union was that the Soviets were 
willing to provide Egypt with needed grain when the Soviet 
Union itself was suffering from shortages. A third advan-
tage of commerce with the Soviet Union was that the Soviets 
were capable of providing Egypt with the technology neces-
sary to industrialize and were often willing to provide it 
gratis or for cut-rate prices that were scheduled for pay-
ment according to the ability of the Egyptians to pay. 
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Despite its manifest benefits for Egypt, there were 
also several important disadvantages inherent in the Soviet-
Egyptian economic relationship. First, there were strings 
attached to Soviet economic aid. The most obvious of these 
is Egypt's dependence upon the Soviet Union for that aid. 
The dependence necessarily gave the Soviets some leverage 
with which they could attempt to influence Egypt's actions. 
An example of the attempted use of the economic lever 
against Egypt is Khrushchev's attempt to pressure Nasser 
into easing his repression of the Egyptian Communist Party 
in the 1958-62 period. In general, however, the economic 
lever was left unused by the Soviets. Such use was in-
effective and usually would have been counterproductive. 
The West would have been quite willing to step in and fill 
the Soviet shoes if the Egyptians found them to be demand-
ing during almost any part of the 1954-70 period. 
Like economic assistance from the Soviets, trade also 
held drawbacks for the Egyptians. Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these was the bilateral nature of that trade. Bi-
lateral trade tends to limit the growth of a developing 
country's economy by limiting its choice of imports and of 
markets. This is even more likely in the case of a one-
crop economy like Egypt's trading with a country like the 
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Soviet Union in a barter type arrangement which pays in 
products rather than hard currency. Overreliance on such a 
partner creates dependency. Another problem was the quality 
of Soviet goods. Goods from the U.S.S.R. were often rela-
tively low compared to similar items available from other 
countries. Spare parts were also often in short supply and 
deliveries were occasionally delayed. 
For the Soviets, the advantages of its economic rela-
tionship with the Egyptians were fewer and less tangible. 
They were nevertheless quite real to the Soviets. The most 
important of the advantages which it gained was something 
that it gained from both its aid and trade relationships with 
Egypt. By entering into a broad-scale relationship with the 
Egyptians which included an economic aspect, the U.S.S.R. 
gained more leverage over Egypt than it would have had 
through a simple military or military and diplomatic rela-
tionship with the Egyptians. Granted, the leverage was still 
ineffective, but that was due to the international situation 
more than anything else. Broadening the relationship with 
Egypt also effectively solidified the political entry of the 
Soviet Union into the Middle East. 
To gain these subjective advantages, the Soviets had 
to expend a great deal. The Soviet Union had to provide 
Egypt with large amounts of credit. They had to give the 
Egyptians a great deal of technical assistance. They pur-
chased large quantities of cotton and oil which they didn't 
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really need. They had to supply grain to Egypt when grain 
was in short supply in the Soviet Union. They also had to 
absorb Egyptian cotton surpluses when the world market was 
down. Finally, the economic lever over Egypt that they had 
hoped to gain proved ineffective in most instances. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the economic re-
lationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt are, like those 
of their military relationship, multifold. Unlike the mili-
tary relationship, for Egypt at least, any assessment of 
long term value of the relationship would almost certainly be 
positive. The Egyptians accomplished their objective of 
getting the Aswan Dam built and irrigation projects through-
out the Nile Valley set up. They also succeeded in getting 
the industrialization of their country underway. And they 
gained all of the less tangible benefits mentioned in the 
foregoing. The advantages of the relationship probably out-
weighed its debits for the Soviet Union as well. The actual 
costs of their aid to Egypt, while great in Egyptian terms, 
were on the Soviet scale relatively small, and the benefits 
of the relationship, while seemingly intangible, were never-
theless concrete enough in Soviet eyes to make them willing 
to pay the costs throughout most of the Nasser era and for 
the first years after his death. 
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CHAPTER V 
EGYPT AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE CULTURAL DIMENSION 
Like the other aspects of the relationship between the 
Soviet Union and Nasser's Egypt, the cultural dimension of 
the relationship between the two countries did not really 
begin to become prominent until after the Czech Arms Deal 
had been concluded. See Appendix A. The cultural aspect of 
the relationship has certainly received less attention from 
scholars than its economic, diplomatic, and military aspects 
have. There are several reasons for this being so, including 
the difficulty of assigning precise values to the effects of 
cultural missions and cultural interaction on the relation-
ship between the two countries and a general inclination to 
downplay the importance of cultural relations in inter-
national relations, but the importance of the cultural ties 
between the Soviet Union and Egypt during the period from 
1954 to 1970 should be emphasized far more than it has been 
heretofore. 
There were several important yet diverse elements 
which made up the cultural aspect of the relationship be-
tween Egypt and the Soviet Union which should be discussed. 
The two countries interacted through exchanges of students, 
religious personnel, films, newspapers, theatrical companies 
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and other performing artists. Tourism played an important 
role in the cultural interaction of the two nations. An-
other important element of the cultural relationship between 
the two was the educational element. The Soviet Union 
helped to improve Egypt's educational system by sending 
hundreds of academics to aid in the furthering of the 
Egyptian development of higher education and also by helping 
to build and develop technical training centers which em-
phasized the development of basic vocational skills, literacy 
1 
and management skills. Another important aspect of the 
educational interaction between the two countries was the 
aforementioned student exchange program which saw hundreds of 
Egyptians travel to the Soviet Union and receive their high-
er education there. 
Leaving aside the more traditional aspects of the 
cultural relationship for the moment, a look at one element 
which has often been disregarded because of its predictable 
and, at times, ludicrous nature would be fruitful. Propa-
ganda is the attempt by one culture to influence the mass 
views of another in such a way so as to improve its image in 
those views. It is a tool which has been commonly used by 
the Soviets throughout the world and one which has of ten 
been ridiculed by Westerners. Nevertheless, it has often 
been an effective tool in swaying the opinions of illiterate 
or unsophisticated audiences such as those which populate 
many of the nations in the Third World. It is also one of 
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the most nebulous aspects of the cultural relationship 
between the two countries and one for which it is difficult 
to ascertain the exact effects. In the case of Egypt, like 
most if not all other Third World countries where the Soviets 
have been active, it is one which has been used by the 
Soviets to influence Egypt and has not been used by Egypt 
to try to influence Soviet society in turn. 
There are many tools which the Soviet Union used to 
disseminate propaganda in Egypt. Films, newspapers, and 
magazines are among the most common of these. However, the 
most common, and probably the most effective, method by 
which the Soviets attempted to influence Egyptian popular 
2 
opinion was the use of radio broadcasts in Arabic. Radio 
has several advantages to off er to a country wishing to 
disseminate a message. Two, however, do far outweigh all of 
the others. First, radio is a medium which can deliver a 
message which is uncensored by the government of the target 
nation. Second, radio can reach peoples with low literacy 
rates who could not otherwise be propagandized. 
The medium of radio was used by the Soviet Union to try 
to convince its Arabic listeners that the Soviets were "pro-
3 
gressive," "peace-loving," and "democratic." Much of the 
radio propaganda broadcast by the U.S.S.R. was also aimed 
at glorifying the so-called "Soviet model" of economic 
development. It was hailed as the most beneficial model of 
development for Third World nations. The economic develop-
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ment of Soviet Central Asia was held up an an example of 
just how good a developmental model the Soviet model was 
for the nations of the Third World. In the words of Soviet 
propagandists, the non-capitalist path of the Soviet Middle 
East had "shown the whole world that all the oppressed 
peoples . . . can throw off the imperialist yoke forever 
The Soviet Eastern republics, like a bright torch, 
were an example to those countries where the labour of the 
peoples and the wealth of the country were still being 
4 
plundered and looted by the Western monopolists." 
The Soviets also used the medium of radio to try to 
discredit their adversaries. Not only were the U.S., Israel, 
and pro-Western Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
castigated in Soviet radio broadcasts, but China was also 
villif ied, particularly when the Chinese attempted to exert 
their own influence in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world 
in the late 1960's. Karen Dawisha cites as an example of 
this a broadcast made in i967 which condemns Mao Tse-Tung and 
China for advising Nasser to carry out a poeple's war against 
Israel and claims that this sort of advice only proves that 
the Chinese really come "out on the side of imperialism and 
5 
Zionism." 
Another use which the Soviets made of the medium of 
radio was to try to offset anti-Soviet propaganda which 
characterized the Soviet Union as atheistic and an "enemy of 
Islam." The Soviets used testimonials from Islamic leaders 
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from the Soviet Union and pro-Soviet nations in the Arab 
world to try to emphasize its "democratic" nature and "that 
religious freedom was one of the cornerstones of Soviet 
6 
life." They also used this same sort of testimonial to try 
to establish the organic nature of the role that the Soviet 
Union played in the Middle East as a Great Power and sup-
porter of the Arab cause. 
Like radio broadcasts, the flow of printed matter and 
films between the Soviet Union and Egypt was one-sided: 
from the Soviet Union to Egypt. Sales of Soviet films and 
books steadily grew in Egypt after the flow began in 1955 
when contacts between the Soviet agencies for books (Mezh-
dunarodnaia kniga), printed media (Novosti and Tass), and 
films (Soviet-export-film), and the Soviet Writers' Union 
and the USSR Academy of Sciences and their Egyptian counter-
parts were established. While Soviet film and book sales 
never outweighed the combined totals of those from the West, 
Soviet sales were nevertheless impressive. The writings of 
Marx and Lenin were sold openly; Tolstoi's and Gorky's works 
were commonly available, as were those of many other Russian 
writers; and Arabic versions of Soviet scientific texts were 
7 
used in many of Egypt's colleges and universities. 
The Egyptians also showed quite a few Soviet films. In 
fact, there were several joint Soviet-Egyptian film festivals 
held in Cairo. However, the showing of Soviet films often 
caused problems between the two nations. One example of the 
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type of problems that were generated is the closure in 
October of 1957 of a film festival which was showing Maxim 
Gorky's Mother, a film which was based upon a story in which 
a woman's rejection of religion in favor of communism and 
8 
atheism is lauded. Nasser closed the film down calling it 
blatant communist propaganda. Even a visit by the Soviet 
Minister of Communications was insufficient to get the 
festival reopened. 
The educational dimension of the cultural relationship 
between Egypt and the Soviets was also quite one-sided, al-
though perhaps slightly less so than either the propaganda 
or the printed matter and film dimension of it. The flow of 
scholars went each way. Egyptian scholars traveled to the 
Soviet Union and Soviet scholars came to Egypt. As mentioned 
earlier, Soviet academics who visited Egypt were often there 
as lecturers or instructors at Egyptian institutions of 
higher learning. Egyptian scholars who went to the Soviet 
Union on the other hand, were usually there to learn rather 
than to teach. The few exceptions to this rule were usually 
9 
Egyptologists or specialists in Arabic culture or history. 
Although their numbers never approached the numbers of 
Egyptians who studied in the West (see figure 9), like older 
scholars many Egyptian students decided to take advantage of 
the educational opportunities that the Soviet Union offered. 
Supported by their government, Egyptian students went to 
universities in the U.S.S.R. to study in many different 
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fields. Usually, however, they concentrated upon either the 
sciences or engineering. Sending students to the Soviet 
Union offered many advantages to the Egyptian government, 
including the availability of more advanced training than 
was available in the Middle East. This sort of training was 
also available in the West, but Soviet universities had one 
advantage which their Western counterparts could not match: 
their graduates always returned to Egypt. Graduates from 
Western universities did not. In fact, 38 percent of all 
Egyptian students who graduated from foreign universities 
10 
did not return to their native country. The percentage of 
emigres from Western universities was obviously higher since 
the graduates of Soviet universities invariably returned. 
Although the advantages of sending students to study 
in the Soviet Union were manifest for the Egyptian govern-
ment, there were also apparently significant drawbacks for 
students who attended Soviet universities. One necessarily 
had to learn to speak Russian, a language which few 
Egyptians had acquired. Western universities, on the other 
hand, usually taught their courses in English or French, 
languages with which many more Egyptians were acquainted. 
Some Western universities even established institutions in 
11 
Egypt which meant that some courses were given in Arabic. 
Another apparent drawback was political. From 1952 to 1969 
none of the 131 Egyptian cabinet ministers who had received 
Bachelor of Arts degrees had received a degree from the 
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Soviet Union or had studied in the U.S.S.R. for any prolonged 
12 
period. This may have been due in part to the relatively 
short time span of the connection between Egypt and the 
Soviet Union, but it seems that it was due in large part both 
to a pro-Western cultural bent of the Egyptian elite and the 
scientific nature of the training which most Egyptians re-
ceived in their studies in the Soviet Union. 
The technical education centers which the Soviet Union 
helped to build in Egypt may in the long run prove to have 
been even more beneficial for Egypt than the training of its 
students in the U.S.S.R. Eventually, at least 43 institu-
tions of the sort were established in Egypt and tens of 
13 
thousands of Egyptians were trained in them. These centers 
provided human material with technical and managerial skills 
without which the Egyptian economy could not have expanded. 
The utilization of the capacities of the Aswan Dam in par-
ticular, and heavy industry in general, was aided irnmeasur-
ably by having technically trained Egyptian managers avail-
able. What raises the value of these technical education 
centers over the value of educational exchanges which had 
similar benefits, is the fact that they would continue to 
train Egyptians long after the Soviet presence in Egypt had 
dwindled until it was only a memory. 
Some of the other media which were used to promote 
cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and Egypt were 
much less undirectional than were radio and education. The 
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flow of contacts through these media went both from the 
Soviet Union to Egypt and from Egypt to the Soviet Union. 
This bi-directional nature was particularly apparent in the 
performing arts. Egypt sent ballet troups, its puppet 
theater, its national folk dance troupe, the Cairo Symphony 
Orchestra, and famous singers like Om Kalthum to the Soviet 
14 
Union. In return, the Soviets sent several ballet companies 
including the Bolshoi, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, and Tashkent 
troupes. They sent folk dance troupes from Moldavia, 
Armenia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaidzhan, and Georgia. They also 
sent the State Puppet Theater and the State Circus to visit 
Egypt. Beyond simply sending troupes of artists to Egypt, 
the Soviets were also instrumental in establishing a nation-
al folklore ensemble and a state circus in Egypt. They also 
15 
helped to expand the Cairo Conservatory of Music. One of 
the more important contributions that the Soviet Union made 
to Egypt's cultural life was its aid in the establishment of 
the first ballet school in the Middle East or Africa which 
16 
was established in Cairo in 1958. 
Exchanges of performing artists were, like so many of 
the other media of cultural exchange between the Soviet Union 
and Egypt, instrumental in the Soviets' attempts to show 
Egyptians the elements of their culture which they wished 
the Egyptians to see and appreciate. Ballet troupes, puppet 
theaters, circuses, and particularly folk dancers were essen-
tial in presenting the ethnic and cultural diversity of 
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the Soviet Union which the Soviets wanted to emphasize to the 
Egyptians. These types of groups also represented ethnic 
minorities, many of which were Muslim, that seemed, at least 
to some extent, to be thriving on the freedom to maintain and 
display their own individual cultures and also to develop 
other aspects of culture that were more European in their 
origin. Cultural and ethnic freedom and attainment was 
exactly the image of itself which the Soviet Union wished to 
project. The medium of the performing arts was the perfect 
medium through which to do so. It was much more credible 
than radio propaganda - or book or film propaganda - because 
it gave objective, if selective, evidence of its reality. 
While the performing arts were perhaps the most easily 
controlled of the elements of the Soviet-Egyptian interchange, 
one that was not quite so easily controlled was tourism. Al-
though both the Soviet Union and Egypt had controls on who 
could come and go to and from their countries, once a tourist 
had arrived at his destination, his interaction with the 
local populace was to a certain extent unpredictable and un-
controllable. Despite the unpredictability of tourism as a 
medium of cultural exchange, limited arrangements for the 
interchange of tourists between Egypt and the Soviet Union 
were instituted in May of 1956. Since that time, the ex-
change of tourists between the two countries grew to a peak 
in the last year of Nasser's life (see figure 10). The 
tourist trade, like the interchange of performing artists 
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offered a glimpse of cultural reality. Because of its un-
official nature, however, it is improbable that tourism made 
any major impact on the relationship between the two coun-
tries. Certainly there are no documented cases that can be 
cited which show any sort of impact. Nevertheless, tourism 
should not be completely discounted since it offered both 
cultural reality and economic interchange between the two 
nations. 
Religious exchange was another of the elements of the 
cultural relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt 
which, on the surface at least, showed a balanced flow be-
tween the two. Religious leaders from both Egypt and the 
Soviet Union visited their counterparts in the other nation. 
The effects of the exchange on Egypt seem to have been 
minimal. There were few if any changes in the practice of 
Islam that were attributable to the Soviet Union and the 
effect of the religious interaction between the two nations 
on Egyptian politics was minimal. For the Soviet Union on 
the other hand, the effects of the relationship have been 
strong and direct. 
Before Egypt and the Soviet Union entered into a close 
relationship and the Soviet Union reformulated its policy 
toward the Third World, Islam was denounced by the Soviets 
as being the product of a class society which was being de-
liberately exploited by the West for "the enslavement of the 
17 
Eastern peoples." Their criticisms of the religion were 
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harsh and consistent. 
After the Soviet Union and Egypt began to develop 
closer ties and the Soviets began to become more intimately 
involved in the Middle East as a whole, the U.S.S.R. began 
to come under increasing fire from Arab leaders for the lack 
of religious freedom and tolerance in its Central Asian re-
18 
publics. 
As the pressure from the Arab world began to mount, 
the Soviets slowly began to change their official position 
on Islam in order to improve their image in Arab eyes. They 
began to ease the strictures on the practice of Islam in the 
19 
Soviet Union. By l970, over 30 million Muslims were inhabi-
tants of the Soviet Union, almost all of them in Central Asia 
and the Transcaucasus. According to Karen Dawisha, reli-
gious freedom and belief was much more prevalent in Central 
20 
Asia than in any other part of the nation. Soviet Muslims 
were allowed to visit Mecca in small groups. Soviet Muslim 
leaders visited Egypt and other Arab countries, and they 
held conferences in which "all Soviet nuslims were urged to 
take more active roles in the political and social life of 
the country in order to extend the influence of Islam and 
21 
protect the rights of believers." 
Along with the improvements in the life of its Muslim 
population, the U.S.S.R. began to moderate the tone of its 
propaganda. Islam no longer came under attack for being one 
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of the world's main reactionary forces. By 1970, Soviet 
criticisms of Islam were as mild as they could realistically 
be, given the militant atheism which is integral to a Marxist 
22 
world view. 
The ties between the Arabs of the Middle East and the 
Muslims of Central Asia were largely responsible for the 
moderation of Soviet views and practices regarding Islam. 
The Soviets wanted very much to extend their influence into 
the Middle East deeply and securely. It was almost vital 
for them in terms of their own image of what a "Great Power" 
was. They felt that they had a religious tool in the 
Muslims in their own lands which could be used to help to 
wedge them into the Middle East, and one which could wedge 
them in to stay. This tool existed because of the cultural, 
religious, and historical ties between Soviet Central Asia 
and the rest of the Islamic world. These ties were rein-
forced by linguistic ones: according to Islamic law, the 
Koran could only be read in Arabic. This forced all Muslims 
to have at least a passing acquaintance with that language. 
The visits of Egyptian and other Arab clerics to the Soviet 
Union pushed the Soviet government to allow more religious 
freedom in Central Asia and thus made improvements in the 
lives of Soviet Muslims inevitable. How much positive 
effect this had on Soviet-Egyptian relations is debatable. 
Certainly, it didn't hurt them. At the very least, it 
partially removed one of the sore points which had made many 
234 
Arab and Egyptian leaders hesitant about increasing their 
ties to the Soviet Union. 
The first two steps toward the opening of cultural 
interchange between the Soviets and Egypt during the Nasser 
years were religious in nature, and they occured almost 
simultaneously. Interestingly enough, they involved the 
interchange of both Muslim and Christian personnel. In 
August of 1955, the month before the Czech Arms Deal was 
signed, Soviet Muslim pilgrims stopped in Cairo on their way 
to Mecca. At the same time, the patriarch of Alexandria was 
on his way to visit the Soviet Union's Eastern Orthodox 
churches and to confer with the leaders of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church in Moscow. These two journeys, while in them-
selves relatively insignificant in terms of world politics, 
signalled the beginning of the cultural relationship between 
Egypt and the Soviet Union. Their religious character was 
significant because it emphasized that religion would play 
an important role in the development of the cultural con-
23 
nection between the two nations. 
A month after the religious connection between the 
Soviet Union and Egypt was established, a Soviet cultural 
center opened in Cairo. With the expansion of cultural con-
tacts between the Egyptians and the Soviets that the open-
ing of a Soviet cultural center in Cairo represented and the 
signing of the Czech Arms Deal, Soviet-Egyptian relations in 
the cultural realm settled into a pattern that was to be 
maintained as long as Nasser was in power. During that 
time, the two nations consistently exchanged missions from 
24 
each of the diverse areas that comprise culture. 
After the pattern was established, the next step in 
solidly setting cultural interaction between the two coun-
tries into the pattern it had acquired was the May 1956 
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visit of a Soviet academic delegation to Cairo. In August, 
leading members of the Egyptian Teachers Union returned the 
visit. During November, another Egyptian delegation visited 
the U.S.S.R. These contacts between members of the educa-
tional communities of the two nations began the educational 
aspect of their relationship. Like religion, education was 
to play a key role in the development of ties between the 
25 
two countries. 
The pattern that had been established in the first 
year and one-half of the cultural relationship between the 
Soviet Union and Egypt continued in 1957. In February, 
Soviet nuclear physicists went to Egypt to help develop 
Egypt's nuclear energy program as part of the agreement that 
the two countries had entered into one year earlier, which 
called for a cooperative effort to give Egypt the ability to 
produce nuclear power. A secondary goal of the mission was 
to help to improve the capacities and abilities of Egypt's 
26 
nuclear physicists. In May, an Egyptian Trade Union dele-
gation went to the Soviet Union to broaden contacts between 
the two nations. Two months later, Egyptian journalists 
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went to the Soviet Union and reaffirmed the connections 
with Tass and Novosti that had been developed in 1955. The 
connections were still tenuous at best. The lack of effec-
tive ties between the presses of the two nations is demon-
strated by the continuing rancor which the official Soviet 
press demonstrated toward its Egyptian counterpart in 
articles in the Soviet press throughout the late fifties 
27 
and the early sixties. 
In September, more Soviet scientists visited Egypt. 
The following month, Nikolai Psurtsev, the Soviet Minister 
of Communications, flew to Egypt, largely in response to the 
"crisis" which had evolved from Nasser's closing of the 
Soviet film festival which was being held in Cairo. 
Psurtsev had flown to Egypt to try to convince Egypt's leader 
that closing the film festival because of the nature of the 
Soviet film being shown which was based upon Gorky's Mother 
was unwise. Despite his best efforts, he was unable to con-
28 
vince Nasser to allow the film to reopen. 
In 1958, the number of cultural contacts between the 
Soviet Union and Egypt increased. In January, another 
Egyptian Trade Union delegation visited the u.s.s.R., as did 
a delegation from an organization which was based upon the 
government's efforts to promote cooperatives in Egypt. A 
Soviet delegation came to Egypt in April to arrange for 
cultural exchanges between the two countries. Later in the 
year, in June, an Egyptian delegation returned the visit. 
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Like its Soviet counterpart, the Egyptian delegation was 
trying to arrange for increased cultural contact between the 
two nations. 
In May, the first of many delegations of Egyptian 
scientists went to the Soviet union. Unlike their counter-
parts from the U.S.S.R., the Egyptian scientists had left 
their country not to teach but rather to be taught. During 
July, a delegation of Muslim leaders went to the Soviet 
Union to visit their Central Asian opposite numbers. In 
September, another Egyptian Trade Union delegation was dis-
patched to the Soviet union to strengthen the ties between 
the labor organizations of the two countries. A month later, 
Egyptian lawyers went to the Soviet Union to study its legal 
29 
system. 
In late November, another delegation came from Egypt to 
the Soviet Union in order to improve and broaden the cultural 
ties betwen the two. These delegations were the first steps 
in an effort to regularize and plan cultural contacts for a 
longer period of time. Up to that point, the contacts had 
been mostly one-shot connections. There were very few ex-
changes which had been set up in advance. The efforts to 
regularize contact did not immediately bear fruit. The 
negotiations between the two nations took until late 1959 
before anything concrete came of them. At that time, an 
agreement between the Soviets and Egyptians was signed which 
outlined the course which the cultural interaction between 
30 
the two nations would take for 1960. 
Cultural contacts for 1960 began in much the same 
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fashion as they had left off. In January, a Muslin delega-
tion from the U.S.S.R. journeyed to Egypt. An Egyptian 
Trade Union delegation visited the Soviet Union in May. 
Like those before it, the Egyptian delegation was there to 
broaden and deepen the contacts between the labor organiza-
tions which they represented and their Soviet counterpart. 
During November, another delegation of Egyptian journalists 
visited the U.S.S.R. despite the rancor with which the 
Soviet press was treating them and their campaign in support 
of Nasser and his efforts to suppress the Communist Party of 
31 
Egypt. 
The agreement regarding cultural exchange which the 
Soviet Union and Egypt had signed in 1959 outlined a program 
of exchange in which a good deal less contact between the 
two nations was scheduled to take place than had taken place 
in 1958. The lull in cultural contact between the two coun-
tries was largely due to the temporary pall which had 
settled over the entire relationship between the two as a 
result of the harsh anti-Communist campaign which Nasser had 
been carrying out in Egypt since 1958. The only contacts of 
importance which occurred in 1960 were the November visit of 
a Soviet delegation headed by a Russian Orthodox patriarch 
in Egypt and the signing of an agreement between the two 
nations regarding cultural exchange for 1961 and 1962. 
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1961 was, like the year before it, a relatively slow 
year in terms of the number of contacts between the Soviets 
and the Egyptians. In April Soviet Minister of Communica-
tions, Nikolai Psurtsev, once more visited Egypt. His visit 
this time was, however, for a much less "dramatic" reason. 
He had journeyed to Egypt to arrange for broader film con-
tacts between the two nations. His visit to Egypt was 
followed in July by the visit of a delegation of Soviet 
journalists to Cairo for the celebrations which marked the 
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anniversary of the Egyptian revolution of 1952. 
1962 was another relatively slow year in Soviet-
Egyptian cultural relations. In February, the two nations 
signed a protocol which detailed their cultural exchanges 
for the year. An Egyptian Trade Union delegation visited 
the Soviet Union in June. Members of the U.S.S.R.'s labor 
organizations returned the visit for the first time in July 
when they came to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the 
33 
Egyptian revolution. 
In 1963, the two nations returned to a more active 
pace in their cultural relationship. The political tension 
which had arisen from Nasser's suppression of the Egyptian 
Communists and his improved relationship with the West had 
eased for the most by then. In February, the Egyptian 
Hinister of Education visited the U.S.S.R. to improve ties 
between the two nations in his sphere of responsibility. At 
the same time, the two nations reached agreement and signed 
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a protocol which outlined their cultural interchanges for 
1963 and 1964. The following month, a Soviet delegation of 
educational specialists returned the visit of Egypt's Minis-
ter of Education to the Soviet Union the month before as 
the first step in increasing cooperation in the realm of 
education. During April, an Egyptian delegation visited 
the U.S.S.R. to study Soviet methods in radio. A month 
later, in May, A. I. Adzhubey, Khrushchev's son-in-law, and 
the Editor-in-Chief of Izvestia visited Egypt at Nasser's 
34 
invitation. 
Like the first half of 1963, the second half was quite 
active. In July, a Soviet Trade Union delegation visited 
Egypt in connection with the anniversary of Egypt's revolu-
tion. The following month, the Soviet Minister of Social 
Affairs led a delegation to Egypt. During October, the 
Egyptians put on a major Soviet film festival which was 
attended by a delegation from Soviet cinema organizations. 
Unlike the festival in 1957, this film festival went smooth-
ly. Cultural contact for the year closed in December with a 
visit to Egypt by the Soviet Minister of Health to arrange 
for cooperation between the two nations in the many areas 
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under his purview. 
In 1964 and 1965, cultural contact between the Soviet 
Union and Egypt was at a minimum. During 1964, the first 
contact between the two nations came in January when a 
Soviet Trade Union delegation visited Egypt. In February, 
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a Soviet academic delegation went to Egypt to strengthen 
their ties with their Egyptian counterparts. For the rest 
of the year, the cultural front of the Soviet-Egyptian re-
lationship was curiously quiet. Contact did not resume 
until February of the next year. At that time, the two 
nations signed a protocol on cultural exchange. In Septem-
ber 1965, an agreement was reached which outlined exchanges 
in the field of television. Finally, a month later, the 
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Soviet-DAR Friendship Society was founded in Cairo. 
In 1966, cultural contacts between the two countries 
picked up once more. There were a total of four important 
contacts in the cultural realm - as many as there had been 
during the previous two years combined. These contacts 
ranged from scientific cooperation, such as the agreement 
which the two countries signed in February which promised 
Egyptian aid in tracking Soviet satellites and orbital 
flights, to educational intercourse like the visits of the 
Soviet Minister of Professional Education and the well-known 
Soviet economist, Evsei G. Liberman, to Egypt. Contact for 
the year closed in December when an accord on cultural con-
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tacts between the two nations in 1967 was signed. 
In February of 1967, an Egyptian delegation went to 
the Soviet Union to increase contacts between the two 
nations in radio broadcasting. At the same time, Yekaterina 
Furtseva, the Soviet Minister of Culture, was in Cairo for 
talks. One month later, an Egyptian Trade Union delegation 
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went to the U.S.S.R. During April, their visit was returned 
by a Soviet Trade Union delegation. In August, the Egyptian 
Minister of Tourism went to the Soviet Union. While there 
he arranged an agreement on the exchange of tourists between 
the two nations. 
In 1968, an Egyptian delegation went to the Soviet 
Union in January to arrange for closer cooperation between 
the two nations in the realm of higher education. At the 
same time, Egyptian nuclear scientists went to the U.S.S.R. 
to participate in a conference there. During flay, Egypt's 
Minister of Education went to Moscow. The result of his 
visit was a protocol detailing the two nations' cultural re-
lationship with each other for 1969 and 1970. The Soviet 
Union opened two new cultural centers in Egypt in June. One 
was stiuated in Cairo and the other was located in Alexandria. 
In September, an Egyptian Trade Union delegation visited the 
U.S.S.R. September also saw the competion of the satellite 
tracking station in Egypt which was built under the auspices 
of the 1966 satellite tracking agreement. Cultural contacts 
for 1968 ended in December when the Deputy Minister of Social 
Affairs for Egypt went to the Soviet Union for talks. 
In 1969, cultural contacts between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union began when Politburo member Aleksandr.· N. Shelepin led 
a Soviet Trade Union delegation to Cairo for a conference. 
At the same time, Soviet experts on space were in Egypt to 
discuss the uses and utilization of the new satellite track-
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ing station. In February, a Soviet delegation went to Egypt 
where they negotiated a supplemental protocal on cultural 
contact for 1969. During the same period, membe~s. of the 
Soviet legal profession went to Egypt to observe the work-
ings of its legal system and an Egyptian educational dele-
gation was in the Soviet Union for talks. In March, Soviet 
writers and scientists visited Egypt. While they were in 
Egypt, high officials from Egypt's trade unions were in 
Moscow. During April, a delegation of teachers from Egypt 
went to the Soviet Union to enhance the relationship of the 
two nations in education. One month later, the Egyptian 
Minister of Youth went to the U.S.S.R. for talks with 
Komsomol leaders. While he was there, a Soviet Trade Union 
delegation visited Cairo. In June, an Egyptian Trade Union 
delegation reciprocated by visiting Central Asia, while 
Egyptian food workers toured factories in European Russia. 
The first half of 1969 ended when the Soviets sent a scien-
tif ic mission to Egypt to aid in the continued development 
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of the sciences there. 
1969 was the most active year in the cultural rela-
tionship between the Soviet Union and Egypt during the Nasser 
era. Like that of its first half, the pace of cultural con-
tact between the two in the year's second half was feverish. 
In July, the Egyptian Minister of Higher Education visited 
the Soviet Union for discussions. Religious contact resumed 
when the patriarch of Alexandria visited the U.S.S.R. July 
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also saw a visit to the Soviet Union by Egyptian woodworkers 
to observe the work of their Soviet counterparts. During 
September, an Egyptian radio delegation went to the u.s.S.R. 
and negotiated a protocol on broadcasting exchanges. A month 
later, the Minister of Education from the Soviet Union 
visited Egypt. While there he arranged a protocol which 
called for Soviet assistance in the training of Egyptian in-
dustrial instructors and the building of a labor university 
at Aswan. 
In 1970, the pace of cultural contact between the 
Soviets and the Egyptians slackened somewhat. Contacts for 
the year did not open until May when Egyptian radio officials 
visited Moscow for the centenary of Lenin's birth. Shortly 
thereafter, the Egyptian Minister of Culture was in the 
Soviet Union for talks. May also saw the Lenin Peace Prize 
awarded to an Egyptian author for the first time. In Septem-
ber, a delegation of Egyptian Muslims visited Central Asia 
where they negotiated an agreement with Soviet leaders which 
provided scholarships to Egyptian universities for Soviet 
Moslems. The following month, October, the month that Nasser 
died, contacts in cultural areas went on as usual. Shortly 
after Nasser's death, an Egyptian educational delegation 
visited the Soviet Union for talks. Contacts closed between 
the two nations in November with a visit by officials from 
Egypt's Ministry of Culture to Georgia. 
The cultural relationship between Egypt and the Soviet 
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Union is almost certainly the only facet of their relation-
ship as a whole of which it can be accurately said that its 
effects on each nation were solely positive. Both nations 
had their cultural horizons broadened. Both were able to 
show themselves off in a generally positive light. The 
Egyptians almost certainly gained more in absolute terms in 
the way of aid, development, and cultural broadening from 
the Soviet Union than they gave to it in return, but that 
was based more upon the relative size of the economies and 
populations of the two countries than it was upon what cul-
ture each had to offer. 
The cultural exchanges and contacts between the two 
countries ebbed and flowed with the changing attitudes of 
the leaders of the two countries toward each other. There 
were clear oscillations in the frequency of contact that 
were based upon displeasure or uncertainty toward the other 
nation. The 1959-1962 period is but one example. During 
that period, the Soviets demonstrated their displeasure with 
Nasser's anti-communist campaign by cutting down cultural 
contacts between the two countries. As a result, the cul-
tural facet of the relationship was probably the most sensi-
tive barometer of the short term political attitudes of the 
two nations toward each other. The reason for that is 
clear. The cultural relationship was the least vital ele-
ment of the entire relationship. As such, it could be used 
as an instrument with which each country could demonstrate 
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its displeasure with the policies of the other. 
Saying that there was a lack of negative effects in 
the cultural relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt 
is not to say that there were no costs in the relationship. 
There were. Both sides expended time and money on the inter-
change. Both had to compromise their attitude on certain 
issues as well. The change in the Soviet attitude toward 
Islam is one example of such a change. 
Despite the costs in time and money, and the necessi-
ties of changing long-held beliefs, the relationship ulti-
mately did have many more positive effects than it did costs. 
Unlike other facets of the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and Egypt, the cultural aspect of that relationship is 
one where there was a balance of power and benefit. It was 
the one aspect of the relationship in which the Soviets were 
able to assert themsleves without hurting their ally unduly. 
As a result, it was the one facet of their relationship in 
which the Egyptians were least able to flout Soviet desires, 
and it was the one aspect of that relationship in which they 
seemed the least willing to do so. 
NOTES (Chapter V) 
1) Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreig n Policy Towards Egypt, 
p. 195. 
2) Radio broadcasts in Arabic had been transmitted by 
Soviet stations since 1943. In 1953, the Soviets 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE LEVER AND THE FULCRUM: CONCLUSIONS 
"I always tell my Arab friends and our own Egyptian 
people that, even if the Russians are slow, in the end they 
give us what we want. That is the important thing; and it is 
what makes them different from the Americans," Nasser told 
1 
Alexander Shelepin in January of 1969. This perception on 
the part of Nasser - and the reality that it reflected - is 
perhaps the most important key to understanding the relation-
ship that developed between the Soviets and the Egyptians, 
why it developed, and how it developed during the period in 
which Nasser was the head of the Egyptian state. 
Throughout the preceding pages of this thesis, it has 
been pointed out that, despite the relative disparities in 
size, economic might, military power, and diplomatic influ-
ence between Egypt and the Soviet Union, Egypt consistently 
showed the ability to use Soviet power and influence for its 
own ends. Nasser's statement to Shelepin points out two of 
the most important facets of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship: 
first, Nasser believed - and clearly he had strong grounds for 
his belief - that no matter what he asked the Soviets for, he 
would eventually get whatever he requested of them, whether 
the Soviets were ready to grant those requests immediately or 
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not. The grounds for his belief were and are obvious. He 
knew that Egypt - and, almost as importantly, he - was the 
key to the maintenance of a strong Soviet presence in the 
Middle East. The bases and port facilities that the Soviets 
had been provided with in Egypt and Nasser's prestige and in-
fluence in the rest of the Arab world were almost indispens-
able for the Soviets' policies in the Eastern Mediterranean 
basin. It was this fact which he used as the fulcrum upon 
which he used the lever of diplomacy - in both its persuasive 
and intransigent aspects - to manuever the objectively more 
powerful U.S.S.R. into acquiescing to his demands, often 
against the best judgment of its leaders. Second, and almost 
as important, Nasser's statement reflected his belief that the 
United States could not be manipulated quite so easily for his 
own ends. It would not accede so readily to his desires. It 
was this belief - one learned through the often bitter experi-
ences of both Nasser and his fellow Arab heads of state - that 
initially caused Nasser to turn to the Soviet Union, despite 
his own original bias toward the West. 
The ends which Egypt sought did not necessarily show a 
one-to-one correspondence with Soviet goals and aspirations 
in the Middle East. The Egyptians were often capable of get-
ting their own way despite Soviet aims which ran counter to 
2 
the goals and intentions of Egypt. The Egyptians were capable 
of manipulating the Soviets not because of any special 
political ability on their part - although Nasser was an ex-
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tremely capable politician, as his humiliation of the British 
and the French in 1956 demonstrated - but rather because of 
the focus of the joint policies of the two countries. 
Egypt nearly always had the upper hand when conflicts 
arose between the two erstwhile allies. This situation 
developed because the joint policies of the two countries were 
for the most part only those which were related to events and 
3 
relationships in the Middle East, an area where Egypt was much 
more intimately concerned and therefore had more directly ap-
plicable political power. It was also because of the very 
fact that the resolutions to the situation which gave rise to 
Soviet-Egyptian cooperation were so much more vital to Egypt 
and to Nasser's own political power and survival. For the 
Egyptians the resolution of a problem on their own terms was 
frequently simply a matter of life or death. They needed to 
have problems in the area settled in their fashion. Often, it 
turned out that this was not a manner which jibed exactly 
with Soviet aims. 
However, while necessity may be the mother of invention, 
in international politics it is frequently insufficient in and 
of itself to bring about a solution satisfactory to the 
country which feels its weight. There are ample historical 
examples of nations which have needed to have certain 
questions resolved in a specific way, but which have failed to 
successfully achieve their aspirations and have perished as a 
result. The losers of many European wars and the leaders of 
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the nations which fell victim to Western colonial expansion 
would certainly attest to that statement if they were still 
alive to be questioned. Fortunately for Egypt, over the 
nearly two decades during which Nasser held power, Egypt had 
sufficient might in both the Middle East and in its dealings 
with the Soviets to at least meet its "program minimum." It 
might not - and often did not - always achieve everything that 
it sought or gain all that it asked from the Soviet Union, but 
on any question which was vital to Nasser, the Soviet leaders 
eventually gave him what he requested. Nasser went along his 
own chosen path, particularly in situations where Soviet 
assistance was not requisite and Soviet disapproval was clear, 
still confident that their need of him was greater than any 
anger which his action might engender. 
During the two decades which it spanned, the 
Soviet-Egyptian relationship became quite broad. As we have 
seen, it encompassed most of the diverse aspects through 
which states can interact with one another: military coopera-
tion, diplomatic support, econmic intercourse, and cultural 
exchange. The military aspect of the relationship was the 
first of these to really develop fully. The Czech Arms Deal 
of 1955 opened the door to Egypt for the Soviets, and through 
it that to the rest of the Arab Middle East. 
By concluding the Czech Arms Deal with Egypt, the Soviet 
Union began to establish itself as a power to be reckoned with 
in the Mediterranean basin. While this achievement had 
historical roots which stretch back far into the imperial 
4 
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period of Russian history, it was not until the post-World 
War II period that the Soviet government began to assiduously 
5 
press its suit towards countries in the area. 
The first serious attempt by the Soviet Union to bypass 
the West's containment barrier of Greece, Iran, Iraq, and 
Turkey and assert its influence in the Middle East came with 
its attempts to court the Israelis in 1947. The creation of 
the state of Israel had been viewed with antipathy by the 
Soviets during the pre-war period. They saw it as the 
"expression of the exploiting and great power oppressive 
strivings of the Jewish bourgeoisie . (which) has turned 
itself into a tool of British imperialism to suppress the 
6 
national liberation movement of the Arab masses." Soon 
after World War II ended, when it became apparent that the 
United Kingdom was not terribly pleased with the Zionists' 
aspirations in what was then Palestine, the Soviets began to 
perform a complete turnaround on the question of whether an 
Israeli state should exist. In May of 1947, when Andrei A. 
Gromyko made a speech at the U.N. supporting the partition of 
Palestine if it turned out to be "necessary'', this turnaround 
7 
began to fully manifest itself. The Jews in Palestine 
greeted the Soviets' new attitude with pleasure. It seems 
unlikely that it was simply coincidence that the change in 
the Soviets' attitude came at a time when they were first 
becoming aware of their role as an international superpower, 
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a superpower which needed to counteract its enemies' efforts 
to nullify its potency. Particularly when it was also a time 
when a new potential ally was becoming visible in the Middle 
East. 
The Soviet Union had completed its turnaround on the 
Israeli question by December of that same year when the Arab 
government of Syria suppressed its Communist Party. By May 
1948, the Soviets and the Americans were engaged in a race to 
see who would be the first to recognize the newly founded 
8 
state of Israel. 
The friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Israel was 
shortlived. Lasting only one year, it was, however, in some 
ways both a model for the Soviet-Egyptian friendship which 
was to come and an indicator of the renewed interests of 
Russia in the area. In both the Israeli and Egyptian cases, 
their friendship with the Soviet Union blossomed after a 
sharp turnaround in Soviet bloc policy toward the new regimes. 
In both cases, the relationship entered its "honeymoon" 
period following an arms deal between the leaders of the 
9 
I1iddle Eastern country and Czechoslovakia. 
After the Soviet-Israeli friendship ran aground, the 
Soviets needed a new partner if they were to establish a 
presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Seven years later, 
after the death of Stalin and the Egyptian revolution had 
altered the patterns of both Soviet and Egyptian diplomacy, 
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the U.S.S.R. and Egypt "found" each other and began what 
turned out to be a mutually advantageous relationship that 
lasted nearly a score of years. Unlike its brief Israeli 
predecessor, the Soviet friendship with Egypt established a 
presence for the Soviet Union in the Middle East which still 
has an important impact on the region today. 
Despite its superficial similarities with the transient 
ties between the Soviet Union and Israel, the Soviet-Egyptian 
friendship developed broad and what appeared to be deep 
interreliance between the two countries. The military re-
lationship, which started with a simple if massive arms deal, 
grew into a series of connections which ended with Egypt 
dependent upon weaponry, training, strategic and tactical 
advice, and physical support from the Soviet military if it 
was to maintain its aggressive foreign policy stance 
10 
vis-a-vis Israel. In its turn, the Soviet Union developed a 
more than passing reliance upon the bases and port facilities 
which Egypt provided, and to a lesser degree, upon the test-
ing grounds which were provided by the Arab-Israeli wars. 
It was the military aspect of the relationship in which 
Nasser's almost paradoxical ability to garner his needs from 
the Soviets, despite their own reluctance, was most evident. 
Perhaps it was because the military situation that Egypt 
found itself in was so often so precarious, but in the realm 
of military hardware and aid Nasser always eventually got 
what he wanted from the Soviets. The massive resupply of 
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Egypt after the Six Day War and the sophisticated technology 
with which it was provided in the last stages of the War of 
Attrition are convincing proofs of Nasser's nonpareil ability 
to overcome Soviet reticence. Even more persuasive evidence 
can be adduced from the unparallelled commitment of Soviet 
combat pilots to Egypt's defense just before Nasser died. 
The interdependence which grew out of the ties between 
the militaries of the Soviet Union and Egypt brought with it 
from its inception an increase in the diplomatic contacts 
between the two states. And what started as a simple increase 
in the level of diplomatic intercourse between the Egyptians 
and the Soviets soon became much more. With the Suez Canal 
Crisis of 1956, Soviet political support became an important 
factor in the success of the political machinations of Egypt. 
Egyptian support of the U.S.S.R., while a negligible factor 
in many of the major international contretemps in which the 
Soviets were involved such as those which followed the 
crushing of the Hungarian revolt of 1956, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis in 1962, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
was instrumental in allowing the Soviet Union to cement its 
presence in the Middle East by aiding the development of 
Soviet ties with Syria, Libya, and the PLO. In a somewhat 
different fashion, Soviet-Egyptian friendship was also a 
factor in the growth of the connections between the Soviet 
Union and Iraq. Without the prestige of Egypt and that of 
Nasser himself, the Soviets might never have been able to 
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break the containment barrier of the West. As a result, it 
might never have become a factor in the political calcula-
tions in the Middle East. It almost certainly would not have 
become a staunch supporter of Arab nationalism. The Soviet 
friendship with Egypt, along with the similar relationships 
which it developed with India and to some extent with Cuba, 
also aided the Soviet position throughout the developing 
world by making the Soviets appear to be the friend of the 
Third World, something which the leaders of those countries 
felt was important if they were to throw off the colonial yoke 
11 
of the West. 
Again, Nasser's extraordinary ability to convince the 
Soviets to aid him is readily seen in the realm of diplomacy. 
The high level of Soviet diplomatic support for Egypt after 
the June war (which rose still further in 1969 when Nasser 
committed himself to what the Soviets believed was a 
disastrous course of action, i.e. the War of Attrition) 
demonstrates the extent to which the Soviets became entangled 
in Nasser's webs of diplomacy. 
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt 
continued to blossom beyond its military and diplomatic 
aspects. The connections which had been developed for 
military and political reasons were soon used to institute 
wide economic interaction between the two states. Both low 
interest loans from the U.S.S.R. to Egypt and bilateral trade 
became important factors in the development of the Egyptian 
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economy. The rapid development of the Egyptian economy 
increased the prestige of Nasser and Egypt in the Third World 
in general and among Arab nations in particular. This, in 
turn, benefitted the Soviet position in world politics for a 
plethora of reasons as had Soviet diplomatic support of 
Egypt. 
The low interest economic loans with which the Soviet 
Union had provided Egypt had helped it to modernize rapidly. 
They made Egypt, and by extension Nasser's regime, a model of 
what was needed to throw off the chains of Western imperial-
ism and to develop a strong independent nation. The build-
ing of the Aswan Dam was crucial (particularly when combined 
with Egypt's success in forcing a positive outcome of the 
Suez crisis) in building an image of a strong, able Arab 
regime in Egypt which was capable of accomplishing almost 
anything. After all, hadn't it overcome the military 
efforts of the West to unseat it and accomplished its most 
grandiose economic projects despite the "perfidious" attempts 
of the U.S. and Great Britain to stop it? It was this image 
which allowed Nasser to overcome the nascent internecine 
hostilities which plague the Arab world and forge the 
ill-fated unions with Syria, and with Syria and Iraq. Other 
later loans helped to broaden this strong, newly visible 
economic base which had been constructed in Egypt with the 
help of Soviet loans for the Aswan High Dam. 
If Soviet loans were the basis for the construction of 
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a more modern economy in Egypt, its trade with the Soviet 
Union was the basis for the exploitation of its new economic 
strength. Bilateral trade with the Soviet Union posed 
several problems and provided many benefits for Egypt, many 
of which were discussed in Chapter IV. Bilateral trade pro-
vided only a limited number of commodities available for ex-
change. It inhibited overall trade expansion by its very 
nature and occasionally resulted in a glut of Egypt's main 
money crop, cotton, on the world market when the Soviets re-
sold excess cotton which they had received from Egypt. This 
caused a drop in world prices and the lowering of Egypt's 
hard currency income. In general, however, bilateral trade 
was not a drain on either Egypt's currency reserves or those 
of the U.S.S.R. In fact, the opposite was true. In the same 
manner that long term Soviet loans to the Egyptians lowered 
the outflow of Egypt's hard currency supply, one of the pri-
mary benefits of bilateral trade between the Soviets and the 
Egyptians was its currency saving effect. Trade with the 
U.S.S.R. was barter trade which ensured that both Egypt and 
the Soviet Union would be able to save their hard earned 
currency reserves instead of spending them on trade goods, 
something that would have been impossible if similar sorts of 
12 
commerce had been carried on with the West. 
Soviet loans to and its trade with Egypt increased over 
the years. As the economies of the two countries became 
more intertwined, the Soviet Union became Egypt's main 
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customer and supplier of goods. The Soviets occasionally 
helped Nasser's regime to stave off crises in its grain 
supply by buying excess rice or by providing low cost or 
even no cost wheat and barley in years of drought and famine. 
They went so far as to sell Egypt grain at below market 
prices even when there were major grain shortages in their 
own nation. 
Nasser's ability to manipulate the U.S.S.R. was less 
apparent in the economic sphere than it was in either 
diplomacy or in military matters. Perhaps this was so be-
cause it was generally less crucial than the military and 
diplomatic aspects of their relationship. Still, the Soviets 
did provide Nasser with grain even when there were shortages 
of grain at home and they did cancel large amounts of Egypt's 
debt to them when those debts and Egypt's other economic 
burdens began to approach crisis proportions. As in diplo-
macy and military interaction, it appears that Nasser could 
convince the Soviets that in economic affairs their most im-
portant mission in the Middle East was to maintain and/or 
step up their support to him even in situations where it 
appeared that their short-term interests lay elsewhere. 
With the broadening of trade and aid over the years, 
there came increases in the Soviet-Egyptian tourist trade 
and in other cultural contacts. Unlike trade, the cultural 
interaction between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt was subject to the 
political vicissitudes of their relationship. Because it was 
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affected by the vagaries of the political situation between 
Egypt and the Soviet Union, the cultural aspect of their 
friendship was something of an anomaly. It was also anoma-
lous in that there were few if any negative aspects which 
were manifest in it for either side. The results of their 
cultural interaction in fields like ballet, archaeology, 
physics, drama, and film only benefitted each in the long 
run. 
The anomalies of the cultural relationship between the 
two countries stenuned mainly from a single factor: it was the 
facet of their relationship which the two countries valued 
least. It was the last element of the friendship to develop 
and the one in which the least time and money were spent upon 
development. Because it had relatively little intrinsic 
worth to either Nasser or the Soviet leaders, their cultural 
interaction became curiously important in the overall re-
lationship. It became the one aspect of their relationship 
in which the two countries both felt comfortable when they 
chastised one another in some relatively concrete form. 
Through cultural interaction, the two nations were able to 
conununicate with each other in a much more tangible manner 
13 
than private words between diplomats could achieve. It was 
also less awkward than more or less public attacks in the 
presses of the two nations. As a result, it was usually the 
chosen venue of conununication because it was: a) private; and 
b) palpable. 
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Because they were a means of communicating displeasure, 
changes in the cultural aspect of the Soviet-Egyptian 
relationship was the one in which Nasser was unable to 
induce the Soviets to accede to his whims when they ran 
counter to the Soviets' own goals. It also seems to have 
been the one - and this is not surprising given the lack of 
intrinsic value of culture in the friendship - in which he 
made the fewest attempts to do so. 
When looked at over the course of nearly two decades, 
Nasser's ability to control the Soviet-Egyptian relationship 
is striking. Given the relative might of the two states and 
Egypt's apparent dependence upon Soviet armaments one almost 
certainly would have expected the Soviets to be in command 
of the stiuation, not the Egyptian leader. Most American 
politicians and many Western analysts believed that the 
Soviets were actually the dominant force in the relationship 
14 
at that time. However, such was not the case. The guiding 
hand in the relationship was clearly Nasser's despite the 
heavy dependence of Egypt's economy, its military, and its 
foreign policy upon Soviet largesse. There are relatively 
15 
few explanations for the situation which developed. The 
most sensible seems to be that the Soviet Union was willing 
to pay heavy costs in terms of time, money, and effort in 
order to gain a relatively small advantage in its strategic 
manuevers for power on the world stage. It was even willing 
to give up a great deal of control over the way in which its 
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money and influence was used if that was what was necessary 
to maintain its advantage over the West in Egypt. Of course, 
the Soviets did try to attach as many strings to the aid as 
was possible. Those attempts were, however, ineffective in 
the relationship as it had developed. 
The Soviet Union's behavior in its relationship with 
Egypt may well present a lesson in power in interstate 
politics to students of international relations. It would 
seem from the Soviet-Egyptian case that in a tightly bipolar 
world such as that which developed after World War II, in-
fluence in small states around the world is at a premium. In 
such a situation, Great Powers often may be willing to give 
a great deal more money, time, effort, and influence than 
would otherwise be deemed reasonable in order to gain their 
requirements. Certainly, American behavior toward dictators 
like Diem and Thieu in Vietnam, Batista in Cuba, and even the 
Shah in Iran would seem to confirm that something of the sort 
may well be true, especially in cases where there is 
significant competition between the two superpowers for in-
fluence. In such instances, manuevering for power through 
aid packages reaches the point of diminishing returns. This 
is because in situations of that sort the small state can 
successfully play the more powerful nations off on one 
another, particularly if it is led by an extremely capable 
politician such as Nasser. 
In Egypt's case, its ability to manipulate the Soviet 
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Union and follow an independent path in both its foreign and 
domestic affairs was certainly enhanced by the political 
situation in the Middle East. The region had been polarized 
by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nasser's hardline stance on 
the Palestinian question in its broadest formulation and his 
determination to avenge Egypt's defeats at the hands of the 
Israelis helped to bring hostilities to pass even in 
situations where he did not wish to initiate them. The re-
sulting hostilities brought about crises in Egypt's political 
life and necessitated further bolstering of Nasser's regime 
by the Soviet Union because of the perception of its leaders 
that he was the key to their presence in the Arab world. 
The need to bolster Nasser was heightened further by the need 
to offset American and French military sales to Israel. 
These factors combined with the specter of the return of 
American influence in Egypt to form a vicious escalating 
cycle which produced rising levels of arms expenditures and 
economic support, and ever lessening prospects of political 
control of Nasser and his policies for the U.S.S.R. and its 
leaders. 
The Soviet willingness to go to great lengths to aid 
Nasser seems to have been a consciously, albeit reluctantly, 
accepted commitment. Despite the high costs of their 
chosen course of action, Soviet leaders seemed to respect 
Nasser's political acumen. According to Mohammed Heikal, 
"The Soviets' relations with President Nasser had been very 
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close: they had had their difficult times together, but there 
16 
had never been any secrets between them." Certainly 
Khrushchev, and later both Brezhnev and Kosygin followed 
suit, developed a close personal relationship with Egypt's 
leader. 
The relationship between Nasser and the Soviets was 
close, but as we have seen, it was not always the most 
cordial of relationships. Storms of political controversy 
gathered and broke. The conflict over Nasser's suppression 
of the ECP which erupted between the two allies in November 
1958 and lasted until early 1960 is but one example of the 
great variation that existed in the levels of friendship 
between the two countries. 
The outbreaks of discord, as well as the more common 
high level of cooperation and cordiality, are important 
elements in the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt. 
No understanding of the growth of Soviet-Egyptian friendship, 
its role in Middle Eastern and world politics, its effects 
on each nation involved, and its internal dynamics can be 
considered complete without taking into account - and ex-
plaining the existence of - the conflicts which arose 
between the two allies. 
In one sense explaining the existence of the discord 
between the Soviet Union and Egypt is easy. Conflict be-
tween the two participants is natural in any alliance in 
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which neither actor is completely dominant. Over the course 
of decades countless policy decisions are made by both sides. 
During such an extended period at least a few issues are 
bound to arise on which the interests of the two nations 
diverge. This, however, explains very little about their 
relationship. It is necessary therefore to understand the 
genesis of the periods of discord. 
In the Soviet-Egyptian instance, conflict nearly always 
arose when the Soviets tried to exert some influence over 
Egyptian policies of which they disapproved. Their efforts 
were never successful. The Egyptians, always in control of 
their situation with regard to the Soviets, continued on 
their chosen path. The reason that the Egyptians were able 
to flout Soviet wishes was simple: the arena in which the 
two were involved was Egypt's home territory. As a result, 
the U.S.S.R. had no effective means of coercing Egypt into 
17 
complying with its wishes. 
The reasons behind the consistent pattern of resolu-
tion to the outbreaks of disharmony between the Soviet Union 
and Egypt confirm the insights into the relationship between 
the two states which are presented by Nasser's equally con-
sistent wish to gain what he felt were his needs from the 
Soviets. The alliance was one from which both sides bene-
fitted. The Egyptians received a large influx of military 
hardware, as well as training, advice, and limited physical 
support. They also obtained high levels of economic aid, 
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a good trading partner, international diplomatic assistance 
and cultural broadening. They gained the aid of one of the 
two most powerful nations in the world with only minimal 
outlays of money and effort and the acceptance on their part 
of only a few political and economic limitations. 
The costs to the Egyptians from their ties with the 
U.S.S.R. were low in economic terms because what they offered 
the Soviet Union was intangible. Merely allowing the Soviet 
Union to establish a presence in the Middle East was Egypt's 
payment for all of the concrete aid which it received from 
the Soviet Union. Connections with the Soviet Union presented 
Moscow with an alliance with the most populous, politically 
and culturally important, and militarily powerful nation in 
the Arab world. Even more, Egypt was an advantageously 
located nation which was anxious to develop, and develop upon 
progressive, quasi-socialist lines. Beyond the intrinsic 
value of ties with such a nation, cooperation with, and aid 
to, Egypt offered the Soviet Union a golden opportunity to 
escape the "containment barrier" of the West which surrounded 
it and to extend its international involvement and power over 
a much broader portion of the world than had theretofore been 
possible. It allowed Moscow to become intimately and 
legitimately involved in all sorts of questions - in both the 
U.N. and other less public forums, such as diplomatic 
tete-a-tetes with the U.S. - throughout the world in ways that 
might well have still seemed laughable in other world capitals 
270 
in the years immediately following World War II. Given the 
tremendous advantages which were offered by an alliance with 
Egypt, it seems to present little wonder that the Soviets 
allowed Nasser to have the guiding hand in their relationship 
in order to avoid its loss. 
Looked at in this light and in the lights which it shed 
by the circumstances from which it arose, the development of 
a close-knit alliance between two such sociopolitically dis-
parate nations as Egypt and the Soviet Union becomes under-
standable. In fact, given the hostility which the West 
exhibited toward Egyptian aspirations - in seemingly legiti-
mate instances like N.E.A.C.C.'s refusal to rearm the 
Egyptians with newer, better, and more numerous weaponry 
after their war with Israel in 1948-49, in more questionable 
situations such as the renege on the Aswan loans, and in 
cases of naked aggression such as the Suez Canal Crisis -
it seems that it was the almost inevitable outcome of the 
political circumstances of the world and the Middle East in 
the 1950's and 1960's. 
Why the relationship developed in the manner in which 
it did is also easy to comprehend. Given the needs and 
strengths of both countries, they were ideally mated. Given 
their arena of action, it is little surprise that Egypt, led 
by a man as politically astute as Nasser proved himself to 
be, was dominant in the overwhelming majority of the 
decisions which involved the two countries. 
271 
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt was 
one of inunense value for both participants. It shaped the 
development of Egypt domestically and internally and the 
development of the Soviet Union in world affairs. By alter-
ing the political futures of these two nations (one the most 
Arab nation in the world and one of the two most important 
nations in the Middle East, the other one of the world's two 
dominant superpowers) the Soviet-Egyptian relationship helped 
to shape directly the politics and history of the world and 
its Middle Eastern region for nearly two decades. 
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Notes (Chapter VI) 
1) Mohanuned Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 67. Nasser was 
expressing gratitude to the Soviets on the occasion of 
the deliveries of the first SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles 
to Egypt. 
2) Again the Egyptian entry into the War of Attrition and 
its suppression of the Communist party at various times 
are perfect examples. 
3) By the end of the Nasser period, Soviet-Egyptian coopera-
tion had broadened from its narrow regional focus and 
begun to operate on extraregional issues. Egypt's 
recognition of the German Democratic Republic and its 
support of North Vietnam in its war with the United 
States are cases in point. For other examples of the 
sorts of issues that Egypt and the Soviet Union co-
operated upon outside of the Middle East, see Alvin 
Rubinstein's appendices in Red Star on the Nile. 
4) For a fairly good synopsis of Russia's historical at-
tempts to penetrate into the Middle East, see Aaron 
Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins, 1970), pp. 27-37. 
5) For example, in what almost seems to have been a flight 
of whimsy, Stalin requested a Soviet trusteeship over 
Libya at the Potsdam Conference. U.S. Department of 
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Confer-
ence of Berlin, Vol. II (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1960), pp. 253-255 and 264-266. Also 
see Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam 
Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 
pp . 3 0 7- 3 0 8 . 
6) Arnold Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and 
the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1953 (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1974), p. 7. 
7) Ibid, p. 22. Also see Mary Newcomb Allen, The Policy 
of U.S.S.R. towards the State of Israel, 1948-1958 
(London: n.p. [dissertation], 1961) for a good chrono-
logical account of early relations between the Soviets 
and Israel. 
8) The question of who won the race is still a point of 
mild contention. Succinctly put, the U.S. was the first 
state to extend de facto recognition to the Israelis -
it did so within fifteen minutes of the Israeli declara-
tion of independence - and the U.S.S.R. was the first to 
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extend the new Israeli regime de jure recognition. See 
Krammer, ibid, pp. 28-30 and Philip M. Brown, "The 
Recognition of Israel," The American Journal of Inter-
national Law, XLII (July, 1948), pp. 621-623. 
9) In the Israeli case, the arms deal with Czechoslovakia 
had come through still another party (Nicaraguan leader 
Anastasio Somoza) before Israel had even become a state. 
Krammer, ibid, p. 59. 
10) For a summary of the costs of the military relationship 
to both the Soviets and Egypt, see Chapter II. 
11) The Soviet concern for the nations of the Third World, 
like that of most states for one another, was motivated 
more by self-interest than by altruism. The Soviets 
clearly believed that by supporting anti-colonialist 
nationalist movements of the world's developing nations 
they were weakening the West. That had been a clear 
theme of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East and 
the rest of the world since at least 1956. For a look 
at its current role in Soviet Middle Eastern policy, see 
Michael Lenker, "The Effect of the Iran-Iraq War on 
Soviet Strategy in the Persian Gulf" in Gulf Security 
and the Iran-Iraq War edited by Thomas Naff (Washington: 
National Defense University Press, 1985). Whether this 
goal was being pursued for traditional Great Power 
motives or for ideological reasons such as weakening the 
foundation of world capitalism, thus hastening its 
collapse and the subsequent reorganization of the world 
along the lines that Marx envisioned, is unimportant from 
the point of view of this work. What is important is its 
effect: it helped speed the development of the U.S.S.R. 
as a world superpower. 
12) For a discussion of the effects of bilateral trade on 
Third World nations, see Carole Sawyer, Communist Trade 
with Developing Countries, 1955-1965 (New York: Preger, 
19 6 6) ' pp . 5 7- 6 3 . 
13) Egypt's withdrawal of its students from study in the 
universities of the Soviet Union is an example of how 
cultural interchange was used as an avenue of communica-
tion. In turn, the Soviets used decreases in tourism 
levels and in cultural contacts to let the Egyptians 
know that they were pursuing a policy of which the 
Soviets disapproved. 
14) Dulles is certainly one example of an American politician 
who feared that the "red menace" was about to become en-
trenched in Egypt. His memoirs are filled with fore-
boding about the prospect. Scholarly work in the West 
from the fifties, sixties, and seventies is no less 
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inaccurate in its perception of the nature of the 
Soviet-Egyptian relationship. See for example, Michel 
Salomon, Mediterranee Rouge: un nouvelle empire 
Sovietique? (Paris: Laffont, 1972); Lawrence L. Whetten, 
The Soviet Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (New 
York: National Strategy Information Center, Paper #10, 
1971); and Jaan Pennar, "Moscow and Socialism in Egypt," 
Problems of Communism, Volume XV, #5 (May 1966). 
15) For instance, Soviet leaders might have been extremely 
selfless individuals who were willing to give Egypt 
nearly unlimited amounts of aid out of sheer altruism. 
They might have been naive blunderers of whom advantage 
was easily taken. Nasser might have been a political 
genius who could easily manipulate the leadership of the 
U.S.S.R. It might have been a fluke brought about by a 
chance confluence of random events. There is probably a 
modicum of truth in each of these explanations. It seems 
likely, however, that the overwhelmingly dominant factor 
in causing the situation to develop as it did was that 
the Soviet position was based upon a conscious decision 
which had been reached from their calculations of the 
long-term benefits of solid entrenchment in the Middle 
East. 
16) Heikal, op cit, p. 113. Khrushchev confirms both the 
respect and the personal closeness in his memoirs. See 
Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 435-438. 
17) The key word is effective. Although the Soviets did 
have the availability of the threat of an aid cut as a 
weapon, the Egyptians had several effective counters to 
such a suggestion, i.e., ejection of Soviet forces from 
their bases or a turn toward the U.S. 
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Figura # 1. The official trade of the Soviet Union with Eqypt, 1917-

































































































































































































Sources: Roger A. Clark, Soviet Economic Facts, 1917-1970; and, 
Vneshniaia Torgovliia (various years). 
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Figure # 2. Egyptian Armaments as of June 1967. 
2410 Tanks, Armored Personnel Carriers, and Assault guns: 
Soviet supplied: Also: 
350 T-34 medium tanks 
500 T-54/55 medium tanks 
60 IS-III heavy tanks 
30 Mark 3 Centurion medium 
20 AMX 13 light tanks 
90 Sherman medium tanks 
guns 150 su-100 self-propelled 
1160 BTR-40, BTR-152, and BTR 50(P) Armored Personnel Carriers 
1,600 artillery piec~s 
540 field guns 
130 medium guns 
200 120mm mortars 
695 anti-tank guns 
a few Snapper (Shmel) anti-tank missile units 
some Katyusha-type tactical rocket launchers 
a few other tactical surf ace-to-surf ace rockets 
500 combat aircraft 
30 TU-16 medium bombers 
40-43 IL-28 light bombers 
120-163 MiG-21 C/D interceptors 
40-80 MiG-19 all-weather fighters or fighter-bombers 
15-55 SU-7 fighter-bombers 
100-150 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers 
also: 
150 SAM-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile installations 
Major naval combat vessels 
4 "Skoryi" destroyers 
8 "S.O. 1 11 Subchaser/corvettes 
8 "OSA" Guided-missile patrol boats 
5 "Romeo" submarines 
6 "W" submarines 
1 "MV" submarine 
tanks 
7 "Komar" Guided-missile patrol boats 
1 "Shershem" Motor torpedo boats 
36 "P6" Motor torpedo boats 
6 "T43" Fleet minesweepers 
2 11T301 11 Inshore minesweepers 
also: 
6 Yugoslav-made motor torpedo boats 4 British-made destroyers 
Sources: Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs; Wynfred Joshua and 
Stephen Gilbert, Arms for the Third World; the Military Balance, 
1967-1968; and, Edgar O'Ballance The Third Arab-Israeli War. 
278 
Figure # 3 soviet-Western Detente and qualitative changes in 
Russian military involvement in Eqypt and the Middle East, 1953-1974. 
Periods of Detente Year 
1953 
1954 





Spirit of Camp David 1960 
1961 
1962 














Czech Arms Deal. Provides 
second-line Soviet equip-
ment and small strategic 
bombing capability. 
Provision of first-line 
Soviet military equipment 
and enlarged strategic 
bombing capability 
Commitment of Soviet air-
defense personnel 
Provision of assured pene-
tration strategic weapons 
and resupply during war 
Source: Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, p.180. 
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Fiqure # 4. Equipment and materials supplied for works being 
built in Egypt through Soviet assistance, 1955-1972 (millions of 
U.S. dollars). 
Year 1955 1960 1965 1970 1972 
Total expendtures going 
to Egypt 
Total machinery 




68.9 206.4 363.0 
23.2 136.2 165.3 
17.4 86.0 78.5 
* Project aid ceased to appear as one of the elements of 
Soviet-Egyptian trade in Vneshniaia Torgovliia after 1970. 
Sources: Vneshniaia Torgovliia SSSR: and Karen Dawisha, Soviet 




Fiqure # 5. Egyptian Trade, 1955-1970 (Millions of U.S. Dollars). 
Imports Exports Total Trade 
Year World USSR CPE World USSR CPE World USSR CPE 
1955 539 6.63 * 419 20.15 * 957 26.78 * 1956 535 22.64 * 409 16.60 * 944 39.24 * 1957 547 53.38 * 493 99.77 * 1040 142.16 * 1958 667 79.38 * 478 82.05 * 1145 161. 44 * 1959 639 85.72 * 461 81.51 * 1099 158.41 * 1960 667 76.90 * 568 88.63 * 1235 165.53 * 1961 701 80.88 * 486 60.73 * 1187 153.79 * 1962 740 60.42 * 398 60.73 * 1138 121.15 * 1963 916 49.08 * 520 101.80 * 1436 150.89 * 1964 953 74.08 * 537 96.37 * 1490 170.45 * 1965 934 84.16 * 604 30.38 * 1538 214.52 * 1966 1070 94.77 * 604 42.55 * 1674 237.73 * 1967 792.00 165.19 323.91 566.12 41.07 276.42 1358.12 306.26 700.32 
1968 665.96 106.23 260.72 621.68 74.69 297.81 1286.64 280.92 558.53 
1969 637.64 86.48 195.69 745.05 246.17 392.88 1382.68 332.65 588.58 
1970 786.60 95.56 242.54 761.71 281.61 448.76 1548.31 377.17 691.20 
Source: U.N. Statistical Trade Yearbook (applicable years) 
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Figure # 6. Soviet Trade, 1955-1970 (millions of U.S. dollars). 
Imports 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Developed Market 430 * * 610 710 1168 1050 1270 1270 Economies 
Centrally Planned 2289 * * 3200 3780 3817 3850 4310 4720 Economies 
Developing Market 185 * * 325 425 638 710 710 730 Economies 
Egypt 15 26 90 92 83 121 87 66 111 
World 3061 3264 3639 4140 4930 5623 5610 6290 6840 
* Figures not kept for 1956 & 1957 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1972 
Developed Market 1750 1919 1720 1870 2190 2540 3070 4472 
Economies 
Centrally Planned 4890 5074 4860 5350 5880 6290 6862 9699 
Economies 
Developing Market 850 638 1060 1060 1060 1220 1788 1857 
Economies 
Egypt 111 163 135 131 154 229 311 299 
World 7590 8057 7640 9280 9110 10050 11719 13753 
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Fiqure # 6 (continued). 
Exports 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Developed Market 553 * * 760 940 1069 1130 1220 1360 Economies 
Centrally Planned 2723 * * 3090 4080 4000 4470 4600 4900 Economies 
Developing Market 91 * * 450 425 970 1350 1300 1320 Economies 
Egypt 11 23 53 79 79 70 98 93 122 
World 3468 3610 4390 4300 5440 5559 6000 7030 7270 
* Figures not kept for 1956 & 1957 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Developed Market 1460 1639 2000 2230 2420 2580 2717 3080 
Economies 
Centrally Planned 4900 5031 5180 5530 6220 6810 7389 8023 
Economies 
Developing Market 1320 1496 1660 1880 2000 2260 2682 2002 
Economies 
Egypt 140 209 188 179 253 239 363 321 
World 7680 8166 8840 9650 10630 11660 12787 15631 
Sources: Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt; U.N. 
Statistical Trade Yearbook (various years) 



























sources: Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreiqn Policy Towards Eqypt; and, 
R.D McLaurin, The Middle East in Soviet Foreiqn Policy. 
Fiqure # 8. Eqyptian Students abroad (1959-1972). 
Year USSR UK us Total (USSR, UK, !_ US) At Home ---
1959 138 725 577 1440 92941 
1961 240 923 344 1507 107789 
1963 240 1217 452 1909 145651 
1965 240 1059 426 1733 177123 
1966 203 993 328 1524 179100 
1969 450 1015 178 1643 197055 
1972 1351 1148 362 2801 272259 
Sources: Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreiqn Policy Towards Egypt; R.D. 
McLaurin, The Middle East in Soviet Policy; and, Charles B. 
McLane, Soviet-Middle Eastern Relations. 
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F iql.".re # 9 • Major cultural missions exchanged between the USSR 
and Egypt, 1952-1970 (number per year). 
Year 
Soviet to E~ Egyptian to the USSR Total 
1952 0 0 0 
1953 0 0 0 
1954 0 0 0 
1955 2 1 3 
1956 1 2 3 
1957 3 2 5 
1958 1 8 9 
1959 1 2 3 
1960 1 0 1 
1961 2 0 2 
1962 1 2 3 
1963 5 2 7 
1964 2 0 2 
1965 0 0 0 
1966 3 0 3 
1967 2 3 5 
1968 3 5 8 
1969 4 13 17 
1970 12 9 21 
Sources: Charles B. McLane, Soviet-Middle Eastern Relations; 
Robert Slusser & Jan Triska, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957; 
Robert Slusser & George Ginsburgs, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 
1957-1973; Alvin z. Rubinstein, Red star on the Nile; and Sbornik 
deistvuiushchikh dogorov, soglashenii i konventsii, 
zakliuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami (various years). 


































* Fiqures for Soviet tourists entering Eqypt are only 
infrequently available. Usually Soviets entering Eqypt are 
classified as visitors from "other countries" by the Egyptian 
government. Although they are sketchy the fiqures which are 
available do seem to show the expected overall rising trend and 
they also seem to be reflective of changes in the level of 
cordiality in the relationship between the u.s.s.R. and Egypt 
(e.g., The decrease in svoiet tourism in 1959 would be the 
expected result of the increased hostility which followed 
Nasser's suppression of the ECP in late 1958 and 1959. The 
rising rate of tourism in 1968 and 1969 would seem to be 
indicative of the high level of cooperation which followed the 
June 1967 between Israel and the Arab nations). 
Sources: United Arab Republic State Tourist Administration, 
Trends of the Travel Movement (Cairo: U.A.R. Tourist 
Administration, 1960); and International Travel Statistics 
(London: International Union of Official Travel Organizations, 
1953-1971). 
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